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IN CELEBRATION OF THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LL.M.
PROGRAM IN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF ARKANSAS SCHOOL OF LAW, THE JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW &
POLICY DEDICATES THIS ISSUE IN RECOGNITION OF THE LL.M.
PROGRAM.
ALL OF THE PUBLISHED ESSAYS AND ARTICLES ARE WRITTEN BY
ALUMNI OR CURRENT LL.M. CANDIDATES. THE ISSUE BEGINS WITH
AN ESSAY THAT MARKS THE FIRST HISTORICAL REFLECTION ON THE
LL.M. PROGRAM.

The Arkansas LL.M. Program: Forty Years of Leadership
Susan A. Schneider*
The University of Arkansas School of Law has been a leader
in agricultural law education for over forty years through its
innovative LL.M. Program in Agricultural and Food Law. I am proud
to serve as the current Director of this Program and as one of its
alumni. This essay memorializes the history of this signature
Program and charts its progress through the decades as agricultural
law issues evolved and the discipline expanded.
I. Beginnings: First in the Nation
Over four decades ago, the University of Arkansas School of
Law created a new specialized LL.M. Program focusing on
agricultural law. Arkansas was the first law school to endorse
agricultural law as a specialty worthy of graduate study, and its
leadership was instrumental in establishing agricultural law as a
discipline. This section of my essay recounts the creation of the
LL.M. Program at Arkansas and describes its formative years.
In February 1977, the University of Arkansas Law School
faculty approved in principle the creation of a post-J.D. graduate
program, i.e., an LL.M. degree program.1 The following June, the
faculty approved the broad outlines of a generalist graduate program
as was proposed by the faculty Committee on Graduate Programs.2
While the faculty supported the creation of this general program, they
also called for a study of the feasibility of a specialized program
focusing on agricultural law.3
Agricultural law is the study of the law as applied to the
agricultural sector. Agriculture is uniquely suited for this type of

*

Susan A. Schneider is the William H. Enfield Professor of Law and serves as the
Director of the LL.M. Program in Agricultural and Food Law at the University of
Arkansas School of Law.
1 Univ. of Ark. Sch. of L. Faculty, Excerpts from the Faculty Minutes Relating to
the Agricultural Law Program: February 1977 to March 1979, at June 20, 1977
(1977) (on file with author).
2 Id. Univ. of Arkansas School of Law Faculty Minutes, June 20, 1977 (on file with
author). The motion was based on a memorandum from the Committee on Graduate
Programs, composed of law faculty members S. Nickles, R, Knowlton, and M.
Gitelman, Chairperson.
3 Memorandum from the Comm. on Graduate Programs to the Univ. of Ark. Sch. of
L. Faculty (Feb. 20, 1978) (on file with the author). Committee members were C.
Carnes, R. Fairbanks, and M. Gitlelman.
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study because so many legal exceptions and special provisions apply
to the agricultural sector.
“Agricultural exceptionalism,” i.e., the use of legal
exceptions to protect the agricultural industry, is pervasive.
This term is often used to reference its American origins in
labor law, where agricultural laborers are excluded from
many of the protections afforded to other workers. However,
the concept is evident throughout the law, with farmers
protected from involuntary bankruptcy, exempted from
many environmental regulations, and excepted from antitrust restrictions. The first use of the term is often credited to
international trade scholarship, where special exceptions are
also evident in other countries.4
In the mid-1970s, there was growing interest in considering
agricultural law as a new discipline. Expanding export markets, high
farmland values, the increasing size of farm operations, and the use
of new contracting arrangements fueled the need for specialized legal
services.5 This peaked the Arkansas Law faculty’s interest, and the
Committee on Graduate Programs was tasked with exploring the
feasibility of developing an LL.M. program in agricultural law in
addition to the general studies LL.M.
The Committee reviewed a survey conducted by the
American Association of Law School (AALS) that reported twentyseven different legal specialties offered by graduate programs at U.S.
law schools, with none focused on agricultural law. The committee
consulted with Professor Drew Kershen of the University of
Oklahoma College of Law. Professor Kershen was one of only a
handful of law professors who taught agricultural law courses and
seminars at that time. The Committee reported its conclusions to the
faculty in a 1978 memorandum.
After the meeting, the Committee was convinced that an
LL.M. program in Agricultural Law would (1) be sound
doctrinally and intellectually, (2) meet government and
private sector professional needs, (3) attract qualified
students, and (4) produce job-marketable specialists.6

4

Susan A. Schneider, A Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of
Food, Farming, and Sustainability, 34 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 935,
936 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
5 Neil D. Hamilton, The Study of Agricultural Law in the United States: Education,
Organization and Practice, 43 ARK. L. REV. 503, 511 (1990).
6 Memorandum from the Comm. on Graduate Programs, supra note 3.
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Based on the Committee recommendation, the law faculty
voted to create a specialized LL.M. Program in Agricultural Law and
gave the development of this program priority over the development
of a general program.7
The subsequent proposal for the creation of this “innovative
and unique”8 program was presented by the University of Arkansas
to the Arkansas Department of Higher Education in 1978. This
proposal described the program as follows:
“The LL.M. in Agricultural Law will be administered by the
School of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, as a
post-J.D. program to provide specialized training in a rapidly
developing, particularly complex area of law, technology,
and government regulation with international, national,
regional, and statewide impacts. The purpose of the program
will be to train a small number of carefully selected attorneys
as specialists in the legal problems of agricultural
production, distribution, and marketing. Graduates of the
program will enter both the public and private sector as
highly trained specialists available to large law firms
representing agri-business interests, large corporations
engaged in agricultural processing, marketing and
distribution, government agencies closely involved in
agriculture (Dept. of Agriculture, State Dept., Commerce
Dept.), and academic institutions seeking to provide
curricular offerings in the agricultural law area.”9
The proposal called for implementation of the new program
in the 1979-80 academic year with the hiring of a faculty director and
the enrichment of the law library’s agricultural law holdings. An
additional faculty member would be hired for 1980-81, and six
fellowship students would be admitted for the inaugural class. A third
faculty member would be hired in 1981-82, with six additional
fellowship students admitted. “About ten additional courses or
seminars” would be created, with these courses available to second
and third-year law students at the University of Arkansas.10
The program was approved by the Arkansas Department of
Higher Education in 1979, and it was subsequently approved by the

7

Univ. Of Ark. Sch. of L. Faculty, supra note 1, at Feb. 28, 1978.
Letter from Milton Copeland, Acting Dean, Univ. Ark. Sch. of L., to Charles E.
Bishop, President, Univ. of Ark. (Sept. 21, 1978) (on file with author).
9 Id.
10 Id.
8

2022]

ARKANSAS LL.M. PROGRAM

4

AALS and the Section of Legal Education and Admissions of the
American Bar Association.11
The law school hired Jerry Wayne (Jake) Looney in 1980 as
the inaugural director of the new LL.M. Program. Professor Looney
already had a distinguished background in agricultural law with dual
master’s degrees in Animal Science and Agricultural Economics and
a J.D. from the University of Missouri - Kansas City. He had teaching
experience at the University of Missouri, Virginia Tech, and Kansas
State and had a solid publication record in agricultural law. 12
As director of the new program, Professor Looney was
tasked with developing policies and procedures for the program and
guiding its formation. Professor Looney presented the faculty with
proposed policies in December 1980 and noted that the University
had committed to add a second LL.M. faculty member in 1981.13 The
law school honored this commitment and hired Neil D. Hamilton, a
young attorney from Iowa who was already making his mark in the
agricultural law community.14 At the time he was hired, Hamilton
served as Assistant Attorney General for the state of Iowa, working
in the Farm Division.15 He assisted Professor Looney with plans for
the new Program, and the inaugural LL.M. class was welcomed in
the Fall of 1981.16
In 1982, Professor Looney became Dean of the Law School,
and in 1983, Professor Don Pedersen was hired as the new Director
of the LL.M.17 Program. Professor Pedersen was an experienced
agricultural law teacher, scholar, and practitioner. He taught at
Capital University Law School, where his courses included Farm
Labor Law, and at William Mitchell College of Law, where he taught
Agricultural Law, with publications across a wide variety of
agricultural law related subjects.18 He was also an experienced
agricultural law practitioner. Professors Looney, Pedersen, and

11

UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L. SELF STUDY, THE GRADUATE AGRICULTURAL LAW
PROGRAM 3 (1986) (on file with author) (hereinafter, 1986 SELF STUDY).
12 Id. See also J.W. Looney, Former School of Law Dean, Dies at Age 74, UNIV. OF
ARK. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://news.uark.edu/articles/45276/j-w-looneyformer-school-of-law-dean-dies-at-age-74.
13 Memorandum from Jake Looney to Law Faculty 4 (Dec. 1, 1980) (on file with
author).
14 1986 SELF STUDY, supra note 11, at 3, 4.
15 Interview with Neil D. Hamilton, Retired Dean, Univ. of Ark. Sch. of L. (Mar. 29,
2022).
16 1986 SELF STUDY, supra note 11, at 3.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 14, 15.
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Hamilton are credited with being the three founders of the LL.M.
Program.
The Arkansas law faculty can be commended for
recognizing the importance of agricultural law as an emerging
discipline, but even with their great foresight, they could not have
imagined the explosion of legal issues during the first decade of the
LL.M. Program. The Farm Crisis of the 1980’s has been
characterized as “a defining period for agriculture in the United
States” and the “worst financial crisis [on the farm] since the Great
Depression.”19 Professor Looney described the situation in a 1985
law review article:
“[T]he current financial distress in agriculture portends other
even more dramatic changes for the farm sector and for rural
communities. Increasing debt-to-asset ratios, cash flow
problems, business failures and bankruptcies combined with
depressed land and machinery markets not only threaten the
continued viability of the farm sector, but also have adverse
effects on farm suppliers and lenders. The cumulative effect
of these financial problems on rural communities is of
particular concern.”20
The need for specialized expertise to navigate the economic
upheaval within the agricultural sector and the complex legal issues
that arose confirmed agricultural law’s status as a discipline worthy
of recognition by both the academy and the bar, with the University
of Arkansas as a recognized leading force.21
The American Agricultural Law Association (AALA) was
formed in 1980 “to further the development and dissemination of
knowledge about agricultural law.”22 One early meeting to discuss
forming the organization was held in Iowa in the summer of 1980,
19

Barry J. Barnett, The U.S. Farm Financial Crisis of the 1980s, 74 AGRIC. HIST.
366, 366 (2000).
20 J.W. Looney, Agricultural Law and Policy: A Time for Advocates, 30 S.D. L. REV.
193, 194 (1985).
21 Arkansas LL.M. faculty have consistently produced scholarship addressing the
special issues presented in agricultural law, and in the 1980’s this scholarship
provided timely information on the financial issues presented. See, e.g., J.W.
Looney, Protecting the Farmer in Grain Marketing Transactions, 31 DRAKE L. REV.
519 (1982); Neil D. Hamilton & J.W. Looney, Federal and State Regulation of
Warehouses and Grain Warehouse Bankruptcy, 27 S.D. L. REV. 334 (1982); Janet
Flaccus, J.W. Looney, Donald B. Pedersen & Mary Davies Scott, Representing
Farmers in Financial Distress, 20 ARK. LAW. 150 (1986).
22 Leo P. Martin, Agricultural Law Association Forms at Law School; Discusses
Taxes, Financing, Zoning, Conservation, QUAERE, Jan. 1981, at 1 (on file with
author).
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with Professor Looney in attendance along with future Arkansas hire,
Neil Hamilton, representing the Farm Division of the Iowa Attorney
General’s Office.23 The official meeting to convene the new
association was held in December 2000 at the University of
Minnesota with all three of the LL.M. founders in attendance,
although at that time, only Professor Looney had been hired by the
University of Arkansas, and the LL.M. Program was being
developed.24
Several years later, the AALA was housed at the University
of Arkansas with Bill Babione, an LL.M. graduate at the helm as
Executive Director.25 The three founders of the LL.M. Program,
Professors Looney, Hamilton and Pedersen all served as Presidents
of the AALA during its formative years.26 Professor Pedersen
coordinated and edited the monthly AALA publication, The Ag Law
Update.27
When Professor Looney developed the policies and
procedures for the new LL.M. Program, a proposed curriculum was
drafted. The following courses, all to be created as new courses that
were likely not offered at any other law school in the United States,
were proposed:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Agricultural Finance & Credit
Agricultural Cooperatives
International Agricultural Trade
Government Regulation of Agriculture
Agriculture and Environmental Control
Farm Estate and Business Planning
Commodities Trading and Regulation

When Professor Pedersen was hired in 1983, one of his first
scholarly projects was developing an agricultural law casebook. In
1985, West Publishing released the book AGRICULTURAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS authored by Professor Pedersen, Keith
Meyer (University of Kansas School of Law), Norman W. Thorson
23

Interview with Neil D. Hamilton, supra note 15.
See Leo P. Martin, Agricultural Law Association Forms at Law School: Discusses
Taxes, Financing, Zoning, Conservation, QUAERE, Jan. 1981, at 1 (showing
Professors Looney and Pedersen); Interview with Neil D. Hamilton, supra note 15.
25 Margaret Rosso Grossman, The American Agricultural Law Association: 1991
and Beyond, 68. N.D. L. REV. 255, 256 (1992).
26 AALA Past Presidents and Directors, AM. AGRIC. L. ASS’N., https://www.aglawassn.org/aala-past-presidents/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
27 See, e.g., Am. Agric. L. Ass’n, 2 THE AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Jan. 1985, at 2, available
at https://www.aglaw-assn.org/wp-content/uploads/01-85.pdf. (crediting Professor
Don Pedersen as editorial liaison).
24
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(University of Nebraska) and John H. Davidson (University of South
Dakota).28 Publication of this extensive casebook made it possible
for law professors across the country to teach an agricultural law
survey course without having to create the course from scratch. This
furthered the discipline and allowed more students to consider
agricultural law as a career path. I was one of those fortunate
students. My professor at the University of Minnesota Law School,
Professor Gerald Torres, relied on a draft manuscript of the casebook
when I took his new Agricultural Law class in 1984.29
Under Professor Pedersen’s leadership, the new LL.M.
Program thrived. The Law School’s 1985 Self Study contains a
chapter on the LL.M. Program and its important contributions to the
law school and the agricultural community.30 The Program
successfully addressed two program policy issues that were
hampering the graduation rates of the candidates: the thirty credit
degree requirement and the thesis requirement. Although at the time
other LL.M. Programs in the United States required only twenty-four
credits for the LL.M. degree, Arkansas’s program required 30.
Professor Pedersen and the Graduate Legal Studies Committee also
proposed a “non-thesis option,” that was “common to American
graduate education” and would better serve those candidates who
were not focused on an academic career. Both proposals were passed
by the faculty and the appropriate university bodies.31
In 1985, the required courses in the Program were
Colloquium in Agricultural Law, Research Seminar in Agricultural
Law I, and Economics of Agricultural Policy. The economics course
was offered through the Agricultural Economics department of the
University’s School of Agriculture. “Non-thesis option” candidates
were also required to take a new Research Seminar in Agricultural
Law II course.32 Twelve elective courses were available, with most
also available to JD students:
•
•
•
•
•
28

International Agricultural Transactions
Regulation of Agricultural Lands
Agricultural Taxation
Farm Estate and Business Planning
Agricultural Cooperatives

See KEITH G. MEYER, DONALD B. PEDERSEN, NORMAN W. THORSON, & JOHN H.
DAVIDSON, AGRICULTURAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1984).
29 Susan A. Schneider, Thoughts on Agricultural Law and the Role of the American
Agricultural Law Association, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1 (2005).
30 See 1986 SELF STUDY., supra note 11, at 2-3.
31 See id. at 5-7.
32 Id. at 8.
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Agricultural Finance and Credit
Agricultural Labor Law
Forestry Law & Policy
Food and Drug Law33

A few JD classes were recognized as appropriate for LL.M.
candidates and Administrative Law was a required background
class.34
When Professor Neil Hamilton left Arkansas to take a
position with Drake Law School, the Law School did not replace
him. The Law School justified this decision by noting that the LL.M.
students “deserve to be exposed to various members of the law
faculty” and recognizing that the “highly specialized nature of the
agricultural law courses” made it difficult to replace someone who
left.35 “By having wide faculty involvement, the loss of a particular
teacher should not cripple the program or create undue problems if a
replacement cannot immediately be found.”36 While law school
financial constraints and JD faculty hires likely contributed to this
decision, the result was the same. Law faculty were recruited to teach
in the LL.M. Program. Given the “highly specialized nature” of the
courses, these faculty members often had to learn new subject matter
and then develop their own course materials.37 Dean Looney also
continued to teach Government Regulation of Agriculture in the
program while serving as dean.38
JD faculty members that were recruited to teach agricultural
law courses were Professor Lonnie Beard (Agricultural Taxation and
Farm Estate and Business Planning), Professor Mary Beth Matthews
(Agricultural Cooperatives), Professor Linda Malone (Regulation of
Agricultural Lands), Professor Charles Carnes (Agricultural Labor
Law) and Professor Robert B. Leflar (Food and Drug Law).
Professor Christopher Kelley taught Forestry Law and Policy as an
adjunct.39
Professor Pedersen handled all aspects of Program
management, including recruitment, placement, alumni relations,
and reporting duties and had an exhaustive teaching load. He taught
Agricultural Colloquium, Research Seminar in Agricultural Law I
33

See id. at 9-11.
See id. at 12.
35 Id.
36 UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L. SELF STUDY, THE GRADUATE AGRICULTURAL LAW
PROGRAM 11-12 (1986) (on file with author) (hereinafter, 1986 SELF STUDY).
37 See id. at 13.
38 Id. at 10.
39 See id. at 10-11.
34
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and II, Agricultural Finance and Credit, International Agricultural
Transactions, and a JD survey course in Agricultural Law.40 From
the Law School’s 1986 Self Study:
All of the students are impressed with the expertise and
tireless efforts of the program’s director, Professor Donald
Pedersen. The success of the program is due largely to his
classroom activities, extensive publications, and
performance of a multitude of other duties on behalf of the
program. . . The only criticism is that the program is too
dependent on Professor Pedersen. In fairness to him, another
faculty member needs to be hired to assist in those duties. At
the very least, another faculty member needs to be
responsible for such duties as recruitment, coordinating
alumni relations, publicizing, and promoting the program
and job placement.41
In addition to its academic work, the LL.M. Program also
provided information to the public, recognizing the “substantial need
for a clearinghouse operation” to serve the legal profession and the
agricultural industry.42 In 1987, thanks to the support of Senator Dale
Bumpers and his legislative assistant, Chuck Culver, an LL.M.
alumnus, the law school received Congressional recognition for its
agricultural law work and funding to support a new agricultural law
center. Quoting from Senator Burdick’s statement to the
Congressional Record, “[t]he Agricultural Law Program at the
[University of Arkansas] Leflar Law Center is recognized for its
unique expertise in the area of agricultural law.”43 This expertise
supported the award of funds to the law school for “the creation of
the National Center for Agricultural Law Research and
Information.”44 The funds were to be used to hire a director,
professional researchers, a research and information librarian, and
support staff, and to fund graduate assistantships for students in the
LL.M. Program, as well as other elements necessary to support the
new Center at the law school.45
Federal funding for the National Center was provided to the
law school through a USDA grant beginning in 1988, with the grant
administrated through the USDA National Agricultural Library. The
40

See id. at 15.
Id. at 37.
42 UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L. SELF STUDY, THE GRADUATE AGRICULTURAL LAW
PROGRAM 34 (1986) (on file with author (hereinafter, 1986 SELF STUDY).
43 133 CONG. REC. S35253 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1987) (statement of Sen. Burdick).
44 Id.
45 Id. The funding was secured through the 1988 appropriations legislation passed
as Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-30 (1987).
41
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cooperative agreement between the USDA and the law school
reiterated the Congressional directive and specified that the Center
was to “provide research and information to the USDA and the
National Agricultural Library” independently from the USDA.46 The
Dean of the Law School (Dean Looney) and the Director of the
Agricultural Law Graduate Program (Professor Pedersen) served as
the inaugural co-principal investigators and were responsible for
setting up the new center.47
The National Center was a natural partner for the LL.M.
Program. Professionals were hired at the center for their agricultural
law expertise and were then available to teach a class in the LL.M.
Program, and LL.M. faculty consulted on Center projects. The
opportunity to teach enhanced the center staff attorney positions and
helped to recruit well qualified attorneys. The availability of Center
attorneys who were qualified to teach reduced the need for JD faculty
to teach in the LL.M. Program. LL.M. candidates were hired as
Graduate Assistants and provided research to support Center
attorneys. I was fortunate to receive a Graduate Assistantship when
I attend the LL.M. Program in 1989-90, working with then Center
Director, John Copeland, on agricultural bankruptcy law issues.
The Center operated under this arrangement for two decades,
receiving consistent federal funding directed to the law school and
producing a wide variety of publicly available information. In 2009,
the USDA shifted the grant for the Center from the law school to the
University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture, thereby placing the
Center under the exclusive control of the Division. By subsequent
agreement between the law school and the Division, the Center
remained housed at the law school for the next two years, with a
number of graduate assistants still funded by the Center. The Center
relocated in 2012, officially ending collaborations with the law
school. The Center remains under the Division as a USDA grantfunded enterprise, directed by Harrison Pittman, an LL.M. alumnus.
The Center’s work is now accomplished by staff attorneys and
students hired from law schools across the country.
Throughout the 1990s, the LL.M. Program was led by
Professor Pedersen and Associate Dean and Professor Lonnie Beard.
Professor Pedersen continued his impressive teaching portfolio.
Center attorneys with excellent academic credentials and practice
experience taught additional LL.M. classes and contributed in many

Letter from Willard J. Phelps, Contract Specialist, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., to J.W.
Looney, Dean, Univ. of Ark. School of L. (Mar. 31, 1988) (On file with author).
47 Id.
46
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ways to the program.48 Associate Dean Beard pioneered the concept
of condensed courses that are still popular today. These courses are
taught over the course of several days, immersion style, by nationally
recognized professionals who travel to Arkansas for a short visit.
These offerings included James Baarda of the USDA Cooperative
Service who taught Agricultural Cooperative Law, and Professor
Drew Kershen of the University of Oklahoma who taught
Environmental Regulation of Agriculture. In addition, Christopher
Kelley, a nationally recognized agricultural law practitioner, taught
Agricultural Administrative Practice, and I taught Agricultural
Bankruptcy, my specialty at that time.
Professor Pedersen retired in 1996, leading to a national
search for a tenure-track agricultural law professor. I was among the
applicants along with Christopher Kelley, my husband. We were
both alumni of the LL.M. Program with agricultural law practice
specialties, and we agreed to compete for the position with the
understanding that one of us could teach and the other would practice
law. In the end, thanks to a suggestion from Associate Dean Beard,
the faculty voted to split the position, hiring each of us for one half
of a tenure-track appointment. Over the next several years, we each
shifted into full-time positions and were tenured. My position was
established as full-time in the LL.M. Program; Professor Kelley’s
position was set at half-time in the LL.M. Program and half-time in
the J.D. Program.
II. An Expanded Focus: Food Law & Policy
As interest in food safety, transparency, quality, and
sustainability increased, the University of Arkansas School of Law
was at the forefront of the rise of another new discipline - food law
and policy. This approach offers a systemic analysis of our food
system, incorporating elements of agricultural law in combination
with food law to provide a more integrated and holistic approach.
This section of my essay explores the development of food law and
policy as a new discipline and the role of the LL.M. Program in
fostering it through its transition from agricultural law to agricultural
and food law.
I was appointed Director of the LL.M. Program in 2000. As
I took the reins of the program, I was inspired by my memories of
Professor Pedersen who served as director when I attended the
48

There are too many talented Center attorneys to mention, but several deserve
special recognition for their many contributions to the LL.M. Program while serving
as staff attorneys or directors at the Center: John Copeland, John Harbison, Janie
Hipp, Christopher Kelley, Martha Noble, Allen Olson, and Michael Roberts.
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program a decade earlier. Professor Pedersen always expected the
best from his students and motivated them to work hard. He also
cared deeply about each of them and his broad range of expertise
allowed him to relate to each student individually. The success of the
LL.M. Program is largely due to his dedication.
Also key to success was the ability to anticipate legal trends
and important issues in a rapidly changing world. Both Professors
Jake Looney and Neil Hamilton were masters of recognizing
impending change and signaling new directions to the profession. I
have tried to continue this tradition by keeping the LL.M. Program
at the leading edge of law and policy.
During the first two decades of the Program, financial and
business issues were at the heart of the LL.M. curriculum. Dramatic
efforts to address the financial problems facing the agricultural
industry during the 1980s - 90s made courses such as Agricultural
Finance & Credit particularly relevant. The loss of family farms was
a recurrent policy theme, with the focus on these farmers and farm
policy. One of the signature aspects of my tenure as director has been
to expand the Program toward a broader perspective. For example,
when a family farmer goes out of business, what is the impact that
this has on the rural community; what impact does this have on our
food system; how are consumers impacted?
Since the 1980s, many agricultural law scholars have
cautioned about the changes occurring in agriculture. Consolidation
and industrialization reduced the number of farms, shifted power and
control from individual farmers to powerful corporations, and dire
environmental consequences have been realized. Most analysts
focused on agricultural policies and the impacts on the farm.
Professor Hamilton was the first agricultural lawyer to emphasize the
impact these changes made to our food system, highlighting the
integral connections between agricultural law and food law.49
In 1999, Professor Hamilton, teaching at Drake University
Law School, developed a Food and the Law class.50 Beginning in
2000, we invited him to teach an introductory condensed course as a
Visiting Professor in the LL.M. Program called Introduction to the
Law of Food and Agriculture that incorporated some of these themes.

49

Neil D. Hamilton, Plowing New Ground: Emerging Policy Issues in a Changing
Agriculture, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L 181, 196 (1997). In this section, he provides the
basic argument for a systemic analysis of our food system.
50 Baylen J. Linnekin & Emily M. Broad Leib, Food Law & Policy: The Fertile
Field’s Origins and First Decade, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 557, 590 (2014).
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Soon thereafter, food safety issues provided a terrifying
window into the direct connections between farm and food when
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow” disease) was
diagnosed in a cow in the United States. The FDA and USDA had
recognized BSE as a potential threat for years and had banned the
practice of giving cows feed derived from cows or other animals
since 1997.51 The reality of the risk, however, did not reach
widespread consumer concern in the U.S. until it was found in a cow
in the Washington state in December 2003.52 The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) had warned of this risk in its 2002
report, noting that in contrast to many other pathogens, the prions
that cause this disease cannot be killed by cooking.53 “Mad cow”
disease and the concept of “downer cattle” exploded into consumer
awareness and dramatically entwined the world of agricultural law
and food law. It accelerated growing concerns about where food
comes from and how it is produced.
I recall discussing the emerging BSE issue with Professors
Christopher Kelley and Michael Roberts as we strategized about the
future of the LL.M. Program. Professor Roberts had paused his
successful practice in Utah to attend the LL.M. Program, and shortly
after he returned to practice, we recruited him back to Arkansas to
lead the National Center. In this role, he also taught in the LL.M.
Program, and along with Professor Neil Hamilton, helped us shape
the future direction of the LL.M. Program. In this strategy session,
we discussed mad cow concerns as an example of how the
connection between farm and food was inseparable, and how
important it was that the LL.M. Program incorporate food law into
our curriculum. This notion of “food law,” however, envisioned a
new approach, one that focused on the farm to food connections.
At this time, food law was taught in law schools as a Food
and Drug Law class that focused on the wide variety of products
under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
Food is one such category of products.54 Such a course, however,
inevitably either excludes or minimizes any consideration of
51

Substances Prohibited from Use in Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins
Prohibited in Ruminant Feed, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,936 (June 5, 1997).
52 Matthew L. Wald & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. is Examining a Mad Cow Case, First in
Country, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at A1.
53 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO-02-183, MAD COW DISEASE: IMPROVEMENTS
IN THE ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER REGULATORY AREAS WOULD STRENGTHEN
U.S. PREVENTION EFFORTS (2002).
54 Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 50, at 591 (referencing Peter Barton Hutt,
Food and Drug Law: Journal of an Academic Adventure, 46 J. AM. L. SCHS. 1, 8
(1996).). See also PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (University Casebook Series, 1st ed., 1980).
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agricultural practices, farm to food connections, or even USDA
jurisdiction over meat and poultry products.55
At our meeting at the law school, we strategized that an
expanded, systemic view of food law, incorporating consumer
perspectives should be a course in the LL.M. Program. Implementing
this new direction, and with the assistance of LL.M. Graduate
Assistant, Amy Lowenthal, Professor Roberts created a Food Law &
Policy class in the Spring of 2004 and first offered it the following
Fall. This class addressed basic elements of FDA food safety
regulation, but also focused heavily on USDA and addressed
consumer interests and concerns. Food Law & Policy soon became a
core course in the LL.M. curriculum.56
With Professor Roberts’ leadership and seed money from the
National Agricultural Law Center, the University of Arkansas
School of Law established the Journal of Food Law & Policy in 2004,
and its first issue was published in 2005.57 Neil Hamilton58 and Peter
Barton Hutt59 both authored articles for the inaugural issue, signaling
a new merger of agricultural law and food law and signaling the new
discipline of Food Law & Policy.
Once again, Arkansas had recognized an emerging national
trend. Consumer interest in food and the perceived failings of
agricultural policies that encouraged “cheap” processed foods were
becoming pervasive. Eric Schlosser’s book, Fast Food Nation was
published in 2001 and the film, Fast Food Nation, was released in
2006.60 Michael Pollen’s book, Omnivore’s Dilemma was published

55

In the early days of the LL.M. Program, a Food & Drug Law class was offered,
using Merrill and Hutt Food and Drug Law as a primary casebook. The course was
initially co-taught by Professors Neil Hamilton and Arkansas Law Professor Robert
B. Leflar, and there was some effort to address the agricultural law issues associated
with food safety through supplemental readings. For example, the USDA “Federal
Nutrition and Feeding Programs” were listed on the initial course syllabus. Univ. Of
Ark. Sch. of L. Faculty, Food and Drug Law Course Syllabus, (Fall 1982) (on file
with the author). Professor Hamilton returned to Iowa to teach at Drake University
Law School in 1983, founding its Agricultural Law Center, the Arkansas course
continued as a J.D. course taught periodically by Professor Leflar with a generally
traditional focus covering not only food, but drugs.
56 Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 50, at 590.
57 About the Journal of Food Law & Policy, UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L.,
https://law.uark.edu/jflp/about.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2022).
58 Neil D. Hamilton, Food Democracy II: Revolution or Restoration?, 1 J. FOOD L.
& POL’Y 13 (2005).
59 Peter Barton Hutt, Food Law & Policy: An Essay, 1 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1 (2005).
60 FAST FOOD NATION (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2006). The film is loosely based on
ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL
(2001).
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in 2006. The documentary Food Inc. was released in 2008.61 By
2014, it was reported that twenty of the nation’s top 100 law schools
offered some type of food law and policy course.62 By 2017, that
number had increased to thirty-four.63
Students increasingly came to the LL.M. Program to learn
about agricultural law because of their interest in where our food
comes from, what agricultural policies guide its production, and how
the legal system frames our food system. We responded by
incorporating more food and consumer-focused elements into our
core agricultural law classes. Agricultural Biotechnology addressed
not only patent and contract issues, but also the use of genetically
engineered products in human and animal food. Agriculture & the
Environment incorporated the study of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act not just to address farm regulation
but to explore the consequences of the extensive use of pesticides in
growing our food.
As we expanded our LL.M. curriculum to increase our food
law offerings. LL.M. candidates were drawn to this integrated study,
and increasingly students came to the LL.M. Program with food law
as a primary interest. Enrollment increased. We were delighted to
add renowned food safety litigation attorneys Bill Marler and Denis
Stearns of Marler Clark64 to our roster of professors, teaching a
condensed course for us each year. Professor Roberts left Arkansas
for a D.C. food law practice, eventually making his way back to
academia as a Professor of Practice and the Founding Director of the
Resnick Food Law & Policy Center at UCLA School of Law,65 and
I took over teaching our Food Law & Policy class, shifting my
research and writing as well.
Tenured Arkansas Law Professor Uche Ewelukwa66 offered
to design and teach courses in the LL.M. Program, capturing her
61

FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Pictures 2008).
Linnekin & Broad Leib, supra note 50, at 599.
63 Emily M. Broad Leib & Baylen J. Linnekin, Food Law & Policy: An Essential
Part of Today's Legal Academy, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 228, 230 (2017).
64 See William Marler, MARLER CLARK, https://marlerclark.com/lawyers/williammarler (last visited Apr. 28, 2022). Denis Stearns has since retired from Marler
Clark and established his own part-time specialized practice as STEARNS LAW,
PLLC, https://www.artisanal-law-firm.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
65
Michael T. Roberts, UCLA L. https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/facultyprofiles/michael-t-roberts (last visited Apr. 9, 2022). See also Resnick Center for
Food Law & Policy, UCLA L., https://law.ucla.edu/academics/centers/resnickcenter-food-law-policy (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
66
Uche
U.
Ewelukwa,
UNIV.
ARK.
SCH.
OF
L.,
https://law.uark.edu/directory/directory-faculty/uid/uchee/name/Uche-Ewelukwa/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
62
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interest in human rights, international law, and corporate
responsibility. She developed two courses for us that have become a
regular part of our curriculum each Fall: Right to Food and Business,
Human Rights, and Corporate Responsibility in the Food and
Agriculture Sector. She also developed an excellent course,
Intellectual Property in Food and Agriculture that is offered
periodically.
Professor Christopher Kelley,67 with half-time duties in the
LL.M. Program, has always been a full partner in all LL.M. Program
developments. Beyond his agricultural law expertise, his leadership
increased our international law perspective, adding international
agricultural and food law issues into the two required courses that he
teaches, Agriculture and the Environment and Agricultural
Perspectives and occasionally teaching Selected Issues in
International Food & Agriculture.
Capturing this new focus and seeking to include the energy
of a new kind of student, Professor Kelley and I proposed a name
change for the LL.M. Program. In 2009, the LL.M. Program in
Agricultural Law officially became the LL.M. Program in
Agricultural & Food Law.68
In 2009-10, I wrote an article that captured my vision for the
future of this combined world of agricultural and food law, A
Reconsideration of Agricultural Law: A Call for the Law of Food,
Farming, and Sustainability.69 In this article, I sought to reconcile
the special legal treatment of farmers with the systemic problems that
so many recognized. I called out agricultural policies for focusing
too much on the economic interests of those involved in production
and processing and focusing too little on the ultimate goal of
sustainable food production. The article proposes a new paradigm for
agricultural exceptionalism that would be based on the production of
healthy food in a sustainable, ethical manner. The article won the
2011 AALA Professional Scholarship Award.70

67

Christopher
R.
Kelley,
UNIV.
ARK.
SCH.
OF
L,
https://law.uark.edu/directory/directoryfaculty/uid/ckelley/name/Christopher+Rowand+Kelley/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
68 Susan A. Schneider, LL.M. Program in Agricultural and Food Law, THE LL.M.
PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG
(Aug.
29,
2009),
https://www.agfoodllm.com/2009/08/llm-program-in-agricultural-and-food.html.
69 Schneider, supra note 4, at 935.
70 Susan A. Schneider, American Agricultural Law Association Symposium, THE
LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG (Oct. 23, 2011),
https://www.agfoodllm.com/2011/10/we-just-got-back-from-wonderful-tripto.html?q=AALA+Distinguished.
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In 2011, the first edition of my book, Food, Farming, and
Sustainability: Readings in Agricultural Law was published.71 This
book solidified the themes that I had written about previously and
provided a text that I hoped would be useful in teaching agricultural
law courses in law schools across the country. The book was
successful in that regard, with a second edition published in 2016. To
my surprise and delight, the book is also used as a resource in
teaching Food Law & Policy, although that was not my original
intent.
As another indication of the importance of the connections
between agricultural and food law, in 2013, Law School Dean Stacy
Leeds72 hired LL.M. alumna Janie Hipp to establish the Indigenous
Food and Agriculture Initiative (IFAI) at the law school.73 Janie Hipp
had served as senior advisor for Tribal Relations to USDA Secretary
Thomas Vilsack in Washington, D.C. and before that had a
distinguished career in agricultural law.74 The IFAI has been
tremendously successful, fulfilling a great need in Indian Country for
legal information and guidance in reestablishing tribal food systems.
Another LL.M. alumna, Erin Parker, now serves as IFAI Executive
Director.75 Staff Attorneys at the IFAI have participated in the LL.M.
Program; Janie Hipp and Erin Parker created the LL.M. course, Legal
Issues in Indigenous Food and Agriculture; and LL.M. candidates
have worked at the IFAI as researchers and graduate assistants.
In 2015, I helped found the first academic membership
organization devoted to the new discipline, the Academy of Food
Law & Policy. The Academy was incorporated as a non-profit
71

SUSAN A. SCHNEIDER, FOOD, FARMING, & SUSTAINABILITY: READINGS IN
AGRICULTURAL LAW (2011).
72 Dean Stacy Leeds, the first indigenous woman to lead a law school, served as
Dean of the Law School from 2011-2018, providing support to our agricultural and
food law efforts. She remains Dean Emeritus but now serves as the Foundation
Professor of Law and Leadership at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law,
Arizona
State
University.
See
Biography,
STACY
LEEDS,
http://stacyleeds.com/biography (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
73 Arkansas Law School Launches Initiative on Tribal Food and Agriculture, UNIV.
OF ARK. NEWS (Jan. 10, 2013), https://news.uark.edu/articles/19942/arkansas-lawschool-launches-initiative-on-tribal-food-and-agriculture.
74 Janie Hipp’s exceptional experience and dedication to agricultural law has more
recently led to her service as General Counsel at USDA. Chickasaw Nation Media
Relations Off., Chickasaw Attorney Confirmed as USDA General Counsel, THE
CHICKASAW NATION (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.chickasaw.net/News/PressReleases/Release/Chickasaw-Attorney-confirmed-as-USDA-General-Couns56487.aspx.
75 Parker Named Director of Indigenous Food and Agriculture Initiative, UNIV. OF
ARK. NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://news.uark.edu/articles/55508/parker-nameddirector-of-indigenous-food-and-agriculture-initiative.
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organization in Arkansas. I served on the inaugural board of trustees
with Emily Broad Leib (Harvard Law School, Food Law & Policy
Clinic); Neil Hamilton (Drake Law School); Margaret Sova McCabe
(New Hampshire School of Law, later to become Dean at our law
school); Michael Roberts (UCLA Resnick Food Law & Policy
Center); Peter Barton Hutt (Covington & Burling / Harvard Law
School); and LL.M. alumnus and food law author, Baylen Linnekin.
I served for the first four years as co-chair of the Board with Emily
Broad Leib.76
I have also been able to showcase the LL.M. Program’s food
law and policy work through the National Food Law & Policy
Student Network (FLSN).77 This network is a collaboration of law
students from around the country “dedicated to promoting the study
and practice of food law and related fields.”78 Formed in 2015
through the Harvard Food Law and Policy Clinic, the network has
been fostered by Food Law Student Leadership Summits sponsored
by Harvard’s clinic. 79 I have been honored to speak at each of the
Summits. And in 2020, thanks to the leadership of Arkansas law
school Dean Margaret Sova McCabe,80 our law school hosted the
summit.81 We were proud to host sixty-three law students from fortytwo different law schools. With a conference theme of “Food Law &
Policy in the Face of Climate Change,” twenty-seven academic,
professional, and governmental experts presented to the students.
The event was co-sponsored with Harvard’s Food Law & Policy
Clinic and the FLSN.82
The LL.M. Program's combined focus on agricultural and
food law has allowed us to continue to lead through our integrated
study of food production and consumption, from "farm to plate" and

76

Emily M. Broad Leib & Susan A. Schneider, A Call to Action: The New Academy
of Food Law & Policy, 13 J. of Food L. & Pol’y. 1, 1 (2017).
77 NAT’L FOOD L. STUDENT NETWORK, https://foodlawstudentnetwork.org/ (last
visited Apr. 9, 2022).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Our food law and policy work helped to attract New Hampshire Professor
Margaret Sova McCabe to Arkansas to serve as dean, as she is “nationally respected
expert in food and agriculture law and policy.” Sova McCabe Named Dean of
University of Arkansas School of Law, UNIV. ARK. NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://news.uark.edu/articles/41816/sova-mccabe-named-dean-of-university-ofarkansas-school-of-law. Dean McCabe served in that role until 2022, providing
support and encouragement to our work.
81 Shirah Dedman, School of Law Hosts 2020 Food Law Student Leadership
Summit, THE LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.agfoodllm.com/2020/03/school-of-law-hosts-2020-food-law.html.
82 Id.
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beyond.83 Because of this expanded approach, the program is able to
consider the diverse interests of all quarters of the food system - the
farm, manufacturer, retailer, and consumer, presenting a holistic look
at our food system. And we have maintained our leadership place
amidst rapidly expanding interest in this area of law.
III. A New Approach: Distance Education
The LL.M. Program took another important step forward
when it expanded its reach through distance education. This section
of my essay discusses this transition and the benefits realized.
From its inaugural class in 1981 through 2014, the LL.M.
Program offered only on-campus, full-time instruction to a small
class of LL.M. degree candidates. Since its beginning, the Program
has always drawn students nationally and internationally, but only
students able to relocate to Fayetteville could attend. The intensive
course of study was designed to be completed in two semesters, with
additional time granted for completion of a final writing project.
As early as 2006, Professor Christopher Kelley and I were
intrigued with the possible advantages posed by new distance
technology. A friend and agricultural law colleague, David
Saxowsky introduced us to remote teaching through video
conferencing technology, demonstrating the technique to us,
Professor Michael Roberts, and Dean Richard Atkinson in a 2006
video conference from North Dakota.84 We were all excited about the
potential of this new technology.

83 “Beyond” from farm to plate references the LL.M. Program's food waste reduction

efforts. Thanks to a grant from the Women's Giving Circle, the LL.M. Program
created the Food Recovery Project. Visiting Professor Nicole Civita produced the
publication,
FOOD
RECOVERY:
A
LEGAL
GUIDE,
available
at
https://law.uark.edu/service-outreach/food-recovery-project/Legal-Guide-ToFood-Recovery.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2022), that has been circulated nationwide
and referenced in the national media. See also Food Recovery Project, UNIV. OF
ARK.
SCH.
OF
L.,
https://law.uark.edu/service-outreach/food-recoveryproject/index.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
84 David M. Saxowsky was an Associate Professor in the Department of
Agribusiness and Applied Economics at North Dakota State University and an
adjunct professor at the University of North Dakota School of Law. See David M.
Saxowsky,
N.D.
STATE
UNIV.,
https://www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~saxowsky/aglawtextbk/author.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2022). He was one of the first professors in North Dakota to teach remotely
via video-conference, delivering his teaching to remote areas of North
Dakota.
Obituary
for
David
Saxowsky,
W. FUNERAL HOME,
https://www.westfuneralhome.com/obituary/David-Saxowsky (last visited Apr. 28,
2022). Professor Saxowsky retired in 2019 and passed away in 2021. Id.
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Dean Atkinson was responsible for leading the law school’s
award-winning building addition, essentially doubling the size of the
law school.85 Part of his new design included a beautiful LL.M.
classroom with a wall of windows that looked out onto a tree-lined
campus street. Although Dean Atkinson passed away unexpectedly
before our move into the new addition, I know he would be pleased
with our use of this amazing facility today, as several years later, we
introduced conferencing technology to our classroom and our
Program.
In 2014, with leadership from Associate Dean Don Judges,
who then served as Associate Dean for Graduate and Experiential
Education86 and Dean Stacy Leeds, the Law School partnered with
the University of Arkansas Global Campus87 to develop a distance
education program as an integrated addition to our on-campus
attendance. Global Campus provided funding for a state-of-the-art
distance technology to be installed in our classroom, allowing our
distance students to video conference into class, participating along
with our on-campus students. Global campus also provided support
for distance course development, including assisting the law school
with the funding to hire LL.M. alumna Nicole Civita as a visiting
professor to help us design distance courses and develop the new
approach.88 Professor Civita was with us for two years designing
courses and helping to further our distance education vision. Her
work was invaluable, and she remains on our faculty as an adjunct
professor.89
In many ways, our plan was audacious. We were already
short-staffed and many in the legal academic community were
hesitant about distance education. Nevertheless, we believed that
there were many talented attorneys who were interested in our
specialized studies but who could not relocate to Fayetteville. We
85

See Design Award Winners (2011): University of Arkansas Leflar Law School
Addition, AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS ARK., https://www.aiaar.org/awards/designaward-winners/detail/university-of-arkansas-leflar-law-school-addition/
(last
visited Apr. 28, 2022).
86 See Donald P. Judges, UNIV. OF UTAH, https://faculty.utah.edu/u6029377DONALD_P_JUDGES/hm/index.hml (last visited Apr. 26, 2022). We recognize
Dean Judges for his leadership and innovation in spearheading our creation of the
LL.M. distance education opportunity. He went on to serve in distance education
leadership roles at the University before retiring in 2019. Id.
87 See Global Campus, UNIV. OF ARK., https://globalcampus.uark.edu/ (last visited
Apr. 26, 2022).
88 Susan A. Schneider, Celebrating our LL.M. Faculty: Visiting Professor Nicole
Civita, LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG (July 25, 2014),
https://www.agfoodllm.com/2014/07/celebrating-our-llm-faculty-visiting.html.
89 Nicole Civita, UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L., https://law.uark.edu/academics/llmfood-ag/faculty/faculty-ncivita.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
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believed that eventually the demand for the convenience of distance
education would force schools to offer distance alternatives, at least
at the LL.M. level, and we wanted to stay ahead of the trend. We also
believed that distance education, if done thoughtfully, could match
our high standards for on-campus instruction. We promised our
alumni that we would only deliver courses that met these high
standards. The integrity of the LL.M. degree would be maintained.
Recognizing that there were attorneys who were already
employed who would like to take advantage of our new offerings, we
also created a part-time option. Students would be able to take the
classes that they wished each semester, within a four-year timetable
for graduation. We would still recruit for our small, full-time, oncampus students, but these students would be joined by part-time and
distance candidates, increasing our overall numbers.
As we worked to expand our student body, we also
completed a full curriculum review. Existing courses were revised,
updated, or eliminated. New courses were created.
Our course formats were also expanded. We would continue
to deliver our signature synchronous classes, with students in the
classroom and distance students participating remotely. These
courses would be scheduled for the full-semester, condensed into a
half-semester, or truly condensed into our popular three-four day
immersion experiences. As a second model, we designed courses that
we refer to as “hybrid.” These courses are designed with a significant
degree of asynchronous work combined with periodic meetings for
high level discussions. And, a third model is a fully online class, with
all asynchronous work and online communication.
Professor Nicole Civita, guided by Global Campus
instructional designers, Miran Kang and Adam Brown, helped us to
create our hybrid and online courses. Distance courses at the
University of Arkansas are designed and certified through Global
Campus as a means for assuring excellence. Our distance classes are
successful largely because of the Global Campus process and the
excellent professionals who work with our professors.
We added additional adjunct professors to our faculty,
supported by enhanced enrollment, the expanded curriculum, and the
flexibility afforded by distance education. These adjuncts included
noted agricultural law experts such as Allen Olson, an LL.M.
alumnus with teaching and extensive agricultural law practice
experience; Amy Lowenthal an alumna with USDA Office of the
Inspector General in Washington, D.C., and Lauren Manning, an
alumna with teaching, practice, journalism, and farming experience.
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We officially launched our part-time and distance initiatives
Fall semester 2014 and our efforts were successful. We posted the
following to the LL.M. Blog that August:
We are delighted to welcome 9 face-to-face LL.M.
candidates to Fayetteville. Eight are out-of-state students;
they have moved to Arkansas from Alaska, Illinois, North
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington, D.C. One student
is from Arkansas. Three are 2014 law school graduates, and
the remaining 6 are experienced attorneys.
We are also very pleased to welcome our inaugural class in
the distance track. These students will be integrated into the
face-to-face classroom through video conferencing,
classroom capture, online communication, and blended
classroom settings. We are proud to have 8 distance LL.M.
candidates with us. All are out-of-state students, and they
live and work in Colorado, Georgia, Michigan, New York,
Oklahoma, Virginia, Illinois, and Washington, D.C. All are
experienced attorneys. Three have significant military
experience and have been recognized for their leadership and
service.90
Since this time, distance enrollment has continued to grow,
bringing talented attorneys with professional experience into our
Program. When the COVID pandemic hit, we moved seamlessly to
distance delivery for all our students with no interruption and none
of the glitches affecting others unfamiliar with the technology. As we
have moved back to on-campus instruction, our distance program has
been strengthened.
IV. The Present and Future of the LL.M. Program
Today, the LL.M. Program continues as a vibrant part of the
Law School, serving a wide variety of students and maintaining ties
with our alumni. This final section of my essay describes where the
Program is now.
The mission of the LL.M. Program remains true to the goals
of the Program founders. As stated in the 2019 Self-Study Report
prepared as part of the university’s program review:

90

Susan A. Schneider, Welcome to the Fall 2014 Incoming LL.M. Class, LL.M.
PROGRAM IN AGRIC. & FOOD L. BLOG
(Aug.
27,
2014),
https://www.agfoodllm.com/2014/08/welcome-to-fall-2014-incoming-llmclass.html.
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The LL.M. Program’s mission is to prepare a small number
of carefully selected attorneys as specialists in the complex
legal issues involving agriculture and food law - a complex
system of national and international importance. This
translates to the following four educational objectives:
to recruit well-qualified attorneys to the integrated
study of agricultural and food law;
to introduce our students to the wide-ranging and
complex law and policy issues associated with our
food and agricultural systems;
to educate our students in a way that allows them not
only to master an understanding of current
agricultural and food law issues, but also prepares
them to address these issues in a changing legal
landscape; and
to graduate students who will use the education they
received to serve at the highest professional level,
enhancing the reputation of the LL.M. Program, the
School of Law, and the University of Arkansas.91
We have now developed over thirty academic courses
focusing on food and agricultural law, each specifically designed for
the LL.M. Program. Each semester we offer more than a full-time
load of specialized LL.M. courses, plus additional opportunities for
experiential work including externships and practicums. New
additions to our faculty include Erin Parker92 teaching Nutrition Law
& Policy and Lauren Bernadett93 teaching Agricultural Water Law.
When a special issue arises, we have a framework in place to develop
a new course addressing that issue. For example, the Food, Law and
COVID-19 class was delivered during the Fall of 2020, organizing a
dozen respected colleagues from across the country to co-teach the
class.94
Most of our courses are delivered with a synchronous, realtime classroom experience. Recordings allow students who are
unable to participate to keep up and to register their reactions. A class

91

UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L., LL.M. PROGRAM IN AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD LAW
SELF-STUDY 1, 14 (2019) (on file with author).
92
See Erin Parker, INDIGENOUS FOOD & AGRIC. INITIATIVE,
https://indigenousfoodandag.com/erin-parker/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
93 See Lauren D. Bernadett, Attorney, HARRISON TEMBLADOR, HUNGERFORD, &
GUERNSEY (last visited, Apr. 26, 2022).
94 National Experts Collaborate to Examine Food, Law and COVID-19, UNIV. OF
ARK. NEWS (Nov. 19, 2020), https://news.uark.edu/articles/55330/national-expertscollaborate-to-examine-food-law-and-covid-19.
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blog feature allows students to comment, either in writing, via
podcast, or video recording.95
Other classes are offered in a hybrid-format, with
independent readings, videos, recorded lectures and podcasts
supplemented with synchronous class meetings for high level
discussions or question-and-answer sessions. A few classes are
offered in a fully asynchronous format, with all interaction online.96
The extensive thesis that was required at the start of the
LL.M. Program was scaled back in the mid-1980s, but the
importance of a legal writing is evident throughout the Program. An
article that demonstrates "rigorous legal analysis" and "quality legal
writing skills" is required, but it can be written as a law review or as
a practice publication. Assistance in drafting is provided through our
Advanced Legal Research and Writing class, providing as much or
as little assistance as is needed. Professor Christopher Kelley’s
Effective Legal Writing class focuses on building good skills and
reducing bad writing habits such as “legalese.” Most of our regular
classes require a written essay of some sort, as we strive for final
projects that offer synthesis and reflection. Unlike the typical JD
exam, our final projects are rarely time-limited and never “closed
book.”
In 2019, we participated in a university-mandated program
review and received an excellent report from our external
reviewers:
The LL.M. program in Food and Agricultural Law benefits
tremendously from the profound level of commitment of a
diverse, nimble, and talented group of core and support
faculty and staff. The program Director and contributing
faculty are thought leaders in this burgeoning field, focusing
on the nexus between agricultural production, food systems,
and related implications for public health, environmental
quality, and human rights. These individuals are the life of
the program and are key to its continued success.
Perhaps the strongest (and most important) aspect of the
program is its attentiveness to student input. It has
demonstrated a high level of flexibility and responsiveness
to students’ needs and interests. It has modified its
95

See Ways to Participate, UNIV. OF ARK. SCH. OF L.,
https://law.uark.edu/academics/llm-food-ag/ways.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2022).
96 Id.
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curriculum to attend to the most pressing food-law issues of
the day while remaining deeply engaged in the production
aspects of our food supply system. It has engaged policy at
a high level, while also explaining the machinations of the
legal system that the students must understand as they adjust
their career trajectories or deepen their skill set. It has done
all of this while maintaining an excellent national reputation.
Both the course work and the reputation of the program also
bring important benefits to the J.D. program, including the
development of a richer array of available courses.
The expansion into distance education and part-time
offerings is also laudable. These enhancements reflect
modern needs for flexibility and adaptability in program
delivery, and also reflect the evolving educational needs of
experienced legal professionals. Moreover, support for the
deployment of distance education via the Global Campus is
top notch.
The program is also notable for the variety of opportunities
it provides students to contribute to legal scholarship through
The Journal of Food Law and Policy, network with other
student leaders around the country through the Food Law
Student Leadership Summit (which will be held here in
Fayetteville in 2020), and gain applied experience (as well
as an invaluable professional network) in this specialized
area through externships with international companies,
government agencies, and leading non-profit organizations.
This diverse array of opportunities exceeds expectations for
a traditional LL.M. program and is, undoubtedly, one of the
reasons for the program’s success and reputation.
All of this enables the program to attract a diverse cadre of
professionals who, after being here, enjoy strong postgraduate prospects. We think the program is a model for the
development of programs in other institutions.97
The reviewers did, however voice one criticism, a lack of
sufficient institutional support for program staffing, an observation
strikingly similar to that provide in 1986.98 Indeed, when the LL.M.
97

Anthony Schutz & Michele Nowlin, LL.M. PROGRAM REVIEW 1, 6 (Oct. 2, 2019)
(on file with author).
98 Id. at 4-5. The reviewers stated that:
Our primary concern is focused on the historic lack of institutional support
for the program. Despite the results of the last programmatic review -
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Program was founded, the proposal to the Arkansas Board of Higher
Education promised tenured faculty positions for a director and two
professors. The LL.M. Program has never had that staffing. Over the
years, we have met our needs with J.D. law faculty who teach a
course in the program, an impressive group of adjunct faculty, and
dedication.
Recognizing the need for additional assistance and
recognizing the experiential opportunities in food and agricultural
law outreach, in 2021, Dean Margaret Sova McCabe obtained the
support from the University of Arkansas for a new visiting assistant
professor position for the LL.M. Program.
After a national search, in December 2021 LL.M. alumna
Kelly Nuckolls was hired as a Visiting Assistant Professor and
Assistant LL.M. Program Director. In this new role, Professor
Nuckolls works to enhance LL.M. Program outreach, teaches in the
LL.M. Program, and assists with Program administration. Professor
Nuckolls’ prior experience with advocacy in Washington, D.C. as a
senior policy specialist at the National Sustainable Agriculture
Coalition (NSAC) combined with experience with the University of
Maryland Agricultural Law Education Initiative provided an
excellent fit to the needs of the LL.M. Program. Her prior teaching
experience at George Mason University Law School and Sterling

which emphasized the urgent need for additional resources - and ensuing
development of both a part-time option and distance learning option that
resulted in substantial increases in program enrollment, the LL.M.
program is now doing more with fewer resources than it has ever had! The
additional burdens on the program Director and Coordinator are not
sustainable, nor are they equitable, and they risk the program’s excellent
national reputation and place in the legal academy. The lack of adequate
resources also undermines opportunities for further growth in size and
stature and impedes faculty contribution to scholarship in this expanding
area of study and practice.
We therefore recommend more attention to all levels of support, beginning
with support for the anticipated strategic planning process the program
will undergo this fall. Mapping the forward trajectory for the program will
help to identify clear priorities for resource allocation. If the program is
going to grow, it must have additional resources. Even if the program
simply wants to maintain its current status, it needs attention to succession
planning and program administration. More pointedly, it would be
impossible to recruit a new program director without these additional
resources. Id. at 4-5.
See also infra, note 38 regarding similar concerns about Professor Pedersen’s role
as director.
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College in Vermont have allowed her to step into the classroom
effectively.99
We are now launching the Food and Agriculture Impact
Project under the Professor Nuckolls’ leadership. This Project will
allow us to work with agricultural and food-focused organizations,
agencies, and other colleges and universities to support legal
research, education, and policy analysis on food and agricultural law
issues. Through this new Project, we hope to provide exciting new
experiential opportunities for our LL.M. students as well as
interested Arkansas JD students.
No reflection on the LL.M. Program would be complete
without recognizing our students and our alumni. Our students
continue to be talented, highly motivated, and anxious to learn as
much as possible about food and agricultural law. They offer us a
premier teaching experience. When they convert their status to
alumni, the bond to the Program continues. We now have over three
hundred alumni in forty-four different states and nineteen foreign
countries, working in private practice, for corporations, for advocacy
groups, for state or federal agencies, and teaching. Each year, it is an
honor to connect them with our current students. For the first time
ever, in Spring 2022, we designed a “Selected Issues” class that is
taught by our alumni, with a different person teaching each week.
Current students helped to pick the topics, and then I was able to
select from our alumni ranks to fill the roster.100 It has been a
wonderful opportunity for me to reflect on the breadth of our area of
study and to be grateful for the LL.M. network that we share.
My appreciation is extended to all my students, past present
and future, to the many professors who have helped to make the
LL.M. Program a success, and to the Deans who supported our work
at every step of the way. I apologize in advance for any aspects of
the Program that I have neglected to mention. There are many
individuals that contributed to its success that deserve recognition
but that are not mentioned here due to space constraints. Many of our
professors, our alumni, and certainly our dedicated staff, could
recount hours of personal experiences that would probably be far
more interesting than my efforts at chronicling the factual aspects of
99

Nuckolls Joins School of Law's Agricultural and Food Law Program, UNIV. OF
ARK. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2022), https://news.uark.edu/articles/58629/nuckolls-joinsschool-of-law-s-agriculture-and-food-law-program.
100 LL.M. Program Celebrates 40-Plus Years, Offers New Course Taught by
Distinguished Alumni, UNIV. OF ARK. NEWS (Feb. 11, 2022),
https://news.uark.edu/articles/58945/ll-m-program-celebrates-40-plus-years-offersnew-course-taught-by-distinguished-alumni.
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the development of the Program. Perhaps when we reach our fiftieth
anniversary, it will be time for that essay.

Agricultural Carbon: The Land, Landowner, and Farmer
Barclay Rogers
Abstract
Carbon is certainly a hot topic in agriculture. Across the
countryside, farmers, landowners, agricultural service providers, and
many others are trying to understand what carbon is about and what
it may mean to them. One of the more interesting topics around
agricultural carbon concerns the relationship between the landowner
and tenant farmers on absentee-owned land (i.e., land that is farmed
by someone other than the person who owns it). This article provides
a brief background on the agricultural carbon opportunity and
explores some ideas about how to pursue the opportunity on
absentee-owned farmland.
I. Agricultural Carbon Primer
Almost every human endeavor – eating, driving, turning on
the lights, even breathing – generates greenhouse gases (GHG),
which in turn have been linked to climate change.1 Companies across
many economic sectors have launched ambitious efforts to reduce
their GHG emissions2 and are actively looking for solutions.
Companies are working in various ways to reduce their GHG
contributions3, including reducing their own emissions (Scope 1),
reducing emissions indirectly caused by them through, for example,
electricity consumption (Scope 2), and working with others within
their supply chains to reduce their indirect emissions (Scope 3). If
reductions are simply not possible (e.g., you can’t fly an airplane
without jet fuel), companies can purchase offset credits.4 Companies
looking for offset credits are focused almost exclusively on those


Barclay Rogers is the Vice President, Carbon Partnerships for Indigo Ag. He
holds an MBA from the University of Cambridge, an LLM from the University of
Arkansas, a JD from Lewis & Clark College, and a BS in Mechanical Engineering
from the University of Arkansas. The views expressed herein are those of the
author alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of Indigo Agriculture.
1 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021: The
Physical Science Bias 4 (2021).
2 Ambitious Corporate Climate Action, SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE,
https://sciencebasedtargets.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
3 Calculation Tools, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL,
https://ghgprotocol.org/calculationg-tools-faq (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
4 What is a Carbon Offset?, CARBON OFFSET GUIDE,
https://www.offsetguide.org/understanding-carbon-offsets/what-is-a-carbon-offset/
(last visited Mar. 13, 2022).

30

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.18

approved by recognized carbon registries like Climate Action
Reserve and Verra.5
Agriculture is uniquely positioned to make material
contributions to help address climate change. U.S. agricultural is
currently a net emitter, accounting for approximately 10% of US
GHG emissions.6 However, with a few simple changes at the fieldlevel (e.g., planting cover crops, reducing tillage, improving nitrogen
management), farms can transition from being net emitters to
“sequesters” of GHG.7 Importantly, certain farming practices –
specifically cover crops and minimal tillage – can result in the
“removal” of GHG from the atmosphere.8 Few other options exist to
remove GHG from the atmosphere, so agriculture could play a truly
meaningful role in helping to address climate change.9
Against this background on the agricultural carbon
opportunity, let’s turn to the specific question of the relationship
among the land, the landowner, and the farmer. Two things are
important with respect to agricultural carbon:
•

•

Additionality, which means that something additional
must be done on the farm to cause the GHG profile to
change in a way that more GHGs are removed, or abated,
relative to the baseline condition.
Permanence, which means that changes must remain
over a long period of time.

A practical example helps to illustrate these concepts.
Assume that a farmer went from conventional tillage practices with
no cover crops to no-till and cover crops. The cover crop is an
example of additionality because the farmer did something that he
had not done before (e.g., planted a cover crop) and that practice
5

Registries and Enforcement, CARBON OFFSET GUIDE,
https://www.offsetguide.org/understanding-carbon-offsets/carbon-offsetprograms/registries-enforcement/ (last visited June 6, 2022).
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited
Mar. 13, 2022).
7 Id.
8 CARBON CYCLE INST., CARBON FARMING: IMPROVING SOIL FERTILITY & WATER
HOLDING CAPACITY THROUGH INCREASING SOIL CARBON 1, 2 (n.d.), available at
https://www.carboncycle.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/carbon-farmingbrochure-Sept2018-CCI-5.pdf
9 Id. at 1.
6
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changed the GHG profile (e.g., the cover crop removed CO2 from the
atmosphere through photosynthesis and stored some portion of it
below the surface in its roots). By limiting the exposure of carbon
stored in the root biomass to the atmosphere, the no-till practice
helped to ensure that the removed carbon remained stored in the soil
profile, and thus helps to establish permanence. In essence, the cover
crop is pulling carbon from the atmosphere and the soil is storing it.10
II. Carbon Farming on Leased Land
Let’s leverage this example to orient our minds around who
does what to sequester carbon in agricultural soils. The farmer is
planting the cover crop and implementing the tillage practices. But
the land itself is storing the carbon, which may be released if the soil
is disturbed in the future. If agricultural carbon is going to be
successful, the agricultural community must ensure that there are
ways to guarantee that the carbon remains stored. And as over 50%
of farmland, and sometimes upwards of 80%, of farmland used to
grow the major commodity crops in the US is absentee-owned,
appropriate incentives must be provided for landowners and tenants
alike.11
Farmers and landowners are very accustomed to working
through commercial agreements together through the land leasing
process. About 70% of the time, farmers lease land from nonoperator owners on a cash rent basis (e.g., $X per acre-year).12 Crop
share, flexible cash, or free arrangements account for the remainder
of leased acres. In essence, the farmer and the landowner reach a
decision about who is going to do what (e.g., farmer will farm the
land), who will be compensated how (e.g., farmer pays landowner a
fixed cash amount or they decide to share in the revenues or profits),
and what conditions govern the arrangement. These arrangements
have been aided by standardized land leases like the ones available
from the National Agricultural Law Center.13

10

Many farming practices may alter the GHG profile of a farm but cover crops and
reduced/no-till currently have the greatest impact in terms of sequestering carbon
in agricultural soils.
11 See DANIEL BIGELOW ET AL., ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EIB-61,
U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, TENURE, AND TRANSFER iii (2016).
12 Id. at 28.
13 Agricultural Leases, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
https://nationalaglawcenter.org/research-by-topic/ag-leases/ (last visited Mar. 13,
2022).
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Some important considerations come into focus when
thinking about carbon farming on leased land:
•
•

•
•

What is required for leased land to enter a carbon
program?
Who should earn money from the sale of any carbon
credits or other payments associated with carbon
farming?
Who should pay the costs associated with the carbon
farming practices?
What happens if a different farmer assumes control of
the leased land?

A. What Rights are Required to Enroll in a Carbon
Program?
Carbon methodologies, like the Soil Enrichment Protocol
published by the Climate Action Reserve, require the participation of
the person who has “management control over agricultural
management activities for one or more fields within the project
area.”14 This is the farmer in common parlance. The Soil
Enrichment Protocol expressly states that “[t]here is no requirement
for direct participation of the landowner. . . .”15 Tenant farmers
therefore can participate in carbon programs on leased land if they
have management rights over the farm.
B. How Should the Revenues and Costs of Carbon Farming
Be Apportioned?
Carbon revenues and costs are no different than any other
revenues and costs associated with farming.
Farmers and
landowners can split them however they desire. For example, a
farmer and landowner might agree to assign all carbon revenues to
the farmer as long as the farmer covers the costs of implementing
carbon farming practices. At the other end of the spectrum, the
farmer and landowner might agree that the landowner gets all the
carbon revenue in exchange for the landowner reducing the rent and
the farmer paying for the costs of implementing the practices. Many
other potential arrangements exist, but it’s fundamentally a
commercial decision for the landowner and farmer to reach together.

14
15

CLIMATE ACTION RSRV, SOIL ENRICHMENT 7 (2020).
Id.
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C. What Happens If Someone Else Starts Farming the Land?
The best question comes last. Recall that carbon is stored in
the soil, and that it may be released through tillage practices. Now
imagine a situation where one tenant farmer is fully committed to
carbon farming on a leased farm, but another tenant assumes control
over this farm and decides to return to a full tillage regime. In this
case, most of the carbon that was stored in the soil would be released
to the atmosphere.
The broader agricultural carbon opportunity may provide
unviable if farmers are “penalized” for implementing practices that
result in the release of carbon when farming conditions require such
intervention (e.g., tilling areas of a field that were heavily rutted
during a wet harvest period). Nevertheless, mechanisms should be
implemented to provide appropriate incentives to help maintain
carbon stored in the soil. In the case of Indigo’s carbon program, the
farmer is paid out over time, as a form of deferred compensation, to
ensure that he always has an incentive to maintain the carbon stored
in the soil.
But what happens if the farmer loses the farm, and the
subsequent tenant releases the stored carbon? The credits have been
sold to third parties on the condition that the carbon will remain
stored in the soil. How do we encourage a continuation of the carbon
farming practices, or at least discourage the release of stored carbon,
when a leased farm passes from one tenant to another?
Fortunately, this kind of situation has been addressed before
in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).16 Under CRP, farmers
remove environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production
and plant ecologically beneficial plant species in exchange for a
yearly payment.17 CRP contracts typically bind the land to the
program for 10 to 15 years.18 Under the regulations governing the
CRP program, parties who wish to remove land enrolled in the
program must “refund all or part of the payments made by CCC with
respect to the CRP contract, plus interest, and must also pay

16

About the Conservation Reserve Program, USDA,
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservationprograms/conservation-reserve-program/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
17 Id.
18 Id.

34

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.18

liquidated damages as provided for in the CRP contract, if directed
to do so by CCC.”19 The regulations, however, further state that:
“If a participant transfers all or part of the right and
interest in, or right to occupancy of, land subject to
a CRP contract and the new owner or operator
becomes a successor to such contract … then such
participant will not be required to refund previous
payments received under the contract
[or]
No refunds of previous payments will be required if
the person or entity to whom all or part of the right
and interest in, or right of occupancy of, land subject
to such contract reaches an agreement with CCC to
modify the contract in a way that is consistent with
the objectives of the program.”20
In short, the CRP program does not impose any financial
penalty if the land enrolled in the program remains in the program
after a transition between owners, operators, or otherwise. USDA
has rightfully recognized that the “land” is the ultimate counterparty
to the contract and realized that the objectives remained satisfied if
the land remains in the CRP program regardless of who owns or
operates it. The CRP program is pointing the way toward a solution
to the carbon farming on leased land problem.
But let’s consider one other important element with respect
to carbon farming: the baseline. Recall that a carbon credit is
essentially a calculation of the relative GHG profile of a farm
before/after a particular farming practice is implemented. The
baseline approximates the GHG profile based on the historical
farming practices on that field before the carbon farming practices
are implemented. The baseline is usually determined based on 3 to
5 years of records for particular fields.
Now, let’s return to the leased field that moved from one
tenant farmer to another. Where is the baseline going to come from?
If the first tenant doesn’t share the baseline, or at least the data by
which it was created, with the subsequent tenant, the subsequent
tenant is effectively barred from earning carbon credits until he farms
19
20

7 C.F.R. § 1410.32 (2022).
Id.
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it long enough to establish the baseline himself (i.e., 3 to 5 years
depending on crop rotation). This is surely a suboptimal outcome,
especially if the farmer wishes to continue to carbon farm that field.
But what incentive does the initial tenant have to share the
baseline data with the subsequent tenant? As you will see in our
proposed path forward, the initial tenant and subsequent tenant could
essentially exchange the baseline for a promise to continue the
carbon farming practices. Several positive outcomes are realized
through this approach:
•
•

•

Carbon farming practices are maintained on the land, thus
eliminating potential release of carbon stored in the soil.
The initial tenant may receive any unvested carbon payments
from the carbon project developer on the condition that the
carbon farming practices are maintained on the field. The
initial tenant could enter a commercial arrangement, like the
CRP construct, via the land lease in which the subsequent
tenant agrees to refund the carbon project developer if the
carbon farming practices are terminated. This commercial
arrangement would give the carbon project developer
confidence to release unvested payments to the initial tenant.
The subsequent farmer could receive the baseline, and
underlying data, from the initial tenant and thus secure his
ability to continue to earn carbon revenue under the
previously established baseline.

Such a construct would provide aligned incentives between
tenants as well as the landowner and the carbon program
administrator. It would avoid potential value destruction – through
release of previously stored carbon or simple delays associated with
re-establishing a baseline – that may otherwise occur when different
farmers assume control of leased farmland.
III. Potential Path Forward
So how to apply these lessons to ensure that the agricultural
carbon opportunity is available on leased farmland? Here are a few
practical perspectives:
•

Farmland leases should include a provision that makes clear
that the tenant farmer has management control over the
agricultural activities on the farm, including the
implementation of carbon farming practices and the right to
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submit the necessary data to comply with agricultural carbon
programs.
Farmland leases should likewise include a provision that
establishes the revenue and cost dynamics associated with
carbon farming. Farmers and landowners need to be clear
about who is responsible for what and how they will be
compensated accordingly.
Farmland leases should have a carbon farming “transition
clause” that allows tenant farmers to agree between
themselves to exchange baseline data on the farm for a
promise to maintain carbon farming practices into the future.

Many farmers and landowners ask how to carbon farm on
leased land. The ideas, outlined herein, and a potential farmland lease
addendum, included as an exhibit below, is an effort to outline a path
forward.21
IV. Exhibit: Farmland Lease Addendum
This Addendum supplements the rights and obligations
associated with the land described in the Farmland Lease between
[Owner] and [Operator] executed on [Date]) (“Effective Date”)
relative to the following land: [Legal Description] (“Land”). Owner
and Operator are collectively referred to as Parties.
1. The Land is enrolled in the following agricultural carbon
program: [Name of Program] (“Carbon Program”)
administered by [Name of Carbon Program Administrator]
(“Carbon Program Administrator”). Owner confirms that
Operator has management control over the Land to a degree
sufficient for the Operator to participate in the Carbon Program.
2. Owner and Operator agree to share revenues and costs associated
with the Carbon Program as follows:

Operator
Owner

21

Revenue
Costs
__________% __________%
__________% __________%

It is ultimately the responsibility of the farmland owner or manager to establish a
lease with this tenant that is acceptable to both parties, and this article or exhibit is
not intended to be final language or represent legal advice of any nature by the
author. The exhibit is a basic template intended to communicate the ideas outlined
in this article.
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In the event that Owner has agreed to share in the Revenues or
Costs, Operator agrees to account to Owner the Revenue and
Costs associated with the Carbon Program by no later than
[Date].
3. The following provisions are applicable if the Land was enrolled
Carbon Program before the Effective Date:
A.

Has Operator received the data from [Yes / No]
[Name of former tenant] (“Former
Tenant”) necessary to establish by, or
continue following, the Effective Date the
baseline for the Land in the Carbon
Program?

B.

Does Operator agree to maintain the [Yes / No]
carbon farming practices and to share the
necessary data as required by the Carbon
Program during the term of this Farmland
Lease?

C.

Does Operator agree to reimburse the [Yes / No]
Carbon Program Administrator for any
losses of carbon to the atmosphere if
Operator discontinues carbon farming
practices or fails to share the necessary Amount:
data as required by the Carbon Program $_________
during the term of this Farmland Lease?
If so, please specify the amount that
Operator agrees to pay Carbon Program
Administrator
upon
delivery
of
reasonable
evidence
demonstrating
failure to maintain carbon farming
practices and/or to share the necessary
data as required by the Carbon Program.

BLACK-OWNED BEEF:
SHOULD BLACK BEEF PRODUCERS STAKE SPACE
IN FOOD JUSTICE?
Shirah Dedman*
I. Introduction
On June 3, 2020, cheers erupted from a crowd gathered in
front of the Discovery Green Park in downtown Houston, Texas.
Astride horses, a trail-riding club trotted through the park with
several of its members donning shirts that read “I Can’t Breathe.”
That day, the Non-Stop Riderz travelled 20 miles through Houston
to protest the murder of George Floyd, a Black man killed by a White
police officer. As Black “cowboys,” the Non-Stop Riderz would
make their mark on the consciousness of a modern-day social justice
movement.1
While there is growing interest in Black cowboys, the
narrative is largely tethered to parades and urban and suburban
saddle clubs, much like the fictional movie on Netflix, Concrete
Cowboy. Missing from the narrative are today’s real Black cowboys:
rural ranchers and farmers raising cattle for beef production and
consumption.
The legacy of the Old West cowboy came out of Texas, in
1890 Texas, estimated one-third of cowboys were black and twothirds by 1910.2 Today, Texas continues to claim its rank as Black
cowboy country. Not only do the highest number of Black cattle
farmers call Texas home, but Texas also has the highest number of
Black farmers and ranchers across the nation.3 Roughly a quarter of
all Black producers in the U.S. live and work in Texas.4 Together
with just eleven southern states, they account for 88 percent of all
Black farmers.5
*

Shirah Dedman is the founder of Cowry & Clay, a consulting firm that
specializes in working with food, agricultural and Web3 businesses. Dedman holds
an LL.M. in Agricultural and Food Law from the University of Arkansas.
1 Cat

Cardenas, The Best Thing in Texas: A Black Trail-Riding Club Joined a
Houston Protest on Horseback, TEX. MONTHLY (JUNE 8, 2020),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/black-trail-riding-club-houstonprotest/.
2 Alwyn Barr, Introduction to BLACK COWBOYS OF TEXAS 10 (Sara R. Massey ed.,
2d prtg. 2000).
3 NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH17-9, BLACK PRODUCERS
1 (2019).
4 Id.
5 Id.
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Nearly half of all Black-operated farms specialize in cattle
production.6 Yet insofar as it persists in the modern American
imagination, the image of the Black farmer is predominately
informed by images growing cotton and traditional Black staples like
collard greens, okra and Black-eyed peas –even if these images don’t
reflect the realities of Black farming operations today.7 But the
reality we can all agree on is that in the United States, Black farmers
are becoming extinct. As of the 2017 Agricultural Census, the total
number of Black producers accounted for just 1.3 percent of the
country’s 3.4 million producers.8 The already dwindling numbers of
Black-operated farms had fallen three percent from 2012.9 While the
largest number of Black producers – farmers and ranchers – may call
Texas home, they account for just three percent of the state’s total
number of producers.10
While the current food justice movement seeks to bring
Black farmers from the edge of extinction, many in the movement
advocate their erasure – perhaps unwittingly – by calling for the end
of beef production. Resulting from the realities of intensive
industrialized animal agriculture, they portray all beef production as
drivers of a public health crisis, environmental disaster, and White
supremacy. However, this portrait leaves out important aspects of
social equity and economic justice, especially for Black rural
populations.
Instead of vilifying beef production, should we re-envision
it as an integral part of food justice? This requires an investigation
into whether beef production can sustain a healthy, environmental
and socially conscious diet that supports thriving local food systems
and racial equity. This paper explores the cultural challenges Black
beef producers face, as well as economic barricades controlled by an
intensive beef industry.

6

Id. Farm specialization refers to the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS). More than half of a farm’s sales come from the commodity. Id.
7 A 1986 USDA report on Black farmers found that while a majority of Blackoperated farms were classified as livestock operations, the likelihood that livestock
was the major specialty decreased as sales increased. Sixty-eight percent of all
Black-operated farms with sales of less than $2,500 annually were classified as
livestock (cattle and hogs) operations. For Black farms with annual sales of
$20,000 or more, livestock specialties were only 11 percent of the total. See VERA
J. BANKS, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RDRR-59, BLACK FARMER
THEIR FARMS 9 (1986).
8 NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 3, at 1.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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II. A Public Health Crisis
African-Americans face an ongoing health crisis. According
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the percent
of Blacks aged 20 and over who are obese: 37.5 percent of Black
men and 56.1 percent of Black Women.11 Besides accidents, the
leading causes of death are heart disease and cancer; both obesityrelated conditions. In 2018, non-Hispanic blacks were twice as likely
as non-Hispanic whites to die from diabetes.12 Furthermore, SARS
CoV-2 has opportunistically exploited diabetes as 39 percent of the
U.S. COVID-19 related deaths were among diabetics.13
Much like the rest of Americans, nutrition-related illnesses
amongst Black communities have climbed during the last forty years
despite national nutritional standards set forth in the Dietary
Guidelines. The Dietary Guidelines forms the basis of federal
nutrition programs and guides local, state, and national health
promotion and disease prevention initiatives.14 By law, school
nutrition programs are required to be in line with the Dietary
Guidelines.15 The National School Lunch Program serves a high
percentage of Black public school students.16 Accordingly, Black
youth’s nutritional access and food culture are significantly impacted
by the low-fat promoting Dietary Guidelines. Since adoption in 1977,
Dietary Guidelines have vilified saturated fats (primarily found in

Health of Black or African American Non-Hispanic Population, NAT’L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STAT., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/black-health.htm (Feb. 16, 2022).
12 Diabetes and African Americans, OFF. OF MINORITY HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
https://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.aspx?lvl=4&lvlid=18 (Mar. 1, 2021).
13 Edward W. Gregg et al., Diabetes and Covid-19: Population Impact 18 Months
into the Pandemic, 44 J. CLINICAL & APPLIED RSCH. & EDUC. 1916, 1919 (2021),
https://diabetesjournals.org/care/article/44/9/1916/138829/Diabetes-and-COVID19-Population-Impact-18-Months.
14 Introducing the New Dietary Guidelines for Americans 2020-2025, WEILER
NUTRITION COMMC’NS, https://weilernutrition.com/2021/01/introducing-the-newdietary-guidelines-for-americans-20202025/#:~:text=The%20US%20Dietary%20Guidelines%20have%20a%20significa
nt%20impact,and%20national%20health%20promotion%20and%20disease%20pr
evention%20initiatives (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
15 The Nutritional School Lunch Program is statutorily required to be in line with
the Dietary Guidelines. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1758 (a)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 117-80); 42 U.S.C.A § 1773 (e)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 11780).
16 See SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
NCES 2010-015, STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
GROUPS IV (2010).
11
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animal products such as meat and dairy)17 while favoring plant-based
unsaturated fats, even in highly processed foods and those containing
trans fats.
Trans fats have been linked to increase heart attacks, stroke,
and type 2 diabetes.18 Prior to the invention of Crisco and margarine
(trans fats made from hydrogenated vegetable oils), Americans
almost exclusively cooked with butter and animal fats. Consumers
shifted away from traditional foodways as mechanization of hulling
and pressing seeds and beans made vegetable oils cheaper than
raising and slaughtering animals for butter or animal fat.19
Additionally, the federal government, scientists and aggressive
advertising convinced consumers that unsaturated vegetable fats, and
not animal fats, should be used as part of a sanitary and nutritious
diet.20 Unnoticed is the influence of the plant-based Seventh-Day
Adventist church on our national food policy.
Beyond the growing theological influence on its followers,
the church is profoundly influential in how we understand nutrition.
And the Dietary Guidelines reflect the more than 100 years of
lobbying against meat and saturated fat. Founded in the midnineteenth century, Seventh-Day Adventist is a homegrown
American religion. Since its inception, the church has promoted a
grain-based, processed food diet.21 Some of its most famous
followers were The Kelloggs brothers: Dr. John Harvey Kellogg,
inventor of Kellogg’s Corn Flakes®, and Will Keith Kellogg,
founder of Kellogg’s Cereal Company.22 But perhaps the most
notable of the church’s followers was Dr. Kellogg’s mentee, Lenna
Frances Cooper.

17

There are plant-based foods with large amounts of saturated fat, namely,
avocado and coconut. The 2020 Dietary Guidelines still suggest using alternatives
to coconut oil because of its high percentage of saturated fat. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.
& U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DIETARY GUIDELINES FOR AMERICANS
2020-2025: MAKE EVERY BITE COUNT WITH DIETARY GUIDELINES 44 (2020).
18 Laura Cassiday, Big Fat Controversy: Changing Opinions About Saturated Fats,
AOCS, https://www.aocs.org/stay-informed/inform-magazine/featuredarticles/big-fat-controversy-changing-opinions-about-saturated-fats-june2015?SSO=True (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
19 Id.
20 See NINA TEICHOLZ, THE BIG FAT SURPRISE: WHY BUTTER, MEAT, AND CHEESE
BELONG IN A HEALTHY DIET 284 (2015).
21 See ELLEN G. WHITE, COUNSELS ON DIET AND FOODS 267 (1938).
22 Howard Markel, The Secret Ingredient in Kellogg’s Corn Flakes Is Seventh-Day
Adventism, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 28, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/secret-ingredient-kelloggs-corn-flakesseventh-day-adventism-180964247/.
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Cooper served as the first Supervising Dietitian for the U.S.
Army, where she played a seminal role in setting nutrition standards
during World War I. Her 1917 book, How to Cut Food Costs, was
published during a time when the American public was being urged
to reduce consumption of key staples feeding soldiers on the front
lines. The book set forth the premise that meat shouldn’t be eaten
because it was unhealthy, and instead recommended a grain-based
diet.23 Cooper went on to co-found the Academy of Nutrition and
Dietetics (formerly known as the American Dietetic Association),
and write the textbook used in dietetic and nursing programs
globally.24
To this day, the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics plays a
major role in nutrition science by establishing the curriculum for
university nutritional science programs,25 publishing a magazine and
peer-reviewed journal,26 and lobbying state governments for
mandatory state licensing for Registered or Licensed Dieticians in
order to work in hospitals and public schools.27 Of the twenty
members of the 2020 Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee, nine
members were dieticians, arguably in violation of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA).28 FACA requires all federal
advisory committees to be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of
view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory

23

While beef is rich in calcium, cereals contain calcium only when fortified. Yet,
in her book, Cooper found that “cereals, which include all kinds of bread stuffs, as
well as breakfast foods, supply important building material for the bones.” LENNA
FRANCES COOPER, HOW TO CUT FOOD COSTS 16 (1917).
24 See John Westerdahl, Academy Co-Founder Lenna Frances Cooper: A Pioneer
in Vegetarian Nutrition and Dietetics, VEGETARIAN NUTRITION,
https://www.vndpg.org/vn/about/academy-co-founder-lenna-frances-cooper-apioneer-in-vegetarian-nutrition-and-dietetics (last visited Feb. 24, 2022).
25 See Accredited Programs Directory, ACAD. OF NUTRITION & DIETETICS,
https://www.eatrightpro.org/acend/accredited-programs/accredited-programsdirectory?rdType=url_edit&rdProj=acend_prog&rdInfo=dpd (last visited Feb. 24,
2022).
26 See Aims & Scope, J. ACAD. NUTRITION &
DIETETICS, https://www.jandonline.org/content/aims (last visited Feb. 24, 2022);
About Us, FOOD & NUTRITION MAG., https://foodandnutrition.org/about-us/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2022).
27 See CAL. ACAD. OF NUTRITION & DIETETICS, https://dietitian.org/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2022).
28 See AGRIC. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF THE 2020
DIETARY GUIDELINES ADVISORY COMMITTEE: ADVISORY REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 1
(2020).

2022]

BLACK OWNED BEEF

43

committee.”29 Despite a cozy relationship with Big Sugar,30 the
Academy continues to have a stronghold on nutrition science.
In addition to new data calling into question previous
findings on saturated fat, in 2016 researchers exposed Big Sugar’s
funding seminal research linking saturated fat to heart disease.31 Yet
antiquated positions on saturated fats continue to permeate our
nutritional standards. Equating nutritional profiles of all beef
penalizes beef cattle raised with practices that can ensure beef as part
of a healthy diet. It also lets industrialized animal agriculture off the
hook by not emphasizing how their practices degrade the nutritional
quality of the meat they produce. There’s evidence that grass-fed
beef is healthier compared to grain-finished, factory-farmed beef.
Grass-fed beef has been found to contain higher amounts of
conjugated linoleic acid (a fatty acid associated with reducing body
fat levels),32 omega-3,33 vitamins A and E,34 and less
monounsaturated fat35 and omega 6 fatty acids (the consumption of
which has been associated with elevated inflammation).36
Emblematic of the current nutritional zeitgeist, journalists,
hospital nutritionists, influencers and hip-hop artists are telling
African-Americans to turn away from meat consumption.37 And it’s
working. A 2020 Gallup poll found that African-Americans were
29

5 U.S.C. App. §5(b)(2).
See Alexandra Sifferlin, Soda and Snack Food Companies Welcomed at
Nutrition Conference, TIME (Oct. 14, 2016), https://time.com/4531268/junk-foodnutrition-diet/.
31 See Cristin E Kearns et al., Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease
Research: A Historical Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, JAMA INTERNAL
MED. (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5099084/pdf/nihms816629.pdf.
32 See Leah D. Whigham, et al., Efficacy of Conjugated Linoleic Acid for Reducing
Fat Mass: A Meta-Analysis in Humans, 85 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1203, 1203
(2007), https://academic.oup.com/ajcn/article/85/5/1203/4632999.2.
33 See A.J. McAfee et al., Red Meat from Animals Offered a Grass Diet Increases
Plasma and Platelet n-3 PUFA in Healthy Consumers, 105 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 80,
80, 87 (2011).
34 See Cynthia A. Daley et al., A Review of Fatty Acid Profiles and Antioxidant
Content in Grass-Fed and Grain-Fed Beef, 9 NUTRITION J. 1, 9 (Mar. 10, 2010),
https://nutritionj.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1475-2891-9-10.pdf.
35 Mary E. Van Elswyk & Shalene H. McNeill, Impact of Grass/Forage Feeding
Versus Grain Finishing on Beef Nutrients and Sensory Quality: The U.S.
Experience, 96 MEAT SCI. 535, 536-37 (2014).
36 See Daley et al., supra note 34, at 4-6, 9.
37 Laura Reiley, The Fastest-Growing Vegan Demographic Is African Americans.
Wu-Tang Clan and Other Hip-Hop Acts Paved the Way, WASH. POST (Jan. 24,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/24/fastest-growingvegan-demographic-is-african-americans-wu-tang-clan-other-hip-hop-acts-pavedway/.
30
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more likely to be flexitarians, those who have reduced meat
consumption by eating a “flexible,” mostly vegetarian diet, and fully
vegan.38 Although vegetarians and vegans are still a small minority
of the population, African-Americans are the fastest growing
segment within veganism, with The Washington Post reporting that
eight percent of African-American adults consider themselves
vegans.39 In a People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA)
article on Black celebrity vegans, most of the celebrities point to
health issues in embracing plant-based diets.40 African-Americans
are more likely to report food allergies than either Whites or
Hispanics,41 and African-Americans with food allergies are more
likely to be vegan or vegetarian.42
Food allergies can point to larger health issues. For instance,
one reason people shift to plant-based diets is due to maldigestion of
meat. This maldigestion could be caused by an infection of H. pylori,
a bacteria that hooks itself into its host’s stomach lining. Whereas the
stomach acid required to digest meat would kill the bacteria, H.
pylori’s main defense is to suppress stomach acid production, leaving
the host with uncomfortable to painful gastritis. Two major cancers
have been linked to H. pylori. It is the main cause of stomach
cancer,43 and linked to colorectal cancer in African-Americans44 (the
cancer which caused the untimely passing of the beloved King of
Wakanda45). The prevalence of H. pylori in African-Americans is
stark: African Americans are thought to have a prevalence around
38

See Justin McCarthy & Scott Dekoster, Nearly One in Four in U.S. Have Cut
Back on Eating Meat, GALLUP (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/282779/nearly-one-four-cut-back-eating-meat.aspx.
39 Reiley, supra note 37.
40 Zachary Toliver, These 47 Black Vegans Who Save Animals Inspire PETA,
PETA, https://www.peta.org/blog/black-vegans-saving-animals/ (last updated Feb.
3, 2022).
41 Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, The New Food Fights: U.S. Public Divides over
Food, PEW RSCH. CTR. 25 (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2016/11/PS_2016.12.01_Food-Science_FINAL.pdf. 27
percent of Blacks, 13 percent of Whites, and 11 percent of Hispanics say they have
food allergies. Id.
42 See id. at 11.
43 See Łukasz Hołubiuk & Jacek Imiela, Diet and Helicobacter Pylori Infection, 11
GASTROENTEROLOGY REV., Mar. 2016, at 150, 150-54.
44 Julia Butt et al., Serologic Response to Helicobacter pylori Proteins Associated
with Risk of Colorectal Cancer Among Diverse Populations in the United States,
156 GASTROENTEROLOGY 175, 181 (2018).
45 See UC Davis Comprehensive Cancer Center, Chadwick Boseman: Actor’s
Death Reflects a Rise in Colorectal Cancer Rates Among Young Adults,
SYNTHESIS, Winter 2021,
https://health.ucdavis.edu/synthesis/issues/winter2021/patient_focus/chadwickboseman.html.
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50-60%, a 2- to 6-fold increased odds compared to Whites.46 So
instead of pushing a plant-based agenda, professionals and
influencers should educate the African-American about the potential
health issues food allergies may evidence.
III. An Environmental Movement
Food justice has its origins in the fight against pollution
endemic to urban minority communities.47 Today, environmental
concerns weigh heavily in Black communities, with a majority of
African-Americans being seriously concerned about climate
change.48 While climate change solutions are at the center of the
current food justice movement, they are driven by an urban
agricultural, plant-based regime advocated by wealthy donors, such
as Bill Gates,49 and the United Nations.50 Industrialized beef
production practices have been linked to climate change,51 yet the
dominant solution narratives ignore the “industrialized” portion of
this equation. In analyzing the work of eco-philosopher Thomas
Berry, African-American environmentalist Carl Anthony
summarizes Berry’s position on the problems created by
industrialization as a dominant paradigm:
“On one side are those who believe in the power of
science and industry to guide us to a safer and more
abundant future... scientific materialism has caused
us to lose touch with spiritual, ethical, and aesthetic
dimensions of life and has led to mass extinctions
and an increasingly toxic industrial environment.”52
46

Meira Epplein et al., Race, African Ancestry, and Helicobacter pylori Infection
in a Low-Income United States Population, 20 CANCER EPIDEMIOL BIOMARKERS
PREV. 826, 827 (2011).
47 CARL ANTHONY, THE EARTH, THE CITY, AND THE HIDDEN NARRATIVE OF RACE 26
(2017).
48 See Matthew Ballew, et al., Which Racial/Ethnic Groups Care Most About
Climate Change?, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N (Apr. 16,
2020), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/race-and-climatechange/.
49 James Temple, Bill Gates: Rich Nations Should Shift Entirely to Synthetic
Beef, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb14, 2021),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/14/1018296/bill-gates-climatechange-beef-trees-microsoft/.
50See generally Int’l Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE AND
LAND: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DESERTIFICATION, LAND
DEGRADATION, SUSTAINABLE LAND MANAGEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, AND
GREENHOUSE GAS FLUXES IN TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS 7 (P.R. Shukla et al., eds.,
2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/4/2020/02/SPM_UpdatedJan20.pdf.
51 See id.
52 ANTHONY, supra note 47, at 141.
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Instead of promoting de-industrialized beef production
practices as a climate change solution, powerful institutions such as
the United Nations (UN) promote industrialized plant-based
solutions. An example of this is factory and laboratory crafted plantbased “meats,” with the UN naming Beyond Meat and Impossible
Foods the 2018 Champions of the Earth, the UN’s highest accolade
for the environment.53 However, these plant-based meats rely on the
same destructive surpluses of soybeans and corn that fueled the
expansion of factory farming. In addition, the environmental impact
and food safety of these products are unknown. Finally, shifting
consumption away from beef to plant-based proteins flies in the face
of environmental justice and racial and gender equity by placing the
primary supply of protein into the hands of corporations, their
investors, and their mostly White male executives.
Yet, there have been proposals to accelerate the shift of
consumers away from beef and toward plant-based proteins by
making meat more expensive through use of a meat tax, with
proponents such as Vice President Kamala Harris.54 According to
FAIRR, a “global network of investors who regard the issues linked
to intensive animal production and seek to minimize the risks within
the broader food system,” a meat tax is now becoming increasingly
likely as a result of the Paris Climate Accord.55 There is little to no
consideration that a tax would disproportionately impact food costs
for low-income communities of color.
While Black communities face a possible regressive tax on
their food to pay for the harmful impacts of industrialized animal
agriculture, they are already paying the price of the destruction to
their environments caused by concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs).56 Whereas factory farming operations used to
See Press Release, UN Env’t Programme, Plant-Based Meat Revolutionaries
Win UN’s Highest Environmental Honor (Sept. 28, 2018).
54 See Amanda Radke, Politician Vows to Tax Producers to Make Beef More
Expensive, BEEF MAG. (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.beefmagazine.com/beef/politician-vows-tax-producers-make-beefmore-expensive.
55 FARM ANIMAL INVESTMENT RISK & RETURN [FAIRR], THE LIVESTOCK LEVY:
PROGRESS REPORT 9 (Jun. 30, 2020).
56 There isn’t much data on whether beef cattle CAFOs (concentrated animal
feeding operation) are concentrated in predominately African-American
communities. Although most cattle farms are found in the Black Belt, most beef
cattle CAFOs are in midwestern states. See S. M. Rafael Harun & Yelena OgnevaHimmelberger, Distribution of Industrial Farms in the United States and
Socioeconomic, Health, and Environmental Characteristics of Counties, 2013
53
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be found in urban areas, they’ve mostly been relocated to rural
areas.57 Thus, ironically, rural populations are now getting the brunt
of the harmful impacts of CAFOs which are used to feed an
increasingly urbanized world.
Largely overlooked are the increasing number of studies that
find cattle raised in regenerative agricultural settings could play an
important part in climate change mitigation. A 5-year study by
researchers from Michigan State University and the Union of
Concerned Scientists found that as opposed to continuous grazing or
feed-lot finishing systems, grass-fed beef from adaptive multipaddock (AMP) grazed and finished cattle not only offset their
greenhouse gas emissions, but may also be net carbon-negative by
virtue of sequestering carbon in the soil.58 And when you add to this
the fact that the organic matter sequestering this carbon also retains
a massive amount of water in the soil, AMP grazed beef could
actually be one of the most environmentally sustainable foods for
some climates and ecosystems.59
IV. An Anti-Racist Movement
In addition to environmental justice underpinnings,
proponents of plant-based diets raise racial equity issues. For
instance, Black veganism itself carries a racial justice component. As
one writer explains: “To be a Black Vegan is a revolutionary act.
Why? Because it takes courage to unlearn what we’ve been taught
both by our families and by governmental agencies who allegedly

GEOGRAPHY J. 3, 4 (July 15, 2013),
https://downloads.hindawi.com/archive/2013/385893.pdf. It is likely that because
these states lack significant African-American populations outside of urban areas,
there aren’t many studies on the issue. However, a study of Ohio’s CAFOs found
that African-American, Hispanic, and poor communities were disproportionately
impacted. See Julia Lenhardt & Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger, Environmental
Injustice in the Spatial Distribution of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in
Ohio in POLITICAL ECOLOGIES OF MEAT 127, 133 (Jody Emel & Harvey Neo eds.,
2015). The most significant research on the detrimental impact of CAFOs on
African-American communities was on hog CAFOs in North Carolina. See
generally Nicole Wendee, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North
Carolina, 121 ENVT’L HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, June 2013, at 182, 183 (2013).
57 See WILLIAM KANDEL, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RECENT
TRENDS IN RURAL-BASED MEAT PROCESSING 1 (2009).
58 See Paige L. Stanley, et al., Impacts of Soil Carbon Sequestration on Life Cycle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Midwestern USA Beef Finishing Systems, 162
AGRIC. SYS. 249, 250 (2018).
59 See Jong-Yoon Park, et al., Evaluating the Ranch and Watershed Scale Impacts
of Using Traditional and Adaptive Multi-Paddock Grazing on Runoff, Sediment
and Nutrient Losses in North Texas, USA, 240 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T. 32,
36 (2017).
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‘want the best for us.’” 60 Many have animal welfare concerns and
added to these concerns are the vestiges of slavery when AfricanAmericans were legally considered property, like animals, and
treated inhumanely.61
However, anti-colonialism rhetoric misses the irony that the
nutrient-dense superfoods they rely on are products of colonialism.
From coconut oil to avocados, these foods are plucked from abroad
per American trade hegemony. The Global South’s small farmers,
farmworkers, food autonomy, and environment suffer to feed our
insatiable appetite for tropical plants. For instance, the ethics of
plant-based protein cashews should be questioned as cashew
harvesting requires laborers to work under unbearable conditions,
often suffering burns from the caustic acid within cashew shells.62
Additionally, anti-racist stances against beef production and
consumption miss the important role cattle have played in American
racial justice movements.
Churches serving northern, urban Black populations
preached the importance of farming within self-support systems.
Religious leaders like Father Divine would lead his followers from
his interracial Harlem-based church to a farm in New York’s rural
Hudson Valley. Among other livestock, they would raise cattle for
their own use or to sell.63 The Nation of Islam, founded in Detroit,
would set up a farm in the 1960s (though it was shuttered by the

60

Danni Roseman, How Black Veganism Is Revolutionary and Essential for Our
Culture, BLAVITY (Jun. 25, 2017), https://blavity.com/black-veganism-isrevolutionary?category1=communitysubmitted&subCat=health&category2=health.
61 The MOVE organization was a social justice driven organization active in
Philadelphia during the 1970s through the mid-1980s. Radical environmentalists
and vegans, most members were killed in 1985 when Philadelphia police dropped
two bombs on their house, which led to several residential blocks being burnt to
the ground within the African-American enclave of West Philadelphia. In a written
interview, one of the only surviving members recounts: “We exposed the crimes of
government officials on every level,” Janine Africa wrote to me. “We
demonstrated against puppy mills, zoos, circuses, any form of enslavement of
animals. We demonstrated against Three Mile Island [nuclear power plant] and
industrial pollution. We demonstrated against police brutality. And we did so
uncompromisingly. Slavery never ended, it was just disguised.” Ed Pilkington, A
Siege. A Bomb. 48 Dogs. And the Black Commune that Would Not Surrender, THE
GUARDIAN (July 31, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/asiege-a-bomb-48-dogs-and-the-black-commune-that-would-not-surrender.
62 See Jack Coulton, Cashew Nuts: A Toxic Industry, SLOW FOOD (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://www.slowfood.com/cashew-nuts-a-toxic-industry/.
63 A Virtual Tour of Father Divine’s Ulster County ‘Heavens’, TIMES HUDSON
VALLEY MEDIA (Feb. 13, 2019), http://timeshudsonvalley.com/stories/a-virtualtour-of-father-divines-ulster-county-heavens,4016.
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1990s).64 Farrahkan is quoted in the organization’s Final Call
newspaper, as describing farming and animal husbandry as “the first
professions,” and “the engine of every nation.”65 The Pan African
Orthodox Christian Church, also founded in Detroit, looked to the
South to purchase farm land to feed its congregation and to “strike a
devastating blow to the myth of Black inferiority and the pattern of
dependency that still shackles the minds of far too many,” and “offer
hope to young people who feel that their only hope is to beg for
employment from corporations that have already proven they don’t
need them or risk their lives in the illegal economy.”66 Today, while
their dream wasn’t fully realized, their farmland is leased to a Black
beef cattle producer.67
Though the Civil Rights era catapulted vegan ideology
amongst northern, urban Black populations,68 southern “back to the
land” agricultural cooperatives made plans to raise cattle as part of
self-sufficiency. Among them was Freedom Farmer Cooperative,
which was established by journalist and anti-poverty activist Fannie
Lou Hamer.69 There was also New Communities, a cooperative land
trust co-founded by Charles Sherrod, a founding member of Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in southwest Georgia,
and SNCC’s first Field Secretary.70 Still in operation today, the
Federation of Southern Cooperatives, a cooperative association of
Black farmers, landowners, and cooperatives, used cattle in their
training farm to promote cooperative economic development as a

Nafeesa Muhammad, The Nation of Islam’s Economic Program, 1934-1975,
BLACK PAST, (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.blackpast.org/african-americanhistory/the-nation-of-islams-economic-program-1934-1975/.
65 Ridgely Mu’min Muhammad & Abdul Arif Muhammad, Fox News Lies: Louis
Farrakhan Receives No Government Funding, NATION OF ISLAM,
https://www.noi.org/fox-news-lies_03-14-2014/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
66 The Beulah Land Farms Story- Mortgage Paid in Full October 2018, SHRINES
OF THE BLACK MADONNA, (last visited June 24, 2020),
https://www.shrinesoftheblackmadonna.org/beulah-land-story/.
67 America's Best Young Farmer & Ranchers: Gary Coleman Jr., PROGRESSIVE
FARMER, https://spotlights.dtnpf.com/abyfr/GC 2013.cfm (last visited June. 21,
2020).
68 See Amariah Mercer, A Homecoming, EATER (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.eater.com/22229322/black-veganism-history-black-panthers-dickgregory-nation-of-islam-alvenia-fulton.
69 MONICA M. WHITE, FREEDOM FARMERS: AGRICULTURAL RESISTANCE AND THE
BLACK FREEDOM MOVEMENT 65 (2018).
70 Shirley Sherrod, The Struggle for the Land: A Story from America’s Black Belt,
NONPROFIT Q., (Feb. 18, 2020), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/the-struggle-for-theland-a-story-from-americas-black-belt/.
64
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philosophy and to advance the stewardship of Black-owned land and
other natural resources in rural, low-income communities.71
In sum, cattle have played an important role in the AfricanAmerican journey for personal freedom and the economic welfare of
rural development. It naturally follows that the Black farmer’s ability
to continue to produce beef is key to economic justice for rural
communities. However, they face many hurdles in succeeding in the
industry.
V. Black Producers’ Beef with the Industry
The United States is the largest producer of beef, primarily
grain-fed beef for domestic and export consumption.72 In 2018, cattle
production was a $67 billion market that represented roughly 18
percent of all agricultural commodities cash receipts.73 Even so, in
this lucrative market, Black beef producers face many challenges,
namely one of profitability. As a Georgia farmer puts it, “We’re in
the game of raising cattle, but [White farmers] are in the business of
raising cattle.”74 Most Black farmers run a few heads of cattle to
diversify their operations,75 as usually crops and cattle succeed
inversely to the other.76
The U.S. beef industry consists of two production sectors:
cow-calf operations and cattle feeding.77 While there may be some
exceptions, Black beef producers run cow-calf operations: farms or
ranches where calves are born and raised to weaning age, and
subsequently sent to a stockyard, sold at auction, or sold to a
concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO), where they are
fattened up on grain.78 Cow-calf operations are the backbone of the
beef industry; they're mostly smaller operations with less than 100
71

See JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A HISTORY OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 118, 121
(2014).
72 Cattle & Beef, Sector at a Glance, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/cattle-beef/sector-at-a-glance/
(last updated Nov. 29, 2021).
73 See id. Data on 2018 cash receipts.
74 Interview with Handy Kennedy, Operator, HK Farm LLC, Co-founder,
AgriUnity (Dec. 2, 2021).
75 Interview with Ben Burkett, President, Nat’l Family Farm Coal. (Mar. 9, 2020).
76 Interview with Albert Jones, Farm Program Dir., Ark. Land & Cmty. Dev. Corp.
(June 9, 2020).
77 Cattle & Beef: Overview, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/cattle-beef/ (last updated Jan. 22,
2021).
78 See JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
EIB-189, THREE DECADES OF CONSOLIDATION IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 37 n. 20
(2018).
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cows.79 In an industry that’s becoming increasingly vertically
integrated, dominated by a few meat packing companies, cow-calf
operations are one of the few refuges in the meat industry for smallscale, independent producers.
Cow-calf operations take on the most risk as they only get
paid when they deliver healthy and hearty cattle to a feeding
operation. If a Black producer can manage to sell his cattle to a
stockyard, they’ll see more money in their pocket, instead of the
pockets of the middlemen at the auction or CAFOs.80 But most Black
producers don’t have the paperwork to prove their cattle’s pedigree,
and a stockyard isn’t going to take cattle without it. And the price
cattle demand at the auctions and CAFOs also depend on pedigree,
because it’s going to determine the beef grade, a uniform system for
valuing a feeder cattle based on the frame and muscle.81 A Black
producer’s payday may further be cut by discrimination: Many have
complained that their cattle will be incorrectly graded.82 But when it
comes to pricing, all cattle farmers are hurt from industry-wide low
prices of cattle. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, the price of
beef cattle had dropped to lows while the price consumers paid kept
inching up. The cause of this seemingly paradoxical situation is the
industry’s structure, and the bottleneck created by the meatpacking
companies.
The American public first learned about the machinations of
the meatpacking industry from Upton Sinclair’s famous novel, The
Jungle,83 which detailed its atrocious working environment at the
turn of the 20th Century. Less than two decades after this exposé was
published, a 1919 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report
concluded that the then “Big Five” meat packers had “attained such
a dominant position that they control at will the market in which they
buy their supplies, the market in which they sell their products, and
See ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SMALLSCALE U.S. COW-CALF OPERATIONS i (2011).
80 Interview with Handy Kennedy, supra note 74.
81 Feeder Cattle Grades and Standards, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., https://www.ams.usda.gov/grades-standards/feeder-cattle-grades-andstandards (last visited Mar. 7, 2022). United States Standards for Grades of Feeder
Cattle, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,587 (June 27, 2000).
82 U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS, 7 RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN AMERICAN
COMMUNITIES: POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND DISCRIMINATION: THE MISSISSIPPI DELTA
REPORT (2001).
83 The Jungle was published serially in 1905 and as a single-volume book in 1906.
An exposé of conditions in the Chicago stockyards, the book caused a public
outcry which led to the passing of the U.S. Pure Food and Drug Act. The 1906 act
helped improve conditions in slaughterhouses. Kate Lohnes, The Jungle: Novel by
Sinclair, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Junglenovel-by-Sinclair (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
79
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hold the fortunes of their competitors in their hands.”84 Following
these FTC findings, Congress passed the Packers and Stockyards Act
of 1921.85 While the Act was initially successful in breaking up the
meatpacking industry, by the 1980s reconsolidation began.86 While
the Big Five meatpackers in 1921 controlled 70 percent of the
market, the Big Four meatpackers currently sitting atop the
American beef industry— Tyson Foods, Cargill, National Beef, and
JBS— process about 85 percent of beef on the market.87 In 2019,
several anti-trust lawsuits were brought against the Big Four
claiming they colluded to fix prices, including reducing capacity or
closing plants. It wasn’t until the Covid-19 pandemic hit that the
USDA and Justice Department started investigating these
allegations.88
Even prior to the pandemic, the Big Four were making
record profits. But with the pandemic came an increase in demand,
and prices went up further.89 According to a 2021 White House blog
post, the Big Four’s profit margins increased 300 percent during the
pandemic.90 This occurred during a time when processing capacity at
plants were cut due to Covid-19 spreading amongst the labor force.
Longstanding unsafe conditions made plants a breeding ground for
the virus.91 Among the large immigrant workforce are Somali
refugees, Black laborers who routinely face discrimination.92 Until
84

Christopher R. Kelley, An Overview of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 2003
ARK. L. NOTES 35, 37.
85 See id. at 38.
86 Id.
87 Leah Nylen & Liz Crampton, ‘Something Isn’t Right’: U.S. Probes Soaring Beef
Prices, POLITICO (May 25, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/25/meatpackers-prices-coronavirusantitrust-275093.
88 Id.
89 See Chelsey Cox, Fact Check: Cattle Farmers Are Paid Less, Consumers Pay
More Amid Beef Shortage, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/06/05/fact-check-farmerspaid-less-consumers-pay-more-amid-beef-shortage/5311455002/ (last visited June
12, 2020).
90 Brian Deese et al., Recent Data Show Dominant Meat Processing Companies
Are Taking Advantage of Market Power to Raise Prices and Grow Profit Margins,
THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec.10, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/blog/2021/12/10/recent-data-show-dominant-meat-processing-companiesare-taking-advantage-of-market-power-to-raise-prices-and-grow-profit-margins/.
91 Michael Haedicke, Meat Factory Work Is Dangerous in Normal Times. The
Same Conditions Spread Covid-19, IN THESE TIMES (May 11, 2020),
https://inthesetimes.com/article/meat-processing-factory-farm-covid-19coronavirus-unions-worker-organizing.
92 See Chico Harlan, For Somalis, Hope Falls to the Cutting Floor: Refugees
Entrapped by Popular Meat Industry, THE WASH. POST (May 24, 2016),
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their arrival Black labor in the meatpacking industry had been on the
decline, having been replaced by Latino immigrants though some
Blacks did find work in supervisorial positions.93 A brutal job for
low-skilled employees who work on fast lines with dangerous
machinery, the virus ravaged workers’ health, while plant closures
sent them to join the unemployed. In the wake of safety issues, the
deputy director of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) said he expects human labor to be
“increasingly replaced by machines.”94 In the meantime, the Big
Four are rolling out their own plant-based “meats.”95 So while
meatpackers make unprecedented profit,96 they seemingly have no
intention of protecting American beef production nor employment
for rural communities and people of color.
That the Big Four’s oligopolistic hold of the market
detrimentally impacts cow-calf operators was never more apparent
when at the beginning of Covid-19 shutdowns beef shortages hit
grocery retailers although there was no shortage of beef cattle.
Because of the meatpacking bottleneck cattle prices plummeted, and
without an end buyer in place, auctions had fewer buyers attending.97
For Black producers, who mostly sell through auctions, this would
mean foregoing a sale altogether.98 The pandemic did increase
opportunities to sell directly to consumers who were worried about
access and about the safety of their meat.99 Unfortunately, for Black
cattle producers who’d like to process and sell their own beef, there
are major hurdles to getting around the Big Four. While Black
producers supplying beef to local communities were selling out, they
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/05/24/for-many-somalirefugees-this-industry-offers-hope-then-takes-it-away/.
93 See VANESA RIBAS, ON THE LINE: SLAUGHTERHOUSE LIVES AND THE MAKING OF
THE NEW SOUTH 32, 61 (2016).
94 Arthur Neslen, Rise of the Robo-Slaughtermen, POLITICO (May 25, 2020),
https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-rise-of-the-robot-slaughtermen/.
95 Chloe Sorvino, The World’s Largest Meat Seller Embraces Plant-Based
Proteins as Pandemic Demand Surges, FORBES (June 18, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2020/06/18/the-worlds-largest-meatseller-embraces-plant-based-proteins-as-pandemic-demand-surges/.
96 See Joe Fassler & H. Claire Brown, Why Covid-19 Plant Shutdowns Could Make
the Big Four Meatpackers Even More Profitable, THE COUNTER (May 14, 2020),
https://thecounter.org/covid-19-meat-plant-closures-food-prices-cattle/.
97 Samantha Masunaga et al., People Want Beef. Ranchers Have Cows. Here’s
What’s Going Wrong, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-05-12/how-coronavirus-disruptedcalifornia-meat-plants.
98 Interview with Albert Jones, supra note 76.
99 Lillianna Byington, As Meat Giants Face Scrutiny, Small and Niche Producers
Capitalize, FOOD DIVE (June 8, 2020), https://www.fooddive.com/news/as-meatgiants-face-scrutiny-small-and-niche-producers-capitalize/578687/.
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were unable to meet the increased demand for their product because
of the backlog at custom processing abattoirs.100
Processing infrastructure remains a critical bottleneck in the
supply chain. Under current law, meat offered for retail sale must be
butchered under the supervision of a USDA Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) employee or by inspectors in states with
FSIS equivalent certification. Only 27 states operate equivalent
inspection programs.101 While these are states that hold a significant
number of Black-operated farms, there still aren’t enough
independent slaughterhouses— i.e., abattoirs— or USDA inspectors
to service most small to mid-size cattle producers locally or even
regionally, and without a constant throughput smaller facilities aren’t
profitable and are soon shuttered.102 Black-owned beef abattoirs are
nonexistent.103
Several years earlier legislation was introduced in the House
that would lower barriers for new meatpacking facilities. Introduced
in 2015, the Processing Revival and Intrastate Meat Exemption
(PRIME) Act, would have allowed states to legalize the sale of
custom-processed meat direct to household customers and to
restaurants, hotels, grocery stores, farmers’ markets, and other
establishments that directly serve consumers in a state.104 The
PRIME Act never left committee.105 While cow-calf operators and
Muslims, whose halal practices require strict animal welfare
100

See P.J. Huffstutter & Rod Nickel, 'How About Next June?' Small Meat
Processors Backlogged as Virus Idles Big Plants, REUTERS (May 26, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-meatpacking/how-aboutnext-june-small-meat-processors-backlogged-as-virus-idles-big-plantsidUSKBN23217V.
101 A subset of the 27 states that have Meat and Poultry Inspection Programs also
have Cooperative Interstate Shipment agreements with the FSIS that allows meat
to be sold across state lines. These are mostly northern states, which don’t have a
significant number of Black-operated farms. See FSIS and Iowa Sign Cooperative
Interstate Shipment Agreement, FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC. (May 21, 2020), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/news-events/news-pressreleases/fsis-and-iowa-sign-cooperative-interstate-shipment-agreement-0.
102 See ROB HOLLAND & HAL PEPPER, UNIV. OF TENN. EXTENSION, INITIAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STARTING A SMALL-SCALE LIVESTOCK HARVEST AND PROCESSING
FACILITY 2-3 (2014).
103 In interviews with Black producers in Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Tennessee, and an unofficial survey of members of the National
Black Farmers Association, no one could point to a black-owned beef abattoir. The
author was able to locate a formerly black-owned abattoir in Tennessee that had
shuttered in around 2017-2018, and an abattoir in North Carolina slated to open
February 2022.
104 Processing Revival and Interstate Meat Exception (PRIME) Act, H.R. 3187,
114th Cong. (2015).
105 Id.
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methods, advocated for the PRIME Act, it was the pandemic that
resulted in its political resurgence due to the general public’s
growing awareness of the food security and safety issues posed by
the consolidated meat supply chain.106
VI. UnCOOL Land and Marketing Issues
The United States is a net beef importer, purchasing lower-value beef
destined for processing.107 Since 2015, foreign beef processed in the
U.S. can legally be labeled “Product of U.S.A.” even if the animal
was raised a continent away.108 As a response to a successful suit for
unfair trade practice filed with the World Trade Organization (WTO)
by Canada and Mexico, the USDA rolled back Country of Origin
Labeling (COOL) for beef and pork products, allowing meat to be
sold without disclosing its home country on the label.109 And as
purveyors of beef that is graded low,110 Black producers are less able
to compete with these cheaper imports. So in order to compete in a
market with odds stacked against them, more Black cow-calf
operators are selling their grass-fed beef directly to consumers.
Grass-fed beef commands a premium for being healthier and more
environmentally sustainable. So, the ability to distinguish themselves
based on their production practices and country of origin is critical
to their brand for the sake of food safety and traceability. And with
Covid-19 consumers are becoming more wary of the food safety
issues of industrialized meat. Large meatpacking companies can
produce a single USDA-inspected beef product that contains more
than 100 animals hailing from multiple countries.111
106

Stephen Robert Miller, Amid Covid-19 Bottleneck in Meat Industry, PRIME Act
Gains Support, FERN’S AGRIC. INSIDER (June 3, 2020),
thefern.org/ag_insider/amid-covid-bottleneck-in-meat-industry-prime-act-gainssupport/.
107 Cattle & Beef: Overview, supra note 77.
108 Joe Fassler, Foreign Beef Can Legally Be Labeled “Product of U.S.A.” It’s
Killing America’s Grass-Fed Industry, THE COUNTER (July 16, 2018),
thecounter.org/grass-fed-beef-labeling-fraud-country-origin/.
109 JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22955, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING
FOR FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING (2016).
110 Cattle finished on grass typically have lower USDA quality grades, an
indication of fat within the muscle, than grain fed cattle. Grass-Fed Beef
Production, PENN STATE EXTENSION (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://extension.psu.edu/grass-fed-beef-production.
111 McDonald’s, a JBS client, openly states their practice of buying beef patties
that contain multiple beef sources in a website FAQ: “Do McDonald's burgers
contain beef from lots of different cows? We only use whole cuts of 100% beef in
our burgers, from over 16,000 British and Irish farmers. Our patty supplier buys
whole cuts of forequarter and flank from approved abattoirs across the U.K. and
Ireland. Here the beef is prepared by skilled butchers before being minced and
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The pandemic’s disruption of the beef supply chain caused
an animal welfare and food waste catastrophe as thousands of cattle
were being culled on farms.112 It also brought the first shipment of
grass-fed beef imported from Namibia.113 Just the year prior to the
repeal of COOL, U.S. producers accounted for more than 60 percent
of the domestic grass-fed market.114 But by 2017, after the repeal of
COOL, American ranchers’ share of the domestic, grass-fed beef
market plunged.115 Now, American producers are estimated for only
15 percent of the grass-fed market.116 Without COOL, meat labeling
can easily confuse consumers into believing a beef product is
American produced. As a grass-fed beef producer explains:
“The splashy consumer-facing label features a USDA
organic seal, a USDA inspection sticker, and, in smaller
print, the phrase “processed in USA” alongside Trader Joe’s
corporate address in Monrovia, California. Of course,
foreign beef can still be certified USDA organic, and all
imported meat goes through USDA inspection.”117
But even with COOL in place, Black producers would still
struggle to compete in the grass-fed market because grass-finishing
cattle requires a lot of land, and African-Americans were historically
kept out of land ownership. After the Civil War, stock laws would
end traditional Southern agricultural practice of allowing livestock to
be grazed in the commons, and this served as one of the biggest
drivers of emigration from the South in search of economic
opportunity.118 For those who were able to obtain land, there were
shaped to create our hamburger patties. In the blending process, we do mix beef
from different delivery batches and the resulting batches can be made up of the
meat from more than 100 cattle.” Do Mcdonald’s Burgers Contain Beef from Lots
of Different Cows?, MCDONALDS, mcdonalds.com/gb/en-gb/help/faq/18908-domcdonalds-burgers-contain-beef-from-lots-of-different-cows.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2022).
112 See Sophie Kevany, Millions of Farm Animals Culled as US Food Supply
Chain Chokes Up, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/apr/29/millions-of-farm-animalsculled-as-us-food-supply-chain-chokes-up-coronavirus.
113 See Charmaine Ngatjiheue, Namibia's First Beef Batch Reaches US, MEAT
IMPORT COUNCIL OF AMERICA (Apr. 23, 2020), http://www.micausa.org/namibiasfirst-beef-batch-reaches-us/.
114 Fassler, supra note 108.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 MATTHEW HARPER, THE END OF DAYS: AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION 85 (2016). Under the old open grazing
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legal mechanisms used to divest them of it.119 Some AfricanAmericans would migrate to the West, but had limited access to
Homestead Acts’ land grabs.120 Known as exodusters, only the best
land was already taken and generally what was available was land
not fit for growing crops; and this kind of land is utilized to support
animal agriculture, which is why many turned to raising cattle for
subsistence.121 With these historical limitations and continuous
limited access to capital, Blacks aren’t able to compete for the best
land when acquiring farms, thus the total value of products sold per
acre are all significantly lower for Black farmers reflecting poorer
quality of land122 as well as less land.123 Pigford vs. Glickman
brought attention to the plight of Black farms’ survival and the
USDA’s racially discriminatory policies that unfairly led to the
foreclosure of farms owned by African-Americans.124 While farmers
ultimately won a settlement, many had already lost their land.
Finally, a major barrier to Black beef producers supplying
local communities is a lack of communications infrastructure in rural
areas. A lack of internet access— and sometimes even a phone
connection— has already plagued Black farmers by creating a barrier
to receiving USDA programs and services.125 This digital divide also
poses a challenge to connecting with customers through direct online
marketing.

system, responsibility for protecting crop lands lay with farmers, who had to build
fences around their fields to keep animals out. Stock laws shifted liability and cost
of fencing from the crop cultivator to the livestock owner. Id.
119 Vann R. Newkirk II, This Land Was Our Land: How Nearly 1 Million Black
Farmers Were Robbed of Their Livelihood, 324 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2019,
at 74, 76, 78-80.
120 The 1862 Homestead Act and Kinkaid Act of 1904 allowed for public domain
land to be acquired free of charge with a modest filing fee. See Homestead Act of
1862, ch. 75 § 1,12 Stat. 392; Kinkaid Act, Pub. L. No. 58-233, 33 Stat. 547
(1904).
121 BRUCE A. GLASRUD & CHARLES A. BRAITHWAITE, AFRICAN AMERICANS ON THE
GREAT PLAINS: AN ANTHOLOGY 7 (2009); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
HISTORY 1896 TO THE PRESENT: FROM THE AGE OF SEGREGATION TO THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 30 (Paul Finkelman et al. eds., 2009).
122 See BANKS, supra note 7, at 10-11, 15.
123 According to the 2017 Ag Census, 85 percent of Black farms vs 70 percent of
U.S. farms generally, had fewer than 180 acres. See NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 3.
124 CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF
DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS 1 (2013).
125 See Greg Kaufmann, Black Farm Families Face a Struggle for a Share of
COVID-19 Aid, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY (May 5, 2020),
https://spotlightonpoverty.org/spotlight-exclusives/black-farm-families-face-astruggle-for-a-share-of-covid-19-aid/.
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VII. Envisioning Equitable Beef
Rather than advocating policies that would eradicate Black
beef production, food justice activists should advocate for a
revamped beef industry: Small-scale, humane, and soil enriching
beef production supporting food security for local communities. The
FAO has also recognized that livestock contribute to poverty
alleviation by building resilience and supporting the livelihoods of
large numbers of rural people by providing food security and
economic opportunity.126 Among economic benefits is the circulation
of money back into Black and rural economies. As the FAO warns
about global famines from global food supply chain disruptions due
to Covid-19, localized food chains are more important than ever.127
The following are policy considerations to help build a racially
equitable beef industry:
Revisit nutritional standards. In recognizing that beef is the basis
of a culturally relevant, nutritious diet, advocating for rigorous
evidence-based data around nutrients, including saturated fats.
Reject calls for a meat tax. Unfair imposition of a tax will
detrimentally impact small beef producers, thus having a
disproportionate impact on Black producers. It also places a
regressive tax on low-income consumers. Instead, advocate for the
removal of government subsidies on corn and soybean so that the
price of meat increases to reflect the true cost of production. In
addition, this would make CAFOs less profitable, if at all
economically viable.
Increase producer participation in local food systems. Nutritious,
affordable, and high-quality food is out of reach for many lowincome neighborhoods, communities of color, and rural areas: Eight
percent of African Americans live in a tract with a supermarket,
while 20 percent of rural counties are food deserts. 128 Increasing
direct-to-consumer opportunities (CSAs, farmers’ market, and
online) for Black beef producers could help meet this need. As
custom processed beef has higher costs, affordability may be a

126

Food & Agric. Org. Of the United Nations [FAO], Shaping the Future of
Livestock 5 (Jan. 2018), https://www.fao.org/3/I8384EN/i8384en.pdf.
127 See FAO Needs $350 Million to Avert Rising Hunger as Countries Reel from
COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impact, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(May 18, 2020), https://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1276081/icode/.
128 SARAH TREUHAFT & ALLISON KARPYN, POLICYLINK, THE GROCERY GAP: WHO
HAS ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS 7 (2010).
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factor.129 One way to address this issue would be to include producers
in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) authorized
retailers and provide assistance in doing so where there are no SNAP
authorized retailers.
Offering training in sustainable production. Utilizing extension
programs, provide producers with training on regenerative animal
agricultural practices. Operations cost will decrease as less feed will
be needed. Sustainable production would transform farms from
specialized to diversified operations, including reverting back to
traditional practices of having multi-use cattle that provide a wide
diversity of products, ranging from milk, leather, tallow, and beef to
increase income and cut food waste. This closed system would also
increase total farm productivity by providing natural fertilization for
crops, and in turn using crop residues into cattle feed into valuable
protein. Fertilizer could also present an additional income source, as
they are needed in the booming organic farming industry. Finally, by
aiding producers toward raising animals in a natural environment,
producers will move away from using inputs that have cattle
competing for human-edible food.
Expand custom processing. Decentralizing meat distribution wrests
in producers’ ability to process their animals for director-to-market
sales. An additional benefit of producing beef for local consumption
is animal welfare. Local processing would cut down on injury to the
cattle during transportation and would decrease unnecessary cattle
harvesting adding to the glut of speculative demand to supply
domestic and international grocery stores, thereby also cutting down
on food waste caused by spoilage or food chain disruptions. Thus,
eliciting congressional support for the federal PRIME Act is
essential. Alternatively, constituents can advocate for state laws that
allow intrastate meat sales. One example is Wyoming’s Food
Freedom Law that allows ranchers to process cattle on the farm and
sell cuts of meat directly to in-state consumers by making those
consumers part-owners of the cattle.130 Another example would be,
The Kentucky Proud Meat Grader Program funded by the Kentucky
Department of Agriculture, which provides USDA-certified meat
grading services to Kentucky Proud members as a service designed

129

See RENEE CHEUNG & PAUL MCMAHON, BACK TO GRASS: THE MARKET
POTENTIAL FOR U.S. GRASSFED BEEF 30 (2017),
https://www.stonebarnscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/Grassfed_Full_v2.pdf.
130 WYO. STAT. ANN. §11-49-103 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Sess.).
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to provide small producers and processors a level playing field with
large-scale businesses at retail.131
Support worker-owned abattoirs. Cooperative organizations have
long been at the heart of the Black economic independence
movement. Whereas the purpose of an agricultural cooperative is to
augment leverage through aggregation, a worker cooperative puts the
workers at the core of the enterprise. By having workers own the
business and they participate in its financial success on the basis of
their labor contribution, the cooperative ensures assets are owned and
controlled by the communities that depend on them for livelihoods,
sustenance, and ecological well-being. Most importantly, with
workers having the power to influence their workplace conditions,
workers would be in a position to better respond to pandemic and
other food safety issues.
Funding programs for new producers. Finally, while farmers of
all races are aging, the Black farmer is on average the oldest.
Congress should ensure funding for the Beginning Farmer and
Rancher Development Program, which was cut under the current
administration. The program supports new minority farmers and
ranchers.
Increase Access to Farmland. In order to help Black farmers secure
farmland and to remediate previous discriminatory practices, the
federal government should provide grants, low-interest loans, and
99-year leases of public land.
VIII. Staking Space in Food Justice
In conclusion, food justice advocates should reframe
mainstream narratives that push out Black farmers. Already
marginalized by the highly industrialized meat industry, Black beef
producers should not be further marginalized by calls for the end of
beef production. Rather, supporting policies to create equitable beef
production is not only good for Black producers, but all American
beef producers and consumers.
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Ray Bowman, KDA Initiates Beef Grading Program, KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
(May 4, 2015), https://www.kyfb.com/federation/newsroom/kda-initiates-beefgrading-program/.

The Broken Beef Cattle Industry: COOL, COVID and
CattleTrace
Hayden L. Ballard*
I. Introduction
“A page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 1
~ U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1921) ~
Kansas City, Missouri – 1922. Just west of Kansas City,
down in the river bottoms along the Missouri River, a hired hand
throws a saddle across the back of an old sorrel gelding. He’s done
this a hundred times before, day in and day out, week after week,
riding pens for the Kansas City Stockyards checking for sick or
downed steers, checking feed and water, and sorting cattle. New
steers come in daily from across the West and Midwest, most either
trailed or trucked in, and most destined for markets back East in
places like Chicago and New York. For a moment, the pen rider
looks up at the colossal Livestock Exchange Building with its 475
offices, making it the largest livestock exchange building in the
world, and one of the largest office buildings in Kansas City.2 Cattle
buyers and sellers are constantly moving in and out of the Livestock
Exchange Building where huge blackboards hang on the wall
showing the ever changing spot prices for cattle from across the
country, and where the tellers exchange money and title to cattle like
a well-oiled, free-market machine. The loud chugging and clanking
of the steam engines and the rail cars pulling up to the loading docks
perks up his horse’s ears and snaps the hired hand back to reality. He
waits for the cars to stop, then he drives a sorted pen of steers up the
alley, pushes them up the ramps, loads them on the cars, turns his
horse back and does it all over again.

*

The author, Hayden L. Ballard, is an attorney and policy analyst in Kanab, Utah.
Ballard holds a Juris Doctor degree from Washburn University School of Law, in
Topeka, Kansas, with Certificates of Concentration in Natural Resources Law, Oil
& Gas Law and Business & Transactional Law. Ballard also holds a Master of
Laws in Agricultural & Food Law from the University of Arkansas School of Law,
a Master of Science in Natural Resources from the University of Missouri, with an
emphasis in Agroforestry, as well as a Bachelor of Science in Political Science
from Southern Utah University, and an Associate of Arts in History from Colorado
Northwestern Community College. The author enjoys team roping and working on
the Ballard family ranch in Northern Arizona/Southern Utah raising Barzona and
Corriente cattle.
1N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
2 LIVESTOCK EXCH. BLDG., https://livestockexchangebldg.com (last visited Mar.
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To put the Kansas City Stockyards in perspective, at its
height in the early 1920’s, over 2.6 million head of cattle came
through the iconic stockyards each year,3 making it the 2nd largest
stockyards in America, second only to the Union Stockyards in
Chicago.4 (While the focus of the Kansas City Stockyards was beef
cattle, there were over 2 million head of hogs5 and thousands of sheep
that were sold through the yards on a cash basis every year).6 From
its humble beginnings as a small set of cattle pens on 5 acres in 1870,
the stockyards had grown to encompass 207 acres, with a handling
capacity of 170,000 head of cattle at any given time, and employed
over 20,000 people.7 Because of the Stockyards, for roughly a
century “[Kansas City] rivaled its big brother Chicago as a
transportation hub, meat packer and agribusiness powerhouse but
with its own Western flair.”8 This free-market inspired cattle industry
transformed Kansas City from a backwater town in Jackson County,
Missouri into a cattle mecca fueled cultural hub.9
However, by the early 1920’s, the free market, or cash
market, which had been used to dictate the fair market price for beef
cattle in places like the Kansas City Stockyards, was being replaced
by a corporatized, monopolized model. In 1920 this model, or
monopoly, was controlled by five large meat packing companies,
namely, Armour & Company, Cudahy Packing Company Morris &
Company, Swift & Company, and Wilson & Company.10 This
monopoly, controlled by the “Big Five” with its captive markets, was
suffocating the independent cattlemen and the rancher. The
monopoly caught the attention of President Woodrow Wilson back
in 1917 when he ordered the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to

3

See Story, STOCKYARDS DIST., http://www.kcstockyardsdistrict.com/story (last
visited Mar. 10, 2022).
4 See Kansas Citys Agriculture Roots Run Deep – Cowtown Turned Animal Health
and Technology Center, GALLAGHER, https://am.gallagher.com/enUS/Solutions/Case-Study-Listings/Kansas-Citys-Agriculture-Roots-Run-Deep--Cowtown-Turned-Animal-Health-and-Technology-Center (last visited Mar. 10,
2022).
5 See Johnny D. Boggs, Cattle, Cowboys, and Culture, TRUE W. MAG. (Feb. 27,
2018), https://truewestmagazine.com/cattle-cowboys-and-culture.
6 See Nancy Jorgensen, Where Did All the Cattle Go?, TODAY’S FARMER MAG.
(June 12, 2013), https://todaysfarmermagazine.com/mag/728-where-did-all-thecattle-go.
7 See id.
8 Boggs, supra note 6.
9 See id.
10 See Robert M. Aduddell & Lous P. Cain, The Consent Decree in the
Meatpacking Industry, 1920-1956, 55 BUS. HIST. REV. 359, 359 (1981).
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investigate the packing industry.11 In 1919 the FTC released its
report, finding that the Big 5 controlled roughly 70% of the market,
and had “attained such a dominant position that they control at will
the market in which they buy their supplies, the market in which they
sell their products, and hold the fortune of their competitors in their
hands.”12
The situation would soon catch the attention of Congress and
President Warren G. Harding (29th President of the United States
from 1921-1923).13 The year he took office, Congress would pass the
Packers & Stockyards Act of 1921 (Public Law 67-51, 42 Stat. 159,
7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.) (Packers and Stockyards Act),14 breaking up the
meat packing monopoly and breathing new life into the suffocating
beef cattle industry. Specifically, as stated by Congress, the purpose
of the Packers & Stockyards Act was "to assure fair competition and
fair trade practices, to safeguard farmers and ranchers...to protect
consumers...and to protect members of the livestock, meat, and
poultry industries from unfair, deceptive, unjustly discriminatory and
monopolistic practices...."15 This breakup of the meat packing
monopoly in 1921 and the protections put in place through the
Packers and Stockyards Act allowed the American cattle industry to
flourish throughout the rest of the 20th Century.
Kansas City, Missouri – 2022. Fast forward 100 years. The
hum and clanking of the cattle cars has been replaced with the hustle
and bustle of a modern city. The iconic Kansas City Stockyards are
long gone – closed back in 199116 and have long since been torn
down. If it weren’t for the old red brick Kansas City Livestock
Exchange Building (the former headquarters for the Stockyards built

A. McEowen, DOJ to Investigate Meatpackers – What’s It All About?,
AGRIC. L. & TAX’N BLOG (May 8, 2020),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2020/05/doj-to-investigatemeatpackers-whats-it-all-about.html.
12 FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE
MEATPACKING INDUSTRY PT. 1 (1919).
13 Warren G. Harding, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-thewhite-house/presidents/warren-g-harding/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
14 See Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-50, 42 Stat. 159
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-229b).
15Jurisdiction of Packers and Stockyard Acts: Hearing on H.R. 7743 and H.R.
8536 Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 85th Cong. 8 (1957); see generally Packers
and Stockyard Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-51, 42 Stat. 159 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229b).
16 See Diane Euston, Moove Over! It’s Time to Embrace Kansas City’s Cowtown
Past, MARTIN CITY TELEGRAPH (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://martincitytelegraph.com/2018/04/16/moove-over-its-time-to-embracekansas-citys-cowtown-past/.
11Roger
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in 1908)17 which still stands, one would have no idea that for over a
hundred years the Stockyards had even been there, let alone been the
keystone that made Kansas City one of the most famous “Cowtowns”
of the era. However, echoes of the past still remain. The Stockyards
lent themselves to making the Kansas City Strip steak a high demand
cut of beef (although it was later rebranded the New York Strip by
the famous Delmonico Brothers),18 and helped create the barbeque
culture, that to this day puts Kansas City on the map as one of the
greatest barbeque cities in the country. In talking about putting
Kansas City on the map, one can’t forget the American Royal
Agricultural Show (the predecessor to the American Royal) and the
namesake for the Major League Baseball Team, the Kansas City
Royals.19 All have their roots and beginnings in the Kansas City
Stockyards. Plus, it’s no coincidence that the nations center of animal
health and animal health technology is now firmly rooted in the
Kansas City Animal Health Corridor, thanks in part to Kansas City’s
Cowtown past.20 Today the West Bottoms where the Stockyards once
reigned supreme is full of shopping and modern housing options in
the aptly named Stockyards District.21
While the Stockyards themselves are gone, just like in the
early 20th Century, a beef monopoly has once again found its way
into the industry, and a way around the Packers and Stockyards Act
of 1921 and is again suffocating the industry. While at the time of
the act’s passage in 1921 five companies controlled the market, today
the market is even more consolidated in the “Big Four,” as the four
biggest meat packing companies in America are commonly known
(Cargill, Tyson, JBS and National Beef/Marfrig), and are again
arguably stifling the free-market. If Americans do not act quickly to
address this extreme consolidation, then the free-market,
independent cattle rancher will soon face the same fate as the Kansas
City Stockyards, and soon, like the Stockyards, will simply be history
and a distant memory. This is not only bad news for the American
rancher, but is even worse news for the American consumer, as the
17

See id.
See Bone Appetit: The History Behind the KC Strip, SULLIVAN’S STEAKHOUSE,
https://www.sullivanssteakhouse.com/bone-appetit-the-history-behind-the-kc-strip/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
19 See Jared Diamond & Kevin Helliker, Think the Kansas City Royals Are Named
for Kings? That’s a Bunch of Bull, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/didyou-know-the-kansas-city-royals-were-named-after-cows-not-kings-1413426602
(Oct. 16, 2014).
20 See generally About the Corridor, KAN. CITY ANIMAL HEALTH CORRIDOR,
https://kcanimalhealth.thinkkc.com/about (last visited Mar. 10, 2022); see also
Gallagher Kansas Citys Agriculture Roots Run Deep – Cowtown Turned Animal
Health and Technology Center, supra note 5.
21 See generally Story, supra note 4.
18
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consolidation creates food security and food safety issues, as
highlighted by the recent events of 2020-2021 surrounding the
COVID-19 pandemic.
To address this looming problem, this paper will highlight
three things:
Part I will show that like the monopoly
created by the Big Five in the early 20th Century, the
Big Four have again created a beef supply chain
monopoly and that the monopoly is again harming
beef producers.
Part II will examine the federal legislation
known as Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling
(MCOOL), which until 2015 was one of the tools that
independent beef producers used to overcome the
monopolistic practices of the Big Four. While
MCOOL was repealed some seven years ago, there
are still efforts to revive it, and it could still be
resurrected as part of a multi-pronged approach to
fixing the broken beef industry.
Part III will examine several other options for
alleviating the burden beef producers currently face
in the market and suggest several solutions to the
consolidation problem aside from simply restoring
MCOOL.
Perhaps by looking to the options presented in this paper,
there is still a fighting chance that the independent American rancher
and cattleman will not go by the wayside or become echoes of the
past like the Kansas City Stockyards and the Cowtowns of
yesteryear.
II. THE MONOPOLY
“The seasons still turn and the prairies still yearn
For those who were here long ago.
The Sioux have all gone and the bison moved on
And soon I will follow them home.” 22
A. CORPORATE CONTROL BY THE BIG FOUR AND
COVID-19

22

CHRIS LEDOUX, The Buffalo Grass, on HORSEPOWER (Cap. Recs. Nashville
2003).
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Hoxie, Kansas – 2022. On the high plains of Western
Kansas, the sun peaks over the eastern horizon and sends a soft glow
across the prairie. A weathered feedlot hand fires up the feed wagon
and the diesel engine reluctantly comes to life in the cold air and
chugs along. The steers out in the vast pens start to beller just a little
as they anticipate breakfast. This particular feedlot is the Hoxie
Feedyard, located just west of Hoxie, Kansas and has roughly 50,000
steers on feed at any given time. Scott Foote, the owner/manager has
several yards of approximately the same size scattered across
Western Kansas and Nebraska,23 making Foote Livestock the 6th
largest feedlot company in America.24
What makes this feedlot so unique is not the fact that Foote
Livestock has close to a quarter million steers on feed at any given
time between its several yards. No, what makes this particular feedlot
company unique, is that it is owned by a private, small-town
company. Unlike so many other major feedlots, it is not owned by
one of the four multi-national companies known in the industry as
“the Big Four” – Cargill, Tyson, JBS and National Beef/Marfrig. The
Big Four control roughly 85% of the meat packing market, and that
market share is growing at a surprisingly rapid rate.25 What is
particularly worrisome about that figure, is that in 1977 only 25% of
the industry was concentrated in these conglomerates, and that
number has risen to 85% in the 43 years since then.26
It may be beneficial before diving into a further analysis of
the Big Four and the beef industry to gain a clear picture of the
difference between a monopsony and a monopoly. In short, “a
monopsony is a market condition in which there is only one buyer,
the monopsonist…The difference between a monopoly and
monopsony is primarily in the difference between the controlling
entities. A single buyer dominates a monopsonized market while an

23

See Our Story, FOOTE CATTLE CO., https://footecattle.com/our-story/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2022).
24 Top 30 Cattle Feeders 2015, R-CALF USA, https://r-calfusa.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/160125-Top-30-Cattle-Feeders.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2022).
25 Brian Deese et al., Addressing Concentration in the Meat-Processing Industry to
Lower Food Prices for American Families, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 8, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/blog/2021/09/08/addressingconcentration-in-the-meat-processing-industry-to-lower-food-prices-for-americanfamilies/.
26 See Telephone Interview by Mackenzie Johnston with Sheila Ellis, Rancher
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://fair-cattle-markets.com/interviews/audio-sheila-ellisdiscusses-why-labeling-us-beef-is-vital-for-consumers-producers/?fbclid=IwAR2GGkDa2jo4hWzeo7mA6MogV8eLw8UxWc3oSOmCAYVYqr372fzST1108w.
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individual seller controls a monopolized market.”27 Here, if the Big
Four control 85% of the packing market, in truth they are a
monopsony where they effectively serve as the only buyers for cattle
ranchers and can effectively set the price for what ranchers are paid
for their product. However, because the Big Four also serve as the
sellers of processed beef to the retail markets, again controlling 85%
of the sector, they are also a monopoly in their relationship with
consumers. So, oddly enough, the Big Four are both a monopsony
and a monopoly – a bottleneck of sorts for the entire beef industry.
Because more people are likely familiar with the term “monopoly”
as compared to the term “monopsony” the remainder of this paper
will use the term monopoly when discussing the consolidation,
however, be advised that in truth the Big Four are both a monopoly
and a monopsony.
In addition to controlling the lion’s share of the packing
industry, through subsidiaries, the Big Four also control a large
percentage of the biggest feedlots in America. For example, while
Foote Livestock is the 6th largest feedlot company in America, the
award for largest in America goes to Five Rivers Cattle Feeding,
based in Greeley, Colorado, and owned by none other than JBS.28
Five Rivers has a combined 11 feedlots with a capacity of close to a
million head.29 As another example, the third largest feedlot
company is Cargill Cattle Feeders, LLC, a subsidiary of Cargill, Inc.
based in Wichita, Kansas.30 It appears the Big Four are not content
with controlling the packing industry, but also seek to (and do)
control a large swath of the cattle feeding sector as well.
The current problem in the beef cattle industry, specifically
the multi-national corporate control of the industry, is best explained
through a somewhat personal look at the industry through the eyes
of someone in the beef cattle industry. This problem was recently
explained by cattle rancher and R-CALF Board Member, Shad
Sullivan in an interview with entrepreneur Patrick Bet-David on his
network Valuetainment. Shad Sullivan was invited onto the show
because in early summer of 2020 Mr. Sullivan uploaded an
impromptu video on the social media platform YouTube discussing
the food security, food safety and other negative impacts of the
corporate takeover of the beef industry, all of which had been
brought to light by COVID-19. Essentially, because of the
consolidation in the beef packing industry, only four companies have
27

Julie Young, Monopsony, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/monopsony.asp. (Nov. 21, 2020).
28 See Top 30 Cattle Feeders 2015, supra note 25.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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processing plants across the country. In addition to one major plant
in Holcomb, Kansas being shut down because of a fire in the fall of
201931 because of the COVID-19 outbreak, processing plant
“workers are afraid to go to work because of COVID, which has
created a bottleneck or backlog of cattle waiting to be slaughtered.”32
But while there is a bottleneck of cattle waiting to be slaughtered,
meanwhile, the United States has begun importing beef from
countries like Namibia.33
Early on the interview, Patrick Bet-David asks, essentially,
so as a consumer why do I care. Specifically, he asks:
“PBD: How does that affect the average person…and
how am I impacted by what’s going on to you?
SS: Well you’re impacted by a supply issue, and a
food safety issue. So what has happened down
through the years is our federal government has
allowed acquisitions and mergers of multi-national
corporations to take over our food supply system. So
in the beef industry for example, we have four
companies that control 85% of the beef cattle supply
chain. Ok, so there we are, putting all our eggs in one
basket so to speak. So what happened is, the COVID
come in, we get these sick people, and because our
eggs are in one basket, we have the inability to
process those animals to get them to the consumer. So
the power that those companies have funnels down to
the consumer, you’re no longer able to get your
product, number one. Number two, the safety, they’re
importing a lower quality beef into our supply and
mixing it into our supply, which is increasing their
profits, oppressing our profits, and gouging the
consumer. So you don’t know exactly what kind of
product you’re getting. It does come down to a food
safety issue and a liberty issue.”34
The conversation then turned to the Big Four specifically,
and after establishing why the consumer should care about the
See Steve Kay, The Smoldering Impact of Tyson’s Holcomb Fire, MEAT +
POULTRY (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/22036-thesmoldering-impact-of-tyson-holcomb-fire.
32 See Valuetainment, Cattle Rancher Warns About the Meat You’re Buying,
YOUTUBE, at 5:05 (May 8, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8ioFjN7viY.
33 Id. at 4:21.
34 Id. at 6:45.
31
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consolidation in the industry, Patrick then asks exactly how this
consolidation is hurting the producer.
“PBD: How do they [the Big Four] bully you around
as the small business owner? Because maybe they can
afford to go through 6 months of bad times, where a
lot of folks in your world cannot. So what role do they
play making it difficult for you?
SS: They have taken away all competition. So with
the acquisitions and mergers over the last 25 or 30
years, they have gained more power and control, and
that has eliminated the competition. So lets say 30
years ago there would have been 800 processors
across the United States able to process and harvest
this beef. Where now, there are only four main
processors that harvest 85% of that chain. So what
they have done is totally eliminated cash competition.
What that does, is that has created their power to
network down and take control of the industry that
way.”35
Addressing the corporate control and depressed beef prices,
compared to other industries, Patrick then asks could you convince
new people to come into the beef industry under these circumstances.
“PBD: So you’re standing there…could you easily
sell others to consider getting into your industry
today?
SS: It’s financially impossible. As an individual it’s
financially impossible…
PBD: Why do you say that?
SS: Because of the overhead, it costs too much to start
up. It takes a lot of land, it takes a lot of
overhead…The proverbial term in the beef cattle
industry is, unless you marry it or inherit it, you aint
gonna have it. And that’s one of the problems that has
taken place as a result of this, it’s hard for families.
Everybody’s dream is to pass the family farm or ranch
down, and that’s totally impossible now. You can’t do
it…These young kids, it is impossible to get a start
up. You can get some government help as a first time
landowner or business owner, but the cost of the
35

Id. at 10:00.
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land…and the cost of the inputs are increasing and
gaining, so it’s impossible without a lot of equity or
cash in the bank to get a start. It’s nearly impossible.
And therefore across America we have seen
thousands of youth not return to the family operation
after high school or college.
PBD: Because of this specific reason?
SS: Correct.”36
Not only are youth not returning to family farms and
ranches because of the financial risk and inability to succeed, but
addressing the loss of American ranchers, earlier in the interview,
Patrick asked how many ranchers we have lost in the last 30 years.
We went from roughly 1.2 or 1.3 million operators, to
approximately 700,000.
“PBD: How many of these 700,000 are going to be
able to withstand the current challenges they’re
facing.
SS: That’s a good question…We could lose through
this COVID situation, we could lose plus 1/3 of
those this year.
PBD: You could lose a third! So we could go from
700,000 to 450,000 in the next 6 or 7 months!
SS: It is possible. Maybe more.”37
This loss of America’s ranchers because of the problems
induced by the Big Four corporate control of the beef industry, is not
a hypothetical issue. It is very real. In fact, during the interview, Shad
Sullivan admits that he and his family have had serious conversations
about having to sell out or at least sell off land just to get by. Patrick
follows up on this part of the conversation by asking:
“PBD: So you’ve actually considered that? You’ve
actually had that conversation?
SS: We are having it more and more every day. It’s
just a tough industry to be in, and if you’re not
profitable, well, it’s not good business. Let’s say
we’re spending $1,200 a head to make $900 a head,
that’s terrible business. We love the life, we love the
36
37

Id. at 18:15.
Id. at 20:20.
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legacy. But at some point you have to draw the line
and say ok, are we going to be business people or are
we going to lose everything we’ve put together over
the last 60 years and go from there. I don’t know. I
think you have to be a business person, you have to
be smart, and you have to be real.
PBD: You know, they don’t see legacy. They don’t
see family. They don’t see tradition. They don’t know
the stories you have with your pops and the lessons
you’re going to hand down to your 4-year-old son.
They just see profit margins. That’s all they see.
SS: That’s right….You know, there are two factions
in our industry, there’s the independent producer, and
then there’s the globalists. And those two factions are
fighting right now for what’s best for our industry.”38
This long set of quotes from the Shad Sullivan interview are
extremely helpful when discussing the problems presented by the Big
Four takeover of the beef industry. Instead of simply looking at
numbers and figures, the personal insight of a man trying to keep a
family operation up and running so he can hand that legacy down to
his own children is gut checking. Mr. Sullivan makes some
extremely good points, and does point out, there is a fight going on
for the future of the beef industry…those who wish to pass on the
western legacy and way of life vs. those who simply see profit
margins and spreadsheets.
B. The DOJ Investigation And Current Political Efforts
The consolidation issue caught the attention of President
Donald Trump in early 2020, and he ordered the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to open an investigation into the packing industry.
Specifically, the President ordered the DOJ to look into allegations
that U.S. meat packers broke antitrust law because the prices paid to
farmers and ranchers has declined even as meat prices rose. “I’ve
asked the Justice Department to look into it. ... I’ve asked them to
take a very serious look into it, because it shouldn’t be happening
that way and we want to protect our farmers,” the president said at a
White House event attended by Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue

See Valuetainment, Cattle Rancher Warns About the Meat You’re Buying,
YOUTUBE, at 24:48 (May 8, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m8ioFjN7viY.
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and Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds. “Are they dealing with each
other? What’s going on?” the president asked. 39
In addition to the DOJ investigation, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture also conducted an investigation into not only the
Holcomb, KS fire, but also the COVID-19 effects and consolidation
effects on the industry. The report, “The Boxed Beef & Fed Cattle
Spread Investigation Report” was released on July 22, 2020.40
Interestingly enough, “one of the earliest conclusions in the paper is
this: ‘Findings thus far do not preclude the possibility that individual
entities or groups of entities violated the Packers and Stockyards Act
during the aftermath of the Tyson Holcomb fire and the COVID-19
pandemic. The investigation into potential violations under the
Packers and Stockyards Act is continuing.’”41 In short, while no
wrongdoing has been discovered …the investigations are ongoing,
and violations have not been ruled out. As of Summer 2021, 27 U.S.
Senators have renewed the call for the necessity of a DOJ
investigation into the meat packing industry, specifically to examine
anticompetitive behavior among meatpackers.42
The concern of anticompetitive behavior in the packing
industry shared by these 27 Senators and former President Trump, is
backed up by data. For example, as written by Professor Roger A.
McEowen, Kansas Farm Bureau Professor of Agricultural Law &
Tax, “according to USDA data, boxed beef prices have recently more
than doubled while live cattle prices dropped approximately 20
percent over the same timeframe. The concern is that the
meatpackers are engaged in price manipulation and other practices
deemed unfair under federal law.”43 The concern is further shared by
the Attorneys General of 16 different states, who in December 2021
addressed a letter to the new Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack,
39

Greg Henderson, Trump Asks DOJ to Investigate Meat Packers, AGWEB, (May
6, 2020), https://www.agweb.com/article/trump-asks-doj-investigate-meat-packers.
40 AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., BOXED BEEF & FED CATTLE PRICE
SPREAD INVESTIGATION REPORT (2022).
41 See Alan Newport, USDA Disasters Investigation Suggests Changes, FARM
PROGRESS: BEEF PRODUCER (July 24, 2020),
https://www.farmprogress.com/regulatory/usda-disasters-investigation-suggestschanges?NL=FP-002&Issue=FP-002_20200806_FP002_743&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_1_b&utm_rid=CPG02000003370832&utm_
campaign=51768&utm_medium=email&elq2=87ec91f6f79741fc92833667f1555f
79.
42 Letter from Michael Rounds et al., U.S. Senator, to Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Just. (June 1, 2021),
https://www.rounds.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060121%20June%201%202021%2
0Rounds-Smith%20et%20al.%20to%20Attorney%20General%20Garland.pdf.
43 McEowen, supra note 12.
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urging the USDA to take action strengthening the PSA.44 The letter
states, in part, “the Packers and Stockyard Act originated in 1921 due
to concerns about the concentration in meat processing markets and
the effect this concentration had on producers…At that time,
however, the five largest processors only controlled 70% of the
market, indicating the concentration problems of today are worse
than they were at the time of the passing of the PSA.”45
President Joe Biden has taken efforts similar to his
presidential predecessor, issuing Executive Order 14036,
“Promoting Competition in the American Economy”46 in July 2021.
Among other things, the Executive Order directs the USDA to
reexamine the Packers & Stockyards Act and issue new rulemaking
addressing several key points in the statutory and regulatory law
thereunder. These changes are examined throughout the remainder
of this article, but suffice it to say, that the anti-trust focus of the
USDA under the Biden Administration will have sweeping effects in
the beef industry.
C. A Comparison To The Hog Industry
With this solid background in mind, to completely
understand how the consolidation in the beef industry is harming the
individual/independent cattle producer, it may be helpful to examine
the beef industry’s sister industry – the hog industry. Like the beef
industry, the hog industry is becoming increasingly consolidated, and
as recent events in 2020-2021 have shown, that consolidation is a
recipe for disaster.
By way of introduction to this sub-analysis of the hog
industry, in the iconic Western television miniseries “Lonesome
Dove” there is a well-known line, still quoted to this day – “We Don’t
Rent Pigs!”47 In light of current food safety events revolving around
COVID-19 and packing house closures around the country, that
classic line is quickly taking on new meaning in 2022.
44

See Keith Ellison et al., Letter to USDA Secretary Vilsack and Senior Advisor
Green (Dec. 21, 2021). In addition to Attorney General Ellison, the letter was
signed by the Attorneys General of the States of Wyoming, Iowa, California,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Utah. Of note is that these states
represent a diverse political spectrum with both “red” and “blue” states
represented, indicating that the meat consolidation issue transcends traditional
party lines.
45 Id. at 2.
46 Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 14, 2021).
47 Hayden L. Ballard, ‘We Don’t Rent Pigs,’ FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 14, 2020),
https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2020/05/we-dont-rent-pigs/.
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For anyone who hasn’t seen it, in Lonesome Dove the two
main characters (Gus McCrae and Captain Woodrow Call) are a
couple of old, washed-up, Texas Rangers-turned-cattlemen, who
start a cattle company and plan to trail a couple thousand head of
cattle from Texas to the Montana Territory. Gus, the more eccentric
of the two, makes a sign for their new cattle company, and to the sign
adds the line “We Don’t Rent Pigs!”48 Captain Call, the more levelheaded and serious one, is obviously not impressed by the sign and
asks Gus why he had to put that stupid line on there. Gus responds:
“Well, we don’t rent pigs and I figure it’s better to say
it up front ‘cause a man that does like to rent pigs is…
he’s hard to stop.”49
While Gus never explains exactly what he meant by the
second half of that statement, it doesn’t take much imagination to
envision why someone would want to rent a pig…to eat it. If you do
rent a pig to a man who wants to eat it, you’re getting the “short end
of the stick” because you’re probably not ever getting that pig back,
“‘cause a man who does like to rent pigs is…, well, hard to stop.”50
Essentially, this tongue-in-cheek line can be interpreted as saying we
don’t tolerate dishonest people who want to “rent” pigs.
As this is an article about consolidation in the beef cattle
industry, at this point, the reader may very well be thinking “well
that’s a wonderful story about two fictional cowboys from a by-gone
era, but what in the world does that have to do with current food
safety issues?” To answer that question, again fast forward to current
events. The Coronavirus (COVID-19) has swept the world, the
booming economy of the United States has ground to a halt, various
state and federal officials have issued controversial stay-at-home
orders, mask and vaccine mandates, and across the country
businesses have closed their doors. Meanwhile, America’s meat
producers (particularly it’s cattle, hog and poultry farmers/ranchers)
haven’t stopped working, and production continues (because you
can’t exactly tell a steer or a hog to stop growing just because the
world is under quarantine).
Unfortunately, many of the meat processing plants across the
country closed, or closed temporarily, due to health concerns related
to COVID-19. For example, over twenty meat processing plants
across the country shut down over the span of two months during the
spring of 2020 as thousands of packing house workers tested positive
48

Id.
Id.
50 Id.
49
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for the virus.51 These closures and reduction in workforce resulted in
an overall reduction in production capacity of 30% - 40% at that
time.52
This reduction in processing capacity is problematic for all
meat producers, but particularly troublesome for pork producers.
Because the pork processing industry has become so centralized in a
handful of companies, those companies have standardized their
processes and require a certain weight of hog for the machinery to
operate efficiently. This creates a bottleneck of sorts, because pork
producers can’t simply wait for the COVID-19 epidemic to blow
over and wait for the packing houses to come back online, because
by then, the hogs they are currently raising will be too big and the
packing house won’t take them.53 While small, local butcher shops
could alleviate some of this bottleneck, because of the consolidation
in the industry, small butcher shops are far and few between, and
with plant closures, most small butchers are already booked 3 months
out or more.54 Producers could also sell directly to consumers, but
few consumers know how to butcher their own pig, and as stated,
small butchers are already booked, so that rules out the option of
consumers purchasing direct from farmers and taking it to get
slaughtered themselves.
What all this means for meat producers is that due to the
COVID-19 virus, they simply have nowhere to go with their
livestock. According to John Tyson, the Chairman of the Board of
Tyson Foods, what this means is:
“In addition to meat shortages, this is a serious food
waste issue…Farmers across the nation simply will
not have anywhere to sell their livestock to be

51 Id. (citing Agriculture Sec. Perdue on Meat Workers Health Concern Amid
Coronavirus Pandemic, FOX NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://video.foxnews.com/v/6153248260001?
fbclid=IwAR0iu6gxCpAiQZx1HcQjh KFsUel0nj04dJu91p6eA6wurQHgrXiaY0FPYE#sp=show-clips.
52

Id. (citing Could Food Plant Closures Disrupt Food Supply Chains?, FOX NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://video.foxnews.com/v/6152541987001#sp=show-clips).

53 Hayden L. Ballard, ‘We Don’t Rent Pigs,’ FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 14, 2020),
https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2020/05/we-dont-rent-pigs/ (citing Jenny
Splitter, Farmers Face Their Worst-Case Scenario: ‘Depopulating’ Chickens
Euthanizing Pigs and Dumping Milk, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysplitter/2020/04/28/farmers-face-their-worstcase-scenarios-depopulating-chickens-euthanizing-pigs-and-dumpingmilk/?sh=32b158403003).
54
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processed, when they could have fed the nation…the
food supply chain is breaking.”55
The situation got so bad in 2020 that it is estimated that
around 160,000 hogs would be euthanized DAILY in the United
States.56 With these kinds of numbers of hogs being killed every
day, but not being put into the food supply chain, it doesn’t take
much of an imagination to realize that very soon there won’t be any
ham, bacon or sausage in the supermarket.
The situation is just as bad for dairy farmers and poultry
farmers, as producers have begun euthanizing millions of
chickens57 and dumping milk for the same reasons.58 Cattle
producers and feedlot owners have not been forced to begin
euthanizing cattle…yet. However, as shown by one stocker
operator in North Texas, Shad Sullivan, the beef cattle industry is
not far behind. In April 2020, he received an official email from the
United States Department of Agriculture and Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, stating as follows:
“State officials will be assisting to help identify
potential alternative markets if a producer is unable to
move animals and if necessary, advise and assist on
depopulation and disposal methods” (emphasis
added).59
Clearly the COVID-19 induced bottleneck in meat
processing has put a huge strain on cattle producers, but has now
created a food security issue for the nation. The control of the
packing industry by the Big Four has simply exacerbated the
problem, and COVID-19 has revealed the problem. As Shad Sullivan
put it, “We are importing beef and we are destroying our harvests in

55Id.

(citing Could Food Plant Closures Disrupt Food Supply Chains?, FOX NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://video.foxnews.com/v/6152541987001#sp=show-clips).
56 Id. (citing Mike Dorning & Michael Hirtzer, America’s Mass Hog Cull Begins
with Meat to Rot in Landfills, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-28/closed-jbs-plant-will-beused-to-euthanize-hogs-peterson-says).
57 Shad Sullivan, Starvation is Coming – Rancher Explains, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28,
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9pCEnEqaz8.
58 See generally Jenny Splitter, Farmers Face Their Worst-Case Scenario:
‘Depopulating’ Chickens, Euthanizing Pigs And Dumping Milk, FORBES (Apr. 28,
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysplitter/2020/04/28/farmers-face-theirworst-case-scenarios-depopulating-chickens-euthanizing-pigs-and-dumpingmilk/?fbclid=IwAR0ILYXF93yb5CvEqym9gv97QQv2dYOjsX10huChipmHgoW
w_onS4I1EBt0#2dc39aa93003.
59 Sullivan, supra note 58.
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a time when people don’t have jobs, and that’s not the American
way.”60
In an effort to curb this problem, in 2020 President Trump
invoked the 1950 Defense Production Act to order meat processing
plants to stay open during this pandemic.61 While some have
criticized the move as endangering lives and creating other food
safety issues, the move was much needed. Ultimately, while some
criticized the President’s actions as creating food safety issues
(letting meat plants and meat workers be exposed to COVID-19) one
must ask themselves, at what point does the risk of food safety
outweigh the actual availability of food at all? At this point, the
repercussions of all plants shutting down in this country would push
recovery from months to years. This move by President Trump may
be a band-aid that “stopped the bleeding,” but it hasn’t cured the
underlying problem.
While the Coronavirus was clearly the identifiable catalyst
to this pending meat shortage, the virus simply exacerbated an
underlying condition that has been festering in this country for the
past few decades – consolidation. In the United States, roughly ¾ of
all pork is processed by four companies, JBS, Cargill, Tyson and
Smithfield,62 commonly known as “The Big Four” in the pork
industry. Further, “there are more than 60,000 pork producers in the
U.S., but roughly 60% of all hogs are processed in just 15 large porkpacking plants. These packing plants are designed to efficiently and
affordably process animals for food consumption, and each one has
a large workforce.”63 While today the Big Four of the pork industry
have vertically integrated the process from piglet to slaughter, as
noted in the Introduction herein, the pork industry used to be
dominated by the cash market, as shown by the fact that over 2
million hogs used to be sold through the Kansas City Stockyards
alone in the 1920’s.
Not only does this level of market share make what’s left of
the hog cash market susceptible to undue influence, but as seen, this
60

Id. at 5:45.
Ballard, supra note 48 (citing Coronavirus: Trump Orders Meatpacking Plants
to Stay Open, BBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-52466502.)
62 Id. (citing FOOD & WATER ET AL., THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF THE
PROPOSED JBS-CARGILL PORK PACKING ACQUISITION 4 (2015).
63 Id. (citing Jayson Lusk & Candace Croney, The Road from Farm to Table,
PURDUE UNIV. COLL. OF AGRIC. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://ag.purdue.edu/stories/theroad-from-farm-totable/?fbclid=IwAR0lORw686qjABwa2_dDM_O52QDkP6Okot3zZ8ILZYmU4b
LMLO1_jzmrbGc).
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consolidation has now contributed to a possible nationwide food
shortage and food safety crisis. All it takes is for one of these
companies to shutter its plants, and as seen by the nationwide
euthanization of hogs, and other meat animals, instantly the farmers
feel the devastating effects. Additionally, with the packing industry
so consolidated, it has pushed small, local butchers out of business,
and only a handful remain – further adding fuel to the fire.
So, if major consolidation and monopolization of the hog
industry has contributed to a nationwide food shortage/safety crisis,
then what can be done to help fix this problem immediately? While
Part III of this paper will analyze some potential solutions in depth,
there are several things that can be done at the federal level now to
assist in rectifying the current hog situation.
(1) The Biden Administration could use the authority
granted by the Packers & Stockyards Act and
enforce its provisions as to break up the meat
packing monopolies, just like was done when the
act was first passed roughly 100 years ago. Doing
so would make it easier for hog livestock auctions
to be reopened and create a cash market for hogs
again. This would reduce the complete reliance
on the integrator contracts the Big Four currently
utilize, and which have aided in the
standardization of hog slaughter which has led to
the current bottleneck in processing. These
integrator contracts essentially make the pork
farmers renters of the very pigs they raise,
because oftentimes the company (one of The Big
Four) retains ownership of the pig for its entire
life, and the farmer simply cares for it.
Essentially, the farmers “rent” the pigs.64
(2) Congress could create small-business exceptions
to the myriad of rules and regulations imposed on
large packers, and extend them to small local
butchers, to make it easier for them to stay in
business, and for more processors to enter the
market.

64

See CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET: THE SECRET TAKEOVER OF
AMERICA’S FOOD BUSINESS 84 (2014).
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(3) Congress could loosen food safety regulations
and make it easier for hog producers to sell
directly to consumers.
While these changes will not alleviate the total problem hereand-now in 2020 (the damage has already been done to the hog
supply chain), by implementing these changes, perhaps we could
avoid a similar problem in the future with the cattle industry. Perhaps
for that reason, the Coronavirus was a blessing in disguise as it
revealed a major vulnerability in the nation’s meat supply chain –
namely consolidation in the meat processing market has created
bottlenecks which as seen in 2020 – 2021 can lead to food shortages,
euthanization of productive farm animals, and ultimately food
insecurity. This attitude of “We Don’t Rent Pigs” translates directly
to the beef cattle industry. This is because, as the sister industry of
the beef cattle industry, the hog and pork industry is a type, or
shadow, or what is to come if the Big Four are able to completely
consolidate and integrate the cattle industry, the same as was done
with hogs.
In the coming days and months consumers may very well
start turning to their local farmers hoping to buy meat. However,
unless action is taken at the federal level as outlined above and in
Part III of this paper, to ensure that the meat supply chain is decentralized and more local processing encouraged, it may be difficult
for every consumer to get enough meat to eat. BUT, if these changes
are put in place, perhaps hog farmers can stop “renting” the pigs from
The Big Four. Like was said at the beginning, the tongue-in-cheek
line from Gus McCrae saying “We Don’t Rent Pigs” can be
interpreted as saying we don’t tolerate dishonest people who want to
“rent” pigs. Today, the Big Four literally rent pigs to the farmers who
are beholden to the companies will, and while the farmer may not
trust the system, there isn’t much that can be done by the individual
farmer. However, as said, if these problems are rectified, then the
independent farmers and ranchers can again hold their heads high,
and may have to start hanging a new sign out front – “We Don’t Rent
Pigs!...But We Do Sell ‘Em.”65
With this foundation established showing the increasing
monopolization of the meat packing industry and the ways in which
COVID-19 brought this issue to light, Part II will now examine one
of the tools previously available to both pork and beef producers in
their efforts to parry packer influence – country of origin labeling.

65

Ballard, supra note 48.
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III. MCOOL
“My old man’s that old man,
Spent his life livin’ off the land,
Dirty hands and a clean soul.
It breaks his heart, seein’ foreign cars
Filled with fuel that isn’t ours
And wearin’ cotton we didn’t grow.”66
Mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling (MCOOL) for beef
is not a new issue in the United States. It has been a hotly contested
policy for years and the American cattle industry remains sharply
divided on the issue. On one side, the supporters of MCOOL include
many independent cow-calf producers and organizations such as the
Kansas Cattlemen’s Association (KCA), and the RanchersCattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America
(RCALF-USA). Supporters argue that U.S. consumers have a right
to know where their beef comes from and that given a choice, they
would purchase the domestic version. Particularly the cow-calf
segment of the beef industry supports MCOOL by and large, since
this would strengthen demand and prices for U.S. ranchers and
producers. They also argue that it is unfair to exempt beef from the
labeling requirements that U.S. importers of almost all other products
already must meet, and additionally that major U.S. trading partners
impose their own COOL requirements for imported meats.
On the other side, the opponents of MCOOL include the
meat packing companies and organizations like the National
Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), the Kansas Livestock
Association (KLA) and the American Meat Institute (AMI), as well
as the governments of Canada and Mexico (as highlighted by World
Trade Organization arbitration proceedings discussed more fully
below). The opponents of MCOOL contend that there is little or no
real evidence that consumers want such information and that industry
compliance costs far outweigh any potential benefits to producers or
consumers. They further argue that mandatory COOL for
agricultural commodities is a form of protectionism that undermines
U.S. efforts to reduce foreign barriers to trade in the global economy.
As extensive litigation and arbitration spanning the past two
decades has shown, the two positions seem to be irreconcilable. This
policy analysis suggests that as unlikely as it may seem, there is a

TOBY KEITH, Made in America, on CLANCY’S TAVERN, at 0:17–0:38 (Universal
Music 2011).
66
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path to a policy-based compromise, and that path runs through
Kansas.
A. Mandatory Country-of-Origin Labeling in the United
States
Since the 1930’s, U.S. tariff law has required almost all
imports to carry labels so that the “ultimate purchaser,” usually the
retail consumer, can determine their country of origin. However,
many products, including many agricultural commodities, have long
been excluded from the country of origin labeling requirement. 67
Supporters of MCOOL in the beef industry have long argued that it
was unfair to exempt beef from the labeling requirements that U.S.
importers of almost all other products already must meet, and
additionally that U.S. consumers have a right to know where their
beef comes from and that given a choice they would purchase the
domestic version.68 Congress first implemented MCOOL for beef in
2002, including it as a covered commodity in the 2002 farm bill.69
The Act required retailers of a “covered commodity” to “inform
consumers” as to the commodity’s country of origin at the “final
point of sale.”70 Implementation of the legislation was delayed, and
then modified in the 2008 Farm Bill to ease some of the concerns
raised with the original 2002 law.71 The final rule to implement the
COOL requirements for beef and all other commodities was issued
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) in early 2009.72
In 2009, Canada and Mexico challenged MCOOL before the
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panel, as
unfairly discriminatory against Canadian and Mexican beef, and
ultimately won in 2012.73 To comply with the WTO Appellate
Body’s holding, the USDA promulgated a new MCOOL rule in May
67

See JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22955, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN
LABELING FOR FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING 2 (2015).
68 Id.
69 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (codified 7 U.S.C.A. § 1638).
70 See Cassidy L. Woodard, From Cattle Drives to Labeling Legislation: The
Implications of Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling on the Beef Industry, 47
TEX. TECH L. REV. 399, 402 (2015).
71 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat.
1651 (codified 7 U.S.C.A. § 8701); JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RS22955, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING FOR FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE
DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING 2 (2015).
72 JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22955, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING
FOR FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING 2-3 (2015).
73 Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling
(COOL) Requirements, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/AB/R (June 29, 2012).
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2013, which required more precise information - revealing the
location of each production step.74 The 2013 rule established the
“Born, Raised, and Slaughtered” regime, by requiring the label on
beef to “specify the production steps of birth, raising, and slaughter
of the animal from which the meat is derived that took place in each
country listed on the origin destination.”75 Thus, for beef to be
labeled a Product of the U.S.A., the animal would have to be born,
raised, and slaughtered in the United States. Almost immediately
opponents of MCOOL, led by the American Meat Institute (AMI),
filed suit, claiming that the new rule requiring country of origin
disclosures was a violation of the Constitution and their First
Amendment rights, that it exceeded the scope of the initial 2008
Farm Bill, and was in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act.76 Ultimately, the case was heard by the D.C. Court of Appeals
who held in favor of MCOOL. The Appellate court found that the
“Government's interests in making country-of-origin information
available to consumers, including history of country-of-origin
disclosures to enable consumers to choose American-made products,
demonstrated consumer interest in extending country-of-origin
labeling to food products, and individual health concerns and market
impacts that could arise in event of food-borne illness outbreak, were
sufficient to sustain United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) regulations mandating disclosure of country of origin
information about meat products, despite meat industry trade
association's contention that mandate violated its First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.”77
Although MCOOL was upheld by the U.S. judicial system,
in 2015, Canada and Mexico again challenged the amended MCOOL
rule, and again the WTO found in their favor, this time authorizing
the two countries to respond with retaliatory tariffs against the United
States.78 Fearing retaliation, and without waiting for final WTO
action, Congress repealed MCOOL in June 2015 with the passage of
the Country of Origin Labeling Amendments Act of 2015.79 Soon
after, U.S. cattle prices began falling, causing U.S. ranchers to lose
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Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,367 (May 24, 2013)
(codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 60, 65).
75 Id.
76 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 968 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42-43 (D.D.C.
2013).
77 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23–27 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
78 JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22955, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING
FOR FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING 2, 5 (2015).
79 Id. at 49.
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upwards of $500 for each animal sold.80 Despite the rapid fall of
cattle prices paid for Fed Cattle81 following MCOOL’s repeal, the
price for beef paid by consumers continued to climb to record highs.
Below is a graph produced by R-CALF USA, depicting this
phenomenon.82
Figure 1.83

As can be seen in the chart above, fed “cattle prices (red line)
historically followed consumer beef prices (blue columns) up and

80Letter

from Bill Bullard, CEO, R-CALF United Stockgrowers of Am., to Donald
Trump (Dec. 11, 2015), BILL BULLARD, LETTER TO DONALD TRUMP 1 (R-CALF,
2015), https://r-calfusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/151211-Letter-toDonald-Trump.pdf.
81 ANDREW P. GRIFFITH, UNIV. OF TENN. EXTENSION, CATTLE AND BEEF MARKET
DEFINITIONS 4 (2019),
https://extension.tennessee.edu/publications/Documents/W801.pdf Fed Cattle,
sometimes referred to fat cattle or live cattle, are “steers and heifers that have been
fed a nutrient-dense ration for the purpose of growing the animals, usually for 90180 days in a feedlot or until they reach a desired slaughter weight and are ready
for slaughter” typically between 1,100 and 1,300 pounds. Id.
82 Chart Shows Cattle Prices (Red Line) Historically Followed Consumer Beef
Prices (Blue Columns) Up and Down Very Closely, R-CALF UNITED
STOCKGROWERS OF AM., https://www.r-calfusa.com/label-our-beef/chart-showscattle-prices-red-line-historically-followed-consumer-beef-prices-blue-columnsup-and-down-very-closely/https://www.r-calfusa.com/label-our-beef/chart-showscattle-prices-red-line-historically-followed-consumer-beef-prices-blue-columnsup-and-down-very-closely/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
83 Id.
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down very closely.”84 However, note that the lines diverge sharply in
mid-2015, which coincides with the repeal of MCOOL. According
to the graph, ranchers are receiving the same prices for their cattle
that they were receiving roughly 10 years ago back in 2011 and 2012
(although given the impacts of inflation and higher costs of inputs,85
that same dollar-for-dollar value is arguably even less than it was 10
years ago). Meanwhile, according to the graph, as of 2021 packers
are receiving record setting highs for the retail value of beef. In short,
the difference between the blue line and the red line shows the profit
margin going to the packers. While the rancher struggles to make a
living, the packers are, quite literally, “making a killing.”
Currently, while MCOOL is not in place for beef, various
other agriculture products are still required to disclose their country
of origin.86 With MCOOL at the national level repealed, groups like
R-CALF USA continue to fight to see it reinstated in one form or
another87 with varying levels of success. For example, in September
2021, “Senator John Thune (R-S.D.), for himself and for Senators
Jon Tester (D-Mont.), Mike Rounds, (R-S.D.), and Cory Booker (DN.J.) introduced the ‘American Beef Labeling Act of 2021,’”88 Senate
Bill 2716. The bill, if passed, “reinstates beef as among the numerous
food commodities currently subject to the United States mandatory
country-of-origin labeling (M-COOL) law that was originally passed
by Congress in the 2002 Farm Bill.”89 The bill also directs the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and Department of
Agriculture (UDA) to “develop a means of reinstating the
requirements that complies with the rules of the World Trade
Organization”90 thus avoiding the pitfalls of the previous MCOOL
law. In short, “Senate Bill 2716 undoes the repeal that Congress did
in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 by simply reinserting
the terms “beef” and “ground beef” back into the existing M-COOL

84

Id.
Reduce Farm Input Costs: Farm Financing Options, AG AM. LENDING (Dec. 2,
2021), https://agamerica.com/blog/reducing-farm-input-costs/.
86 7 U.S.C.A. § 1638(1)(A) (Westlaw through P.L. 117-80).
87 See Ranchers Cattleman Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
Perdue, 718 Fed. Appx. 541, 542 (9th Cir. 2018) (arguing that a Federal Meat
Inspection Act regulation cannot exempt imported beef and pork from complying
with the statute's demand that meat be labeled with its country of origin through
retail).
88 Country of Origin Labeling: MCOOL Bill Officially Introduced, TRI-STATE
LIVESTOCK NEWS (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.tsln.com/news/country-of-originlabeling-mcool-bill-officially-introduced.
89 Id.
90 American Beef Labeling Act, S. 2716, 117th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2021).
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law, and it requires M-COOL to be implemented no later than 1-year
after the bill’s enactment.”91
In addition to seeking MCOOL reinstated at the federal
level, some states have sought to implement state level COOL. For
example, in 2019 Montana proposed a state level COOL system in
response to testimony delivered in 2016 to the Montana House Ag
Committee showing that under current federal laws, the “USDA
allowed a loophole for beef and pork to be labeled ‘Product of USA,’
even if it is only processed or packaged here.”92 According to the
testimony, a state level COOL was needed because “oftentimes, USA
beef is mixed in with cheaper imported beef, misleading our
consumers and defrauding our ranchers.”93 In recent years, Wyoming
and South Dakota have also ran similar bills.94
B. Voluntary Country-of-Origin Labeling in the United States
Most recently, Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling
(VCOOL) was first used when MCOOL was included the 2002 Farm
Bill. The bill stated that the MCOOL labeling requirements would
not become mandatory until 2004, and until then, labeling would be
voluntary under the USDA guidelines promulgated for that
purpose.95
While VCOOL was used only in the interim between the
passage of MCOOL and its implementation, it was again proposed
when Congress ultimately repealed MCOOL in June 2015. At the
time of repeal, there was a compromise bill ran at roughly the same
time entitled the Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) and
Trade Enhancement Act of 2015 (S. 1844).96 While the VCOOL bill
91

Fact Sheet: Senate Bill 2716 (S.2716), R-CALF USA, 1 (2021), https://www.rcalfusa.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/210923-Fact-Sheet-S2716-final.pdf (last
visited Mar. 11, 2022).
92 Associated Press, Montana Country-of-Origin Labeling Bills Stuck in
Committees, FARM J. PORK (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.porkbusiness.com/news/ag-policy/montana-country-origin-labelingbills-stuck-committees.
93 Id.
94 Dan Flynn, Ranchers Look for Some Traction on Country-of-Origin Labeling,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2017/02/ranchers-look-for-some-traction-oncountry-of-origin-labeling/.
95 J. VanSickle et al., Int’l Agric. Trade & Pol’y Ctr., Country of Origin Labeling:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, PBTC 03-5 (May 2003). See also Establishment
of Guidelines for the Interim Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling, 67 Fed. Reg.
63,367, 63,368 (Oct. 11, 2002).
96Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) and Trade Enhancement Act of
2015, S. 1844, 114th Cong.
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also repealed MCOOL for beef, it simultaneously sought to amend
the Agricultural Marketing Act,97 requiring USDA to establish a
label designation that enables meat processors to voluntarily use a
U.S. label for beef that is exclusively born, raised, and slaughtered in
the United States.98 At the time, the National Farmers Union (NFU)
called the compromise bill “the only real solution for food labeling,”
since the repeal of MCOOL would put to rest the complaint by
Mexico and Canada, and yet put in its place a voluntary labeling
system that could allow consumers to know the origin of their food.99
The NFU lauded VCOOL as a “win-win” for all the parties
involved, including Mexico and Canada. In fact, during the 2012
WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada and Mexico both suggested
voluntary labeling as a way to resolve the issue.100 Canadian Minister
of Agriculture Gerry Ritz stated in August 2014 that “when it’s
mandatory it creates that segregation and discriminatory price
system…if you do a voluntary label, which we do in Canada under
product of Canada, you don’t have that trade sanctioned problem.”101
The VCOOL system proposed would have been similar to
other labeling programs overseen by the USDA. For example, the
voluntary Certified Organic label program overseen by the
Agricultural Marketing Service, allows for certain food products to
carry the “USDA Organic” label if the production of that food
followed certain steps as put forth by the USDA.102 Thus, if a
consumer wants to buy organic food, they can be assured that if the
food carries the USDA Organic label, that it was produced following
all the USDA Organic regulations.103 The consumer can trust that the
label represents a certain process that was followed to get that food
to them, and be assured it’s truly “organic.” Although it is completely
voluntary, the organic labeling program provides a system, where if
consumers demand organic products, then producers can have a level
playing field that allows them to put a premium on their products as
the free-market dictates. Without the integrity the label provides,
97Id.
98 JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22955, COUNTRY-OF-ORIGIN LABELING

FOR FOODS AND THE WTO TRADE DISPUTE ON MEAT LABELING 25-26 (2015).
99

Fact Sheet: Bipartisan Senate COOL Compromise: The Only Real Solution for
Food Labeling, NAT’L FARMERS UNION (July 27, 2015), https://1yd7z7koz052nb8r33cfxyw5-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/Senate-COOL-Compromise-Final.pdf.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 About Organic Labeling, AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/organic/labeling (last visited Mar. 11,
2022).
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anyone could simply state their product was “organic” and undercut
the producers who followed the labeling regulations.
Because the 2015 VCOOL bill failed, there is currently no
structure in place, like the organic labeling system, that would allow
consumers to use the free market to demand beef produced in the
USA.104 Had the 2015 VCOOL bill passed, it would have done much
to appease those worried about renewed sanctions from Canada and
Mexico, while maintaining the integrity of the “Made in the USA”
brand and providing a framework for producers to utilize their
greatest asset, the “Product of the USA” label.
Returning to President Joe Biden’s Executive Order 14036,
“Promoting Competition in the American Economy,”105 among other
things, the Executive Order directs the USDA to issue new
rulemaking addressing a VCOOL label. Specifically, the Executive
Order directs the Secretary of Agriculture as follows:
“…to ensure consumers have accurate, transparent
labels that enable them to choose products made in
the United States, consider initiating a rulemaking to
define the conditions under which the labeling of
meat products can bear voluntary statements
indicating that the product is of United States origin,
such as “Product of USA”…”106
As the status of the Biden Executive Order and the resulting
rules and regulations are still pending, the effectiveness of this
particular order remains to be seen. However, with the Secretary
being directed to at least consider a USDA voluntary Product of USA
label, the potential for a USDA sanctioned VCOOL system is high.
C. Economic Benefits of Beef Country-of-Origin Labeling
While MCOOL has been repealed, and the 2015 VCOOL
proposal failed in Congress, there is no lack of support for COOL in
the United States. For example, the support of COOL among
agricultural producers is extremely high, with one study showing that
98% of U.S. agricultural producers favored labeling.107 Support of
COOL among consumers hasn’t declined either and has in fact
increased slightly over time. For example, in 2002 when COOL was
first passed, a national survey found that 86% of consumer
104

Voluntary Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) and Trade Enhancement Act of
2015, S. 1844, 114th Cong.
105 Exec. No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,993 (July 9, 2021).
106 Id.
107 VanSickle et al., Int’l Agric. Trade & Pol’y Ctr., supra note 96, at 12.
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respondents favored country of origin labeling.108 Compare that to a
study conducted by the Consumer Federation of America in 2013,
indicating that 90% of the Americans surveyed favored COOL on
fresh meat.109 This willingness of the consumer to “spend a little
more in the store for a tag in the back that says USA,”110 translates
into an economic impact in excess of $3.5 billion for beef alone (as
of 2002).111
On the other hand, opponents to COOL rely on studies like
the one conducted by the Kansas State University Department of
Economics, that suggest that even if there were increased market
demand, that the costs of compliance introduced by COOL
outweighed any evidence of increased demand. These particular
results suggest an aggregate economic loss for the U.S. meat and
livestock supply chain spanning from producers to consumers as a
result of MCOOL implementation.112 The study then went on to state
that if VCOOL was economically beneficial, it would have occurred
on its own, and where it hadn’t, this supported the assertion of many
COOL opponents, “where is the market failure?”113 However, this
study is in conflict with another study that proved that the
implementation costs, in regard to record keeping specifically, were
90 to 95% lower than the USDA cost estimates, and translated into
less than one-tenth of a cent per pound for the covered
commodities.114 Thus, whether the costs of implementation really do
outweigh the benefits is still debatable, and deserves further analysis
industry wide.
D. The Current State of MCOOL
In the battle of studies, surveys, and public opinion, both
sides of the COOL debate remain heated and staunchly fixed in their
respective positions. Even if the support of the cow-calf sector and
the consumers was enough to get some sort of VCOOL passed,
there’s no real incentive on the part of the retailers and packers to
participate. In short, opponents of COOL, such as the packing
industry, oppose COOL because their studies affirm their position
108
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Large Majority of Americans Strongly Support Requiring More Information on
Origin of Fresh Meat, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. (May 15, 2013),
https://consumerfed.org/press_release/new-poll-shows-strong-support-for-usdasapproach-to-resolving-country-of-origin-labeling-dispute/.
110 KEITH, supra note 67.
111 VanSickle et al, Int’l Agric. Trade & Pol’y Ctr., supra note 96, at 3.
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LABELING: CONSUMER DEMAND IMPACT 3-4 (2012).
113 Id. at 5.
114 VanSickle et al., Int’l Agric. Trade & Pol’y Ctr., supra note 96, at 3-4.
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that the cost to implement it (including data collection and record
keeping) outweighs any benefit to the packing industry, and they get
“stuck with the bill” as it were. Supporters of COOL, such as many
cow-calf producers, are in favor of it because it puts a premium price
on American beef, thus driving up domestic cattle prices, yet they
have almost no implementation costs as non-regulated entities.115
Groups such as R-CALF have brought litigation attempting to
reinstate MCOOL,116 and have launched websites and initiatives to
encourage Congress to bring it back and reinstate it.117 On the other
side of the issue, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA)
is much larger, and wields much greater political influence than does
R-CALF. The NCBA is adamantly opposed to MCOOL118 and so for
the time being, MCOOL will face an uphill battle in making a
resurgence.
With the two sides adamantly opposed, and with studies on
both sides supporting their claim, it seems impossible to reach some
sort of policy compromise. Accordingly, cattle producers need to
begin thinking outside the box and begin looking at additional
options to cure the market ills that ail them. This is the topic of Part
III.
IV. BEYOND MCOOL
While the analysis in Part II has shown that there is a viable
argument in favor of reinstating Mandatory Country of Origin
Labeling for beef, the hard truth most producers now face is this –
MCOOL is a steep uphill battle. It is still possible that MCOOL could
be reinstated legislatively, and it is possible that some of the ongoing
litigation revolving around MCOOL could bring a similar result.
However, the chances of that are slim, and so is it possible? Yes. Is
it likely? It seems that the metaphorical jury is still out on that
question. So then the question becomes, if reinstating MCOOL is the
best option, but unavailable to producers, what else can be done to
bring back competitive cattle markets, raise cattle prices for
producers, and lessen the control that the Big Four have on the beef
industry as a whole? This section seeks to put forward several options
115
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Court Finds Cattle Producers Harmed by Lack of Country-of-Origin-Labeling:
Moves Issue Onto Administration’s Plate, R-CALF UNITED STOCKGROWERS OF
AM., (June 5, 2018), https://www.r-calfusa.com/court-finds-cattle-producersharmed-lack-country-origin-labeling-moves-issue-onto-administrations-plate/.
117 Label Our Beef, R-CALF UNITED STOCKGROWERS OF AM.R-CALF USA,
https://www.r-calfusa.com/label-our-beef/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2022).
118 Julie Harker, NCBA Says R-CALF Is Wrong on COOL, BROWNFIELD (May 9,
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that can be used, or at least put forth to be explored further as possible
options.
A. U.S. CattleTrace, Inc. and the Path to Compromise
A possible solution to the MCOOL standoff comes in the
form of a compromise involving a state level VCOOL system
coupled with the Kansas CattleTrace Pilot Project (now U.S.
CattleTrace, Inc.). In December 2017, members of the Kansas
Livestock Association voted to amend their policy to support
mandatory cattle disease traceability, in support of the Beef Industry
Long-Range Plan put forth by the National Cattlemen’s Beef
Association.119 Soon after, on June 30, 2018, Kansas Governor Jeff
Colyer announced the creation of the Kansas CattleTrace Pilot
Project, a public-private collaboration including the KLA, the
Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA), and others, aimed at
animal disease traceability.120
The CattleTrace program uses Ultra-High Frequency (UHF)
eartags on participating cattle, and automated tag readers located at
partner livestock markets, feedyards and processors to gather the
minimal data points necessary to determine: (1) that a particular
animal was (2) at that place, (3) on that date, and (4) and that time.
These four data points allow for a disease trace back in the event of
an outbreak.121 The project has been funded by private industry
groups, the USDA, as well as the Kansas Department of Agriculture,
which was allocated another $250,000 towards the project in the
2020 Kansas Senate budget bill.122
Support for the CattleTrace program has been generally
positive, but in ways mirrors the same “camps” that support and
oppose COOL. As of December 2018, all three major beef packing
companies in Kansas were participating in CattleTrace as well as 14
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See Pat Melgares, Keeping Kansas Beef on Track: CattleTrace Project Aims to
Safeguard State’s $17B Industry, SEEK, Spring 2019, at 30, 30.
120 See Kansas Announces Cattle Trace Pilot Program for Disease Traceability,
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2%80%9D%20said%20Colyer (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
121 See What Was the CattleTrace Pilot Project?, U.S. CATTLE TRACE,
https://www.uscattletrace.org/cattletracepilotproject (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
122 See Legislative Action Includes CattleTrace Funding Enhancement, KAN.
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feedyards and 7 livestock markets.123 With a goal of enrolling 55,000
cattle over the next two years, there is a strong need for more cowcalf producers, so in the final year of the pilot project, the recruitment
focus is on getting more cow-calf operators and backgrounders to get
involved.124
Cow-calf producers have many concerns about participating
in the program, and David Gregg, a World Perspectives consultant,
has been working with Cattle Trace to try to address those concerns,
as well as develop a system that can be replicated across the country.
Cow-calf producers have raised concerns about management of data,
data privacy, as well as the hefty initial cost of setting up a system
and maintaining it. Cattlemen have also expressed concerns that
traceability would not provide enough added value to offset the cost
of participation in an identification system. (i.e., each eartag would
cost between $1.00 and $2.75).125 Then there’s also the added
liability that can arise from the ability of regulators and others to
trace back meat products to the farm of origin.126 With these
concerns, many cow-calf producers just don’t see any benefit of
participating in CattleTrace, unless there was some other incentive
that outweighs these concerns.
Dr. Justin Smith, the Kansas Animal Health Commissioner,
has addressed the potential for the CattleTrace infrastructure to be
used for other purposes to benefit the cow-calf producers in Kansas.
In September 2018, Dr. Smith gave a presentation in Kansas City,
Missouri on the CattleTrace program. There he emphasized the focus
of CattleTrace is disease traceability, but went on to say:
“...All the time [we] get the questions about what else
can it do, what else can it do?
“We hope the infrastructure is going to be there to do
a huge amount of things for the industry, for each
participant to grab a hold of that infrastructure and
leverage it for their own purposes, but our focus is
disease traceability and that’s the direction we’re
123
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125 See generally The Producer-Led Organization for Animal Disease Traceability,
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going, and that’s why we’re only going to collect the
four data points. But honestly, we hope that
infrastructure’s there that they can leverage for their
own purposes and collect what they want to collect…
We’re trying to address the cow-calf concerns…the
biggest questions we get out of cow-calf producers,
which I think is a hugely valid question, is what’s in
it for me? Why do this?... I think that’s a question that
we’ve all struggled with, and we’re working through
that. I think that’s where the opportunity of trying to
demonstrate to them some of the ability to leverage
that infrastructure for their purposes, for their
economic purposes...”127
While Dr. Smith never mentions Country of Origin Labeling
as a potential use of the CattleTrace infrastructure, he does state that,
in addressing the cow-calf concern of “what’s in it for me,” he
believes that one of the benefits to the cow-calf producers is their
ability to “grab a hold” of the CattleTrace infrastructure and leverage
it “for their economic purposes.”128 A Kansas VCOOL system could
very well be that “economic purpose” and could provide the
incentive necessary for the cow-calf producers to get on board with
CattleTrace. By using the four data points already being collected for
disease traceability, the infrastructure for a state-wide record keeping
system necessary for COOL would already in place.
Implementing a Kansas VCOOL system utilizing the
CattleTrace infrastructure, would simultaneously solve two
problems – break the MCOOL standoff and increase cow-calf
participation in CattleTrace. The opponents of COOL don’t see its
value, particularly where the implementation costs outweigh any
benefits they receive. This same group also supports CattleTrace but
are struggling to get cow-calf producers support for it. On the other
side of the fence, the cow-calf producers aren’t participating in
CattleTrace because their implementation costs outweigh any
benefits they would receive. Thus, when you boil it down, packers
don’t see the value of COOL, and cow-calf producers don’t see the
value of CattleTrace.

Justin Smith, Cattle Trace – Livestock Traceability Initiatives and Projects,
YOUTUBE, (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=peftDhAYXFs, at
14:05-15:10 (presenting from the NIAA 2018 Strategy Forum on Livestock
Traceability, September 25 - 26, 2018, Kansas City, MO, USA).
128 Id. at 15:03.
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Perhaps some quid pro quo could be provided by
implementing a Kansas VCOOL system in conjunction with the
CattleTrace project. In exchange for greater, voluntary participation
in CattleTrace, the packing industry would support a VCOOL system
in Kansas, utilizing the CattleTrace infrastructure for COOL data
collection. It’s true that the packing industry could then face VCOOL
implementation costs, but the cow-calf producers would also face
CattleTrace implementation costs. Still, all involved would get some
sort of a “win.” The consumers would now have a reputable labeling
system overseen by the KDA, and be given the choice to purchase
domestic beef, or not - a win for the consumer. The cow-calf
producers would now be provided a way to put a premium on their
product – a win for the cow-calf producers. The packing industry,
and supporters of CattleTrace, would now also have the participation
of the entire beef supply chain for disease traceability – a win for
them. Lastly, so long as the COOL system was voluntary, it would
avoid discriminating against beef from Canada or Mexico, and avoid
running afoul of any WTO proceedings.
Some may challenge this proposal on the basis of the fact
that as a voluntary system implemented by individual states, the
program lacks the “teeth” or the sweeping effect of a federal law. The
critics would likely say that to fix a nationwide problem requires
federal law applicable, well, nationwide. While this argument has
some merit, to put the vast potential of this policy proposal into
perspective, perhaps it would be useful to briefly examine some
numbers using a visual.
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Below is a map of all of the states that, according to the U.S.
CattleTrace program, are now States with U.S. CattleTrace
Participation.

Figure 2. U.S. CattleTrace – Industry Partners129
By looking at the above map, it may not be immediately
apparent that the CattleTrace partnership really covers that much of
the beef industry, as many states are still not partners. This seemingly
lends credence to the critics’ argument mentioned above. However,
looking at the Partner states individually, and looking at the number
of cattle in each may help make this argument clear.
Below is a crude table created by the author. This table
shows a list of all the CattleTrace Partner states (according to the
above map), as well as the number of beef cattle in that state, a
ranking of that states beef population (in parenthesis) as well the
percentage of the total U.S. beef herd that is raised in that state. These
numbers are retrieved from the beef informational website
“Beef2Live”.130

129

See Industry Partners, U.S. CATTLE TRACE, https://www.uscattletrace.org/ourpartners (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
130 See Rob Cook, Ranking of States with the Most Beef Cows, BEEF2LIVE, (Mar.
10, 2022), https://beef2live.com/story-ranking-states-beef-cows-0-108181.
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Table 1.131
State (Rank)

Total Cattle

Percentage of
U.S. Total

Texas (1)

4,685,000

15.04%

Oklahoma (2)

2,189,000

7.03%

Missouri (3)

2,035,000

6.53%

Nebraska (4)

1,900,000

6.1%

South Dakota (5)

1,799,000

5.77%

Kansas (6)

1,477,000

4.74%

Montana (7)

1,419,000

4.55%

Kentucky (8)

983,000

3.15%

Florida (10)

929,000

2.98%

Arkansas (11)

925,000

2.97%

Tennessee (12)

900,000

2.89%

Iowa (13)

890,000

2.86%

California (16)

670,000

2.15%

Colorado (17)

659,000

2.12%

Virginia (18)

595,000

1.91%

Oregon (19)

525,000

1.68%

Idaho (22)

474,000

1.52%

Ohio (30)

302,000

0.97%

Washington (32)

221,000

0.71%

Arizona (34)

194,000

0.62%

Michigan (38)

100,000

0.32%

CattleTrace States

23,598,000

76.61%

United States

31,200,000

100%

As the above table makes clear, when all of the cattle in the
CattleTrace Partner states are added together, they total 23,598,000
head of beef cattle. This number represents 76.61% of the total U.S.
beef cattle herd. This is not an insignificant number. For those who
say that a federal law is required to address this problem, because the
CattleTrace Program isn’t applicable nationwide, this graph shows

131

Id.
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that it indeed has nationwide potential. In fact, as shown, over threequarters of the entire U.S. beef herd is currently in Partner states.
Perhaps, instead of attempting to reinstate federal legislation
like MCOOL, by strategically using CattleTrace to the producer’s
advantage, over three-quarters of the U.S. beef herd could be
included in this compromise - having major effects on the U.S. beef
industry as a whole. Not only is this a possible path forward, but it is
also producer driven and would avoid a federally mandated animal
disease traceability system. This point is driven home by Joe
Leathers (CattleTrace, Inc. Board Member and General Manager of
the 6666 Ranch in Guthrie, Texas) when he said the following about
the CattleTrace initiative as a whole:
“We’re working real hard to make sure that the
producer is the one that’s driving it…I want everyone
to understand that the driver of this is from the
producer up, not from the federal government down.
I think that’s a big difference in what’s been
happening before…I really feel like this is one of the
rare opportunities where we in the cattle industry have
an opportunity to not only have a seat at the table,
which doesn’t come very often, but we can be
proactive instead of reactive.”132
It's true that this compromise proposal is not the “end-all-beall” solution, and likely raises more questions than it answers.
However, this proposal is of a limited scope, and is not intended to
answer every possible question raised. Instead, this analysis is simply
meant to show that this policy proposal is an option that if explored
further, is a workable solution to an issue that has faced the cattle and
beef industries since MCOOL was first passed 20 years ago. In short,
the American cattleman’s greatest asset and marketing tool is the fact
that American beef is renowned worldwide, and that standard
deserves to be protected. However, the battle lines involving
MCOOL have been drawn such that neither side seems to be willing
to budge. A Kansas VCOOL system containing a born, raised and
slaughtered regime, coupled with CattleTrace, provides a route to
compromise. By implementing a state level voluntary country-oforigin labeling system in Kansas, the free market would be given a
structure wherein consumers could demand domestic beef. It would
also provide a way for domestic cattle producers to put a premium
on their product, and simultaneously kick-start the CattleTrace
132

Ken Anderson, Texas Cattleman Helps Lead Cattle Traceability Effort, FOUR
SIXES RANCH (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.6666ranch.com/news/texas-cattlemanhelps-lead-cattle-traceability-effort/.
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animal disease traceability project by giving cow-calf producers an
incentive to participate. If this policy was pursued, Kansas and
CattleTrace could be a realistic model of compromise for the
remaining CattleTrace Partner states to follow, or even be a model
for a federal system (as the Biden Executive Order directs the
creation of a USDA sanctioned VCOOL system).133 Perhaps if this
compromise is followed, beef producers can show that it still means
something to be Made in America.
B. The Corporate Social Responsibility Argument
Another avenue worth exploring, and one that is commonly
overlooked, is viewing the consolidation issue through the lens of
Corporate Social Responsibility. First, before beginning an in-depth
analysis, regarding the Big Four’s beef packing practices through the
lens of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), it’s important to first
define CSR and also determine which CSR definition is going to be
used.
Companies worldwide are increasingly feeling the pressure
to “behave socially responsible”134 and adopt some sort of Corporate
Social Responsibility to guide their efforts. The problem, thus far,
has been that there is no universal definition of what constitutes
“CSR.” This is partially because the “modern era of CSR, or social
responsibility…is most appropriately marked by the publication by
Howard R. Bowen of his landmark book Social Responsibilities of
the Businessman in 1953”135 effectively beginning the CSR era at
that time in the not so distant past. This initial CSR work came about
because of Bowen’s belief that seven hundred of the largest
businesses in the United States “were vital centers of power and
decision making and that the actions of these firms touched the lives
of citizens in many ways.”136 Bowen’s initial work was refined by a
man by the name of Carroll, who broke down a businesses’ social
responsibility into four main responsibilities, stating: “Corporate
social responsibility encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary (philanthropic) expectations that society has of
organizations at a given point in time.”137 These four responsibilities,
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic were later visualized into
133

Exec. No. 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,993 (July 9, 2021).
Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility Is Defined: An
Analysis of 37 Definitions, CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T. MGMT., Jan. 2008, at 1, 1.
135 Archie B. Carroll, Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR: Taking Another Look, INT’L J.
CORP. SOC. RESP., July 5, 2016, at 1, 1,
https://jcsr.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s40991-016-0004-6.pdf.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2.
134
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what has become known as “Carrolls’ Pyramid of CSR.”138 Carroll’s
Pyramid broke these four responsibilities down into what is required
by society, expected by society and what is desired by society.
Starting at the bottom of the pyramid, Economic Responsibilities, the
responsibility to be profitable, was required by society.139 The next
step up, Legal Responsibilities, the duty to obey laws & regulations,
was also required by society.140 Moving up the pyramid, Ethical
Responsibilities, that of the duty to “do what is just and fair” and
“avoid harm” was expected, but not required, by society.141 At the
top of the pyramid, Philanthropic Responsibilities, the duty to be a
good corporate citizen, was simply desired by society.142 While this
pyramid seemed to place emphasis on certain responsibilities more
than others, Carroll believed that all four should be considered
simultaneously when determining whether an action was corporately
socially responsible.
While Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR did much to shed light on
the issue, as the years progressed, no single definition of CSR
emerged. In fact, recently one study found that 37 different
definitions had been adopted by global companies.143 For example,
the Commission of the European Communities, in 2001, defined
CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”144 Another
group, Business for Social Responsibility, defined CSR as
“achieving commercial success in ways that honour ethical values
and respect people, communities and the natural environment.”145
While each of the 37 definitions was slightly different, each of the
37 sound somewhat similar, because as a whole, each took into
account five main dimensions that were taken into account when
drafting each individual definition. These dimensions are: (1) the
Environmental Dimension, which takes into account the natural
environment when making business decisions,146 (2) the Social
Dimension, which considers the relationship between business and

138

Id. at 5 fig. 1.
Id.
140 Id.
141Archie B. Carroll, Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR: Taking Another Look, INT’L J.
CORP. SOC. RESP., July 5, 2016, at 1, 5 fig. 1,
https://jcsr.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s40991-016-0004-6.pdf.
142 Id.
143 See Dahlsrud, supra note 135, at 3.
144 Id. at 7 app.
145 Id. at 8.
146 Id. at 4.
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society,147 (3) the Economic Dimension, which looks at socioeconomic or financial aspects, including describing CSR in terms of
a business operation,148 (4) the Stakeholder Dimension, which
considers individual stakeholders and stakeholder groups,149 and (5)
the Voluntariness Dimension, which accounts for actions not
prescribed by law.150 So while none of the above 37 definitions of
CSR could agree on a single definition of what exactly CSR is, each
looked at these five dimensions, environmental, social, economic,
stakeholders and voluntariness when crafting a CSR proposal that fit
each unique circumstance.
With this understanding of not only the four responsibilities
proposed by Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR, but also the five dimensions
used by modern companies, an in-depth review can now be
undertaken regarding beef packing companies in the United States
and whether they are arguably committing CSR abuses.
It’s no secret that the United States beef packing industry has
become extremely consolidated, as has been analysed thus far. In
fact, “according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the top four
beef processors hold 85 percent of the market share, controlling the
beef market to the point that some farmers believe the companies’
clout unfairly influences livestock prices.”151 These four companies,
Tyson, Cargill, JBS and National Beef are often referred to as the
“Big Four” as stated before.152
Through horizontal and vertical integration, the
consolidation of the beef market in the hands of only a few major
players, namely the Big Four, is only getting worse. For example, in
2019, National Beef (the fourth-largest of the Big 4) was acquired
(almost wholly) by the Brazilian company Marfrig Global Foods

147

Id.
Id.
149 Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility Is Defined: An
Analysis of 37 Definitions, CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T. MGMT., Jan. 2008, at 1, 4.
150 Id.
151 Grant Gerlock, Consolidation in the Livestock Industry May Get a Boost Since
Proposed USDA Rule Won’t’ Take Effect, HARVEST PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.harvestpublicmedia.org/post/consolidation-livestock-industry-mayget-boost-proposed-usda-rule-won-t-take-effect.
152 Joe Fassler, A New Lawsuit Accuses the “Big Four” Beef Packers of
Conspiring to Fix Cattle Prices, THE COUNTER (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://thecounterBa.org/meatpacker-price-fixing-class-action-lawsuit-cattlementyson-jbs-cargill-national-beef/.
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SA.153 This same year, the Marfrig owned National Beef acquired
another beef packing company – Iowa Premium Beef, which is a
regional packer focused on processing steers in the Upper
Midwest.154 While this deal didn’t make waves or national headlines,
it highlights the dangers that consolidation poses to the beef industry.
Iowa Premium was one the last smaller, independent packers,
situated in the Iowa-Minnesota region, which “is the only place left
in the country where over half of all cattle are sold into the cash
market”155 meaning, livestock auctions, where the fair market price
of the cattle is determined by competitive bidding. Today, because
of consolidation (like the Iowa Premium buyout) nationwide “only
25 percent of cattle sell on the cash market. Instead, most cattle are
sold through forward contracts or through ‘formula pricing,’ in
which packers determine the value of cattle based on a nonnegotiated pricing formula.”156 This number is concerning because,
as stated by Robert Taylor, Professor of Agricultural Economics at
Auburn University, “the thinner the cash market is, the more easily
it’s manipulated.”157 Referencing the Iowa Premium deal, Bill
Bullard, CEO of the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund (RCALF) had this to say – “The deal could hasten the death of
competitive price setting for cattle…The cash market is the price
discovery market for the entire cattle industry. If the cash market
continues to thin…then it’s essentially game over for cattle
producers…with a lack of a competitive marketplace, the packers
will dictate prices to producers.”158 In short, when there are only four
main buyers of cattle, those four buyers can control the entire beef
industry.
The CSR implications of this growing consolidation through
acquisitions and mergers may not be apparent to some, but the
actions taken by the Big 4 are arguably socially irresponsible. When
the Big Four’s monopoly is viewed through the lens of Carroll’s
Pyramid of CSR, it’s clear that all four companies are meeting their
first responsibility, the Economic Responsibility, or duty to be
profitable. In fact, in late 2019, packers’ profit margins rose to a
Brazil’s Marfrig Raises Stake in National Beef to 81.7%, REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/national-beef-ma-marfrig-gl-foods/brazilsmarfrig-raises-stake-in-national-beef-to-81-7-idUSL2N27Y05P (Nov. 18, 2019).
154 See Claire Kelloway, Beef Packing Merger Threatens America’s Last
Competitive Cash Cattle Market, FOOD & POWER (Apr. 11, 2019),
http://www.foodandpower.net/2019/04/11/beef-packing-merger-threatensamericas-last-competitive-cash-cattle-market/ (2019).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
153

2022]

COOL, COVID & CATTLETRACE

101

record $358 per head.159 To put that in perspective, in 2018 alone,
there were 33.7 million cattle slaughtered in the United States.160 On
the flip side, at the same time period that packers profit margins were
$358 per head, “… cattle feeders saw their margins decline from an
average of $24 per head profit to a $28 per head loss.”161 That swing
is a direct result of the “cash fed cattle market at $5 per cwt. lower”162
than usual.
While packers are “making a killing” in profits, the rest of
the industry is suffering, and the cash market is down to a point that
cattle producers are losing money. With this information in mind,
looking at the rest of Carroll’s Pyramid, the next rung is Legal
Responsibilities, or the duty to obey laws & regulations, which is
required by society. While the Big Four are arguably meeting this
responsibility, on the surface, this meeting of this responsibility is
questionable. For example, the Packer & Stockyards Act was passed
in 1921 to, in part, prevent the monopolization of the cattle industry.
The Packers & Stockyards Act contains various provisions defining
what is “unfair practices” in an effort to prevent packers’ abuses of
the rest of the industry. However, as the law currently stands, for an
individual cattle producer to be able to show that one of the Big Four
has engaged in an unfair practice, they “have to prove harm for the
entire. . . .industry rather than harm to themselves when seeking
relief. . . .for abusive contract practices.”163 An interim rule was
passed in 2016 called the Farmer Fair Practices Rule (FFPR), which
eliminated this requirement, and required only that the producer
show that the unfair practice harmed his individual operation, not the
industry as a whole. The FFPR was withdrawn in 2017, much to the
chagrin of independent cattlemen’s groups, such as the United States
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Greg Henderson, Profit Tracker: Packer Margins Went Up How Much?!,
DROVERS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.drovers.com/news/industry/profit-trackerpacker-margins-went-how-much.
160 Statistics and Information, STATISTICS AND INFORMATION, ECON. RSCH. SERV,
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161 Henderson, supra note 160.
162 Id.
163 See Action Alert: Farmer Fair Practices Rules in Jeopardy at USDA, NAT’L
FARMERS UNION, https://nfu.org/action-alert-farmer-fair-practices-rules-injeopardy-at-usda/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2022).
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Cattlemen’s Association.164 The repeal was lobbied for by the
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association.165
This section of the PSA that the FFPR sought to address is
the subject of President Biden’s Executive Order 14036, “Promoting
Competition in the American Economy,” which directs the Secretary
of Agriculture to:
“…address the unfair treatment of farmers and
improve conditions of competition in the markets for
their products, consider initiating a rulemaking or
rulemakings under the Packers and Stockyards Act to
strengthen the Department of Agriculture’s
regulations
concerning
unfair,
unjustly
discriminatory, or deceptive practices and undue or
unreasonable preferences, advantages, prejudices, or
disadvantages, with the purpose of furthering the
vigorous implementation of the law established by the
Congress in 1921 and fortified by amendments.”166
In short, the proposed rule would be similar to the FFPR, in
that a producer would no longer have to prove industry wide harm to
receive some sort of relief under the PSA.167
Another example of questionable legal responsibilities
includes two of the Big Four, JBS and National Beef/Marfrig, both
of which are Brazilian based companies. Together with JBS,
“Marfrig has a record of colluding with JBS to lower prices paid to
Brazilian cattle producers and bribing public officials.”168 While
similar practices have not been proven here in United States, the fact
that JBS and Marfrig/National Beef has a history of such practices in
their home country it should not surprise anyone that they are now
being accused of that here in the States (more on that infra).

See Hagstrom Report, USDA Withdraws GIPSA’s Farmer Fair Practices Rules,
THE FENCE POST (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.thefencepost.com/news/usdawithdraws-gipsas-farmer-fair-practices-rules/.
165 See USDA Moves Forward with Flawed GIPSA Rules, NAT’L CATTLEMEN’S BEEF
ASS’N (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.ncba.org/newsreleases.aspx?NewsID=6030.
166 Exec. Order 14036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 14, 2021).
167 See Daniel Litwin, How Will Updates to the Packers and Stockyards Act Shape
Agriculture’s B2B Relationships?, MARKETSCALE, (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://marketscale.com/industries/food-and-beverage/how-will-updates-to-thepackers-and-stockyards-act-shape-agricultures-b2b-relationships/.
168 Kelloway, supra note 155 (citing Brazil Prosecutors Seek $774 mln in Fines
over Alleged Loan Scheme, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-caixa-fraud/brazil-prosecutors-seek-774mln-in-fines-over-alleged-loan-scheme-idUSL2N1WL13E).
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Moving up the pyramid, Ethical Responsibilities, that of the
duty to “do what is just and fair” and “avoid harm” were expected,
but not required, by society. Here, there is nothing just or fair about
dictating prices to cattle producers in a way that the Big Four are
seeing record profits and forcing the rest of the industry into a losing
game. At the top of the pyramid, Philanthropic Responsibilities, the
duty to be a good corporate citizen, were simply desired by society.
Here, the duty to be a good corporate citizen is lacking. Each of the
Big Four have issued various CSR Reports outlining the good they
do. From a philanthropic view, they do much for the good of society.
However, behind the scenes they are crippling, or simply buying
their competition. This is not meeting the duty to be a good corporate
citizen. Carroll’s pyramid seemed to place emphasis on certain
responsibilities more than others, Carroll believed that all four
responsibilities should be considered simultaneously when
determining whether an action was corporately socially responsible.
Here, when viewed in light of these four responsibilities as a whole,
it appears that the Big Four, as a whole, are lacking.
When the actions of the Big Four are viewed through the lens
of the five dimensions of CSR proposed by Dahlsrud, there also
appears to be some holes in their conduct. The first dimension, the
environmental dimension, is not really the focus of this paper and as
such would require extensive research beyond the scope of this paper
and will not be addressed. However, the second dimension, the social
dimension, considers the relationship between business and society.
Here, the alleged conduct of dictating prices, and price fixing, is
putting America’ cattlemen/cattlewomen out of business and killing
the ranching way of life in America as we know it. While it may not
be as drastic as the shuttering of the Stockyards in Kansas City or
Omaha, it is killing a way of life. These actions likely are in conflict
with the social dimension. Third, the economic dimension, as
discussed above, is being met by these companies. The fourth
dimension, the stakeholder dimension, will be discussed in the final
section of this paper. Lastly, the fifth dimension, the voluntariness
dimension is a tough one to meet, because as was stated above, CSR
compliance is not regulated by State’s, and is completely voluntary
on the part of the company. As such, if companies, such as the Big
Four, choose to violate various aspects of CSR, there isn’t a whole
lot of enforcement mechanisms available.
As stated above, CSR compliance is not regulated by States,
and is completely voluntary on the part of the company. As such, if
companies, such as the Big Four, choose to violate various aspects
of CSR, there are not many enforcement mechanisms available.
Industry groups can try to work with the Big Four to reach workable
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solutions, or overcome these CSR shortcomings, but at the end of the
day, if the Big Four choose to continue down the path they are on,
the voluntariness dimension says they can do as they please. This is
where R-CALF USA again comes into play.
According to their website “R-CALF USA (RanchersCattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America), is
the largest producer-only membership-based organization that
exclusively represents U.S. cattle and sheep producers on domestic
and international trade and marketing issues. R-CALF USA, a
national, non-profit organization, is dedicated to ensuring the
continued profitability and viability of the U.S. cattle industry.”169 In
short, their slogan is “Fighting for the U.S. Independent Cattle
Producer.”170
As one of the leading groups fighting for the independent
U.S. cattle producer, R-CALF has taken many steps thus far,
including extensive litigation over the years. For example, in 2019,
R-CALF filed a large class action lawsuit with a 121-page complaint,
alleging that the Big Four conspired to depress cattle prices, and
inflate their own margins. As such, “the suit alleges the nation’s four
largest beef packers violated U.S. antitrust laws, the Packers and
Stockyards Act, and the Commodity Exchange Act by unlawfully
depressing the prices paid to American ranchers.”171 While the
outcome of this litigation remains to be seen, as shown, JBS and
Marfrig have faced similar charges at home in Brazil, it may not be
surprising if similar conduct is found here in the States.
In fact, while the R-CALF lawsuit continues, another lawsuit
ended in February 2022, making essentially the same allegations. In
the case of Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. v. JBS USA Food Company
Holdings, et al.,172 the Plaintiff Pacific Agri-Products, Inc. (a
wholesale food distributor who purchases beef from the Big Four)
brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
alleging that “Tyson, Cargill, National, and JBS worked together,
starting in 2015, to reduce the number of cattle slaughtered which
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created, ‘artificial Beef supply restraints.’”173 The case settled in
early February 2022, wherein “JBS SA agreed to pay a sum of $52.5
million to settle litigation following accusations of conspiring to
inflate prices and pocketbooks by limiting beef supply in the U.S.
market.”174 In a Press Release dated February 2, 2022, Iowa’s
Senator Chuck Grassley had this to say regarding the settlement:
“If there were any doubt about the shenanigans Big
Packers play to line their pockets at the expense of
consumers and independent producers, look no
further than JBS’ $52.5 million settlement in pricefixing litigation. The other members of the Big Four
packers continue to face similar allegations. Although
the settlement is a spit in the ocean compared to JBS’
record profit throughout the pandemic, it validates
what cattle producers have been telling me when they
try to get a fair price in the marketplace. It’s time to
put an end to these price fixing schemes once and for
all. Congress must pass the Cattle Price Discovery
and Transparency Act to bring access and
accountability to the meatpacking industry.”175
In addition to litigation, R-CALF has taken other steps, such
as advocating extensively for the implementation of the Farmer Fair
Practices Rule discussed above.176 Another example of their
involvement is through organizing educational events, workshops
and meetings across the nation, in conjunction with other advocacy
groups, such as the recent “Rally to Stop the Stealin’” held in Omaha,
Nebraska in October, 2019, held in conjunction with the
Organization for Competitive Markets.177 Such educational events
173
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Responds, DROVERS (Feb. 2, 2022), https://www.drovers.com/news/industry/jbssettles-price-fixing-allegations-525m-industry-responds.
175 Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Senator, Grassley: JBS Settlement Tells You
Everything You Need to Know About Packers’ Anticompetitive Tactics (Feb. 2,
2022), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-jbssettlement-tells-you-everything-you-need-to-know-about-packers-anticompetitivetactics.
176 See GIPSA Rules Will Help Reverse Cattle Industry Decline, RANCHERSCATTLEMEN ACTION LEGAL FUND UNITED STOCKGROWERS OF AM. (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.r-calfusa.com/r-calf-usa-gipsa-rules-will-help-reverse-cattle-industrydecline/.
177 October 2, 2019; Rally to Stop the Stealin’!, ORG. FOR COMPETITIVE MKTS.,
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://competitivemarkets.com/stopthestealin/.
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are important, as fighting to influence the “court of public opinion”
is oftentimes as important as fighting in the courts of law. This is
because, as once wisely observed by Wilma Mankiller (the first
female president of the Cherokee Nation), “public perception creates
public policy.”178 With that in mind, the following are several
recommendations on how this issue can be more effectively
addressed in the future to influence better practice and change within
the private beef packing sector.
First, because much of CSR is voluntary, most internal
company change in regard to CSR comes as a result of the company
feeling pressure to change from their consumers. R-CALF has done
an excellent job at educating beef cattle producers, but so far, has
somewhat overlooked the consumers. There are far more consumers
in America, than there are beef cattle producers. If advertising, and
educational events could be tailored in a way that draws consumers
into them, then the consumers can use their collective weight through
the power of their “purse” to slow any abusive practices in the
packing industry.
The second step would be a nationwide push for the
reimplementation of the Farmers Fair Practices Rule. Because the
FFPR would benefit not just beef producers, but all livestock
producers nationwide, a working group could be created consisting
of representatives of all independent beef cattle producing
organization, as well as those that represent independent sheep, pork,
and poultry producers. By creating a working group consisting of all
segments of the livestock industry, there would not be a lone voice
in favour of the FFPR, but the collective power of the entire meat
industry. Again, the Biden Administration has proposed rulemaking
similar to the FFPR, and the success of said rulemaking remains to
be seen.
The second step then translates into the third step, the
creation of a “United States Multi-Stakeholder Initiative.” This
cross-sector initiative could include representatives from the beef
industry, the cattle industry, as well as consumer groups, food safety
groups, and free-market advocates. This multi-stakeholder initiative
has the benefit of governance without government. In other words, if
the federal government were not ultimately successful in reinstating
the FFPR, or enforcing the Packers & Stockyards Act, then the
initiative could create an independent system of market-based
178

Gary Herbert, Utah Compact on Racial Equity, Diversity and Inclusion,
FACEBOOK (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.facebook.com/GovGaryHerbert/videos/145876427011787/.
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regulatory mechanisms including guidelines, certifications, auditing
and labelling, to start. With representatives from this cross-sector
group, these market-based regulatory instruments could be drafted in
a way to take the Big Four and “hold their feet to the fire” as it were.
While these suggestions arising from the CSR analysis are
like the VCOOL/CattleTrace Compromise in that they are not the
“end-all-be-all” solutions, they are still worth mentioning. Up to this
point in time, the entire argument surrounding overcoming the
packers consolidation of the industry has revolved around MCOOL
and breaking up the “Big Four.” By shedding light on other options,
like those proposed above involving CSR, perhaps the discussion can
be changed to where producers and organizations begin looking at
other options.
C. Other Solutions
As stated above, the point of introducing other options aside
from simply renewing the fight for MCOOL is to get producers and
industry experts thinking about how else to fix the problem. It’s true
that MCOOL is one of the best tools to fight back against
consolidation, price fixing and price manipulation – however, since
that option is only one options, what other options are available
beyond what has been discussed?
In a recent interview with rancher Sheila Ellis, she was asked
that very question, namely, “what are some solutions that could be
implemented to fix these issues?”179 She responded, “the PRIME Act
being made into law, enforcement of anti-trust laws, and breaking up
the packer monopolies would all be viable solutions.”180 Of Ms.
Ellis’ proposals, the first, instating the PRIME Act is one of the best
options available at this point. The PRIME Act (Processing Revival
and Intrastate Meat Exemption) was first introduced in 2015.181 This
options is one of the best because “currently, custom facilities across
the country are exempt from state and federal inspection regulations
to process meat for personal consumption…However, when a farmer
wants to actually sell meat to any buyer — individual consumer,
restaurant, hotel, or grocery store — the animal must be slaughtered
and processed at a USDA-inspected or…state-inspected facilities to
legally sell the meat.”182 By exempting these smaller processing
facilities from strict, suffocating federal “red tape” would encourage
179

Johnston, supra note 27.
Id.
181 Jared Cates, What is the PRIME Act?, CAROLINA FARM STEWARDSHIP ASS’N
https://www.carolinafarmstewards.org/what-is-the-prime-act/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2022).
182 Id.
180
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the development and building of more, local, processing plants.
Thus, giving consumers more local options for their meat, and giving
up-start beef processors a fighting chance against the Big Four.
Under the Biden Executive Order discussed prior, the USDA
recently announced that it intends to invest $500M to support and
incentivize “new competitive entrants into meat and poultry
processing” and more than $150M to strengthen existing “small and
very small” facilities.183 This funding will do much to encourage the
development and building of more, local, processing plants. Again,
however, in addition to funding, the USDA should consider ways to
decrease the “red tape” that these small processing facilities must cut
through simply to get their product to the consumers. For example,
Kaibab Processing is a small, family owned “custom-exempt meat
processing facility” located in Fredonia, Arizona.184 Kaibab
Processing has a 4 out of 4 rating from the Arizona Department of
Agriculture and “offer[s] custom slaughter and processing
livestock.”185 As an Arizona inspected facility, the family has been
able to bring this custom processing facility from an idea to a fully
functioning plant in less than 2 years processing livestock and game
in the State of Arizona. However, where Fredonia, Arizona is located
on the Arizona/Utah border, and due to the unique geography,
Kaibab Processing is very isolated from the rest of Arizona yet
extremely proximate to Southern Utah (Fredonia is 195 miles from
its county seat of Flagstaff, Arizona, yet only 7 miles from Kanab,
Utah, the county seat of neighboring Kane County, Utah). Because
of USDA regulations, Kaibab Processing is able to engage in only
limited interstate commerce even though most of their potential
clientele reside north of the Arizona/Utah border. Again, particularly
in situations like those pertaining to Kaibab Processing, in addition
to funding, the USDA should consider ways to decrease the “red
tape” that these small processing facilities must cut through simply
to get their product to the consumers.
The second solution brought up by Ms. Ellis is that of
enforcing the anti-trust laws that are already on the books. This is
another viable option, as there are various anti-trust laws already in
Ellison et al., supra note 45(citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA
Announces $500 Million for Expanded Meat & Poultry Processing Capacity as
Part of Efforts to Increase Competition, Level the Playing Field for Family
Farmers and Ranchers, and Build a Better Food System (July 9, 2021),
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2021/07/09/usda-announces-500million-expanded-meat-poultry-processing).
184 About Us, KAIBAB PROCESSING, http://kaibabprocessing.com/?page_id=11 (last
visited Mar. 16, 2022).
185 Id.
183
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effect that are simply not being enforced – such as the Packers and
Stockyards Act. According to Professor Roger A. McEowen, “a good
case can be made that the courts have not carried out the legislative
intent of the PSA provision concerning price manipulation.”186 There
are legal mechanisms already in place to prevent the type of activity
engaged in by the Big Four, those mechanisms just need to be used
and enforced. Here, a federal/state partnership may be extremely
beneficial as highlighted in the letter signed by 16 Attorneys General
in December 2021 and sent to Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack,
urging the Secretary as follows:
“USDA should consider using funds appropriated
through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 to
establish a grant that state antitrust enforcers could
avail themselves of for the purpose of investigating
and bringing actions in agricultural markets. State
attorneys general have the potential to have
significant
impact
on
agriculture
market
concentration, but lack of resources is a perennial
limitation on what states can do.”187
While the State attorneys general share the enforcement
authority to enforce and investigate antitrust violations, as noted the
perennial lack of resources prevents States from playing an active
role. However, if a fund were to be established from which States
could draw from and aid the USDA in its efforts, perhaps the PSA
could be enforced like it was originally intended.
The third solution raised by Ms. Ellis is that of breaking up
the packing monopolies. Of the three options, this one is by far the
hardest to accomplish. To break up the monopolies (as was done with
the Big Five early in the 20th Century) would require some sort of
proof of wrongdoing. As discussed earlier in this paper, there are
ongoing investigations into the meat packing industry. So while as
of now this option may not be viable, if the DOJ returns with findings
that the Big Four have violated the Packers & Stockyards Act,
perhaps this could be a reality.
The list of possible solutions is extensive, and this paper is
not intended to address all of them, but other possible solutions
include looking further into the following:

186
187

McEowen, supra note 12, at 4.
Ellison et. al., supra note 45.

110

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.18

1. Promoting local processing options through
funding mechanisms rather than simply
through the PRIME Act.
2. Enforcing the Packers & Stockyards Act
through federal/state partnerships.
3. Reinstating the Farmer Fair Practices
Rule.188
4. Break-up the Big Four monopoly as was
suggested.
5. A Beef Contract Library (like the Swine
Contract Library §222 P&S Act) to
encourage greater transparency into the
contracts entered into by the Big Four and
facilitate price discovery.
6. Mandatory Cash Sales, as has been
suggested by Senator Chuck Grassley (RIA) in his recent bill,189 dubbed the “50/14
Rule.” In short, this “bipartisan bill will
require that a minimum of 50 percent of a
meat packer’s weekly volume of beef
slaughter be purchased on the open or spot
market”190 and require a packer to actually
slaughter the beef within 14 days of the
sale.191
While this list is not exclusive and would obviously require
greater “flushing out” to determine how effective (or ineffective)
each would be, the point is still this – producers need to begin looking
at other options besides just MCOOL. As has been stated, if
producers desire a level playing field that is not dominated by the Big
Four, then MCOOL is a wonderful option. However, as shown, it’s
not truly viable at this point, as various groups oppose it, and under
the current political climate, the odds of it passing Congress are not
good. So in the meantime, there is a problem that needs addressing,
and these suggestions are simply that, suggestions. Suggestions to
spark conversation and get beef producers thinking about how best
to save their industry from those who simply see profit margins and
188

GIPSA Rules Will Help Reverse Cattle Industry Decline, supra note 177.
Alan Newport, Senate Bill Would Require 50% Cash Cattle Sales, BEEF MAG.
(May 14, 2020), https://www.beefmagazine.com/legislative/senate-bill-wouldrequire-50-cash-cattle-sales.
190 Press Release, Chuck Grassley, Senator, Grassley, Colleagues Introduce
Bipartisan Bill to Increase Transparency in Cattle Market, (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-colleaguesintroduce-bipartisan-bill-to-increase-transparency-in-cattle-market.
191 S. 949, 117th Cong. § 1(4)(A)(ii) (2021).
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spreadsheets. To get producers thinking about how to preserve their
industry and the western legacy for those to come.
V. CONCLUSION
“So when you see the cowboy, he’s not ragged by his choice
He never meant to bow them legs or put that gravel in his voice.
He’s just chasin’ what he really loves and what’s burnin’ in his
soul
And wishin’ to God that he’d been born a hundred years ago,
Still singin’ Strawberry Roan and Little Joe.” 192
Omaha. Dodge City. Abilene. Denver. Fort Worth. All five
of these American cities have one thing in common. Like Kansas
City, all five were founded as “Cowtowns.” After the American Civil
War ended in 1865, there was a shortage of beef in the ever
industrializing northern states, and millions of head of cattle in the
western plains of the country that needed to get to those markets.193
Accordingly, the Chisolm Trail became a hotbed of cattle being
trailed from Texas and Oklahoma to shipping yards in places like
Kansas City or Dodge City, which was affectionately dubbed “Queen
of the Cowtowns.”194 These Cowtowns were where the cattle coming
off the trail were sold to cash bidders, and railed to packing houses
back east. The success of these Cowtowns, and the competitive
markets of the cash bidders for cattle, gave rise to some of the most
iconic ranches and heroes of the day.
Those days are long gone. The giant shipping yards and
stockyards of Kansas City and Denver are no more, but cattle
ranching in the United States is still hanging on, along with the
cowboy spirit that it embodies. In fact, as of 2017, there were
882,692 total cattle and calve operations in the United States195 the
vast majority of which (96%) are family-owned or individually
operated.196 However, this industry, and its way of life is being
threatened of extinction alongside those early Cowtown stockyards

192

GARTH BROOKS, The Cowboy Song, on IN PIECES, (Liberty Records 1993).
Litwin, supra note 168.
194 Cowtowns, KANSAPEDIA, KAN. HIST. SOC’Y,
https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/cowtowns/15598 (Feb. 2013).
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NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRI., AC-17-A-51, 2017 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE 19 tbl. 11 (2019),
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due to the ever-growing monopolistic power of the four, multinational corporations known as the “Big Four.”
Returning to the interview between Patrick Bet-David and
Shad Sullivan, towards the end of the interview Patrick asked Shad
the following question:
“PBD: Do you have kids?
SS: I do.
PBD: Any plans of one day passing this down to your
daughter and son?
SS: Absolutely. That’s the goal. That is every
rancher’s dream is to be able to pass down this
business and the lifestyle. It’s a tradition. It’s
something that we love. It brings a lot of hardship, but
it brings a lot of love to the heart to. There’s a lot of
rewarding experiences in this life, and I shouldn’t say
it isn’t about the money. Because we have to be able
to feed the world at a profit, we can’t do it at a loss.
And in order to send that dream on down the road, we
have to be successful. Because we do want to hand
down that legacy, that’s what it’s all about…were
proud to be multi-generational operators, but at this
point, it aint looking like it…. at some point you have
to have a win.”197
That tradition, and love of a way of life that Mr. Sullivan
talks about is on the verge of extinction. There truly is a battle
between those who love that tradition and way of life and those who
simply see profit and cold, hard numbers. The American rancher and
cattleman needs a win, otherwise, the industry is looking at losing
many of its producers in the coming years, according to Mr. Sullivan.
While the Big Four continue their march towards consolidation,
groups such as R-CALF USA are attempting to do something about
it, and slow that march, or halt it. By looking to the options presented
in this paper, and considering the U.S. CattleTrace/VCOOL
compromise proposed herein, perhaps the American Rancher will
not go the way of the Kansas City Stockyards and the Cowtowns of
yesteryear.
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Plantain Cultivation in Puerto Rico: Its Inclusion in the
National Crop Table of the United States Department of
Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency, and its Loss
Compensation in Disaster Programs.
Javier A. Rivera-Aquino, Esq.*
April 11th, 2022**
Abstract
If justice is to provide each person what they deserve, it
seems plantain producers in Puerto Rico did not relish a just
compensation for their farm losses after Hurricane Maria in 2017.
The main culprit? Stale data. Farm Service Agency’s (FSA) Wildfire
and Hurricanes Indemnity Program (WHIP) utilized plantain
production data under the National Crop Table (NCT) 2017, which
seemingly did not reflect up-to-date yield averages of Puerto Rico’s
plantain farmers at the time of Hurricane Maria. According to the
University of Puerto Rico (UPR), one acre of plantains, in the
highlands, where no irrigation is utilized, averages a yield of 30,000
fruits. Based on NCT data, the County Expected Yield (CEY) for
non-irrigated plantains in 2017, is 19,142 fruits per acre. UPR’s
averaged yields of 42,075 fruits for the coastal, semi-arid plains of
Puerto Rico, where irrigation is more often used, whereas the NCT
data, reflects an equivalency of 25,714 fruits. Plantain CEYs have
been the same since 2013, for all counties in Puerto Rico,
disregarding improvements in higher yielding clonal varieties and
plant health protection, as well as plant density. Because the NCT
data is used to determine loss compensation under Standing Disaster
Assistance Programs like the Noninsured Crop Assistance Program
(NAP), and Ad Hoc Payments such as WHIP, as less plantain fruits
per acre were accounted for in FSA’s dataset, plantain farmers
received inadequate compensation. To claim higher compensation,
plantain farmers will have to prove in administrative appeal, by
*
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preponderance of the evidence, that the agency erred applying its
own rules. They will have to overcome jurisdictional matters as well
as the appealability of rules of general applicability. Funding
considerations also apply. The data contained on the NCT will have
major impact on FSA decisions in the future. A less than adequate
compensation for plantain losses is likely to occur again if the data is
not accurately maintained. Puerto Rico is situated in a hurricane
alley, and plantains are very susceptible to wind damage. It is in the
best interest of plantains farmers to verify that the information
contained in the NCT is current and accurate, to avoid less than
adequate compensations in the future. The objective of this paper is
to raise awareness so that farmers can be better prepared and more
involved in FSA decision making, and know their legal options, to
ensure better program delivery.
I. Introduction
On September 20th, 2017, Hurricane María struck Puerto
Rico as a Category 4 hurricane, borderline Category 5. With
sustained winds of over 155 mph and gusts of wind exceeding 180
mph, this event had catastrophic results throughout Puerto Rico,
particularly on its agriculture. This was one of many natural disasters
experienced in the United States (U.S.) during that year.
It is known that farms are quite susceptible to natural
disasters, not only affecting the livelihoods of farmers, but
compromising food security as well, and because of it, the Federal
Government provided funding to assist farmers overcome the losses
inflicted by these natural disasters in the form of crop-loss
compensation and recover as soon as possible. These compensations
are often based on historical production and sales data provided by
farmers to government institutions, or by regional production and
sales historic averages kept by these institutions. If data is accurate
and up-to-date, compensations will fairly reflect the losses
experienced by farmers. Instead, if production and sales data is not
properly kept, overpayments or underpayments are likely to occur.
When the first occurs, taxpayers’ money is expended unjustifiably.
If the latter occurs, the purpose of disaster relief programs is defeated
as farmers will not fully recover from their losses.
In this article, the second scenario is analyzed from the
perspective of a staple crop, plantains, grown mostly by historically
underserved farmers in the unincorporated U.S. territory of Puerto
Rico. There is data that supports that, production and sales averages
kept by the Federal government did not reflect up-to-date averages.
This article looks in depth the effect FSA’s official data had on the
disaster loss compensations to plantain producers, explores the legal

2022]

PLANT CULTIVATION IN PUERTO RICO

115

remedies available to these farmers, and proposes a call to action to
ensure proper policy execution.
II. Plantain Cultivation in P.R.
It can be argued that, within the U.S., commercially grown
plantain mostly occurs in Puerto Rico,1 as it is a tropical cultivar,
widely used in many Puerto Rican dishes. Plantain cultivation was
the most important crop in Puerto Rico.2 According to the 2017
Agricultural Census,3 there were 2,035 farms dedicated to plantain
cultivation, with 10,315 acres (10,624 “cuerdas”)4 in production,
with an estimated value of $42,271,955.5 This figure reflects a
significant decrease if compared to the 2012 data: 4,737 plantain
farms; 22,060 acres (22,719 “cuerdas”); at a value of $80,505,103.6
This reduction in production is mainly due to the passage of
Hurricane María in 2017.
Plantain (musa spp.) cultivation can be produced throughout
all of Puerto Rico. Traditionally its cultivation is divided into two
zones: Highlands or Humid areas; and Semiarid, also referred to as
Coastal.7 This crop can be cultivated with irrigation (usually in
semiarid or coastal areas) or without irrigation (usually in the
highlands, where rainfall is evenly distributed throughout the year).
One plant bears a “bunch” or “raceme” with several fruiting
“hands.”8
In Puerto Rico, the following plantain varieties are found: a),
Maricongo, which can produce between 32 and 45 fruits per bunch;
b) Dwarf (or Common Dwarf) which can average 25 to 40 fruits; (c)
Hartón, with an average of 15 to 25 fruits; d) Super Plátano, which

A quick search of this crop on USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service
only showed results for this cultivar in Puerto Rico.
2 See Mildred Cortés & Manuel Díaz, Gastos e ingresos proyectados para la
producción de una cuerda de plátanos con una densidad de 1,100 plantas en la zona
semiárida de Puerto Rico 2017-2018 [Projected Expenses and Income for the
Production of a ‘Cuerda’ of plantains with a Density of 1,100 Plants in the SemiArid
Zone
of
Puerto
Rico
2017-2018]
(n.d.),
available
at
https://www.mercadeoagricolapr.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/platano-llano.pdf.
3 Prepared by the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), issued in
2020.
4 One (1) “cuerda” equals 0.971 acres.
5 NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AC-17-A-52, 2017 Census of
Agriculture: Puerto Rico (2018): Island and Regional Data 48 (2020).
6 Id. at 19 tbl. 15.
7 Cortés & Díaz, supra note 4.
8 OECD (2010), Safety Assessment of Transgenic Organisms: OECD Consensus
Documents: Volume 4, OECD Publishing.
1
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by pruning inferior fruits, can average 58 to 60 fruits per raceme. 9
Over the past ten (10) years, high-yielding varieties have been
selected and cloned, producing a greater number of fruits per plant.10
According to the University of Puerto Rico (UPR), planting densities
can range from 850 Plantain plants per “cuerda” (825 plants per acre)
in the Highlands to 1,100 plants per “cuerda” (1,068 plants per acre)
in the Coastal plains, and sales should be $9,000.50 with a net income
per “cuerda” approximates $5,114.68, and $12,622.50 and a net
income should be $8,867.31 respectively.11
Plantain is a versatile product; it can be consumed green or
ripe, and it is suitable for either fresh consumption, or for processing.
The Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture (PRDA) estimates the
per capita consumption of plantains in Puerto Rico at 50.47
pounds.12 A phytosanitary ban13 limits the entry of fresh produce with
skin into Puerto Rico, to prevent the entry of pests.14 The market for
processed plantains seems to have taken surge, most products being
imported (presumably from South and or Central America), except
for plantain chips.15 Vertical integration (farming-manufacturing or
farming-distribution) is limited. Roadside vendors, supermarkets,
and restaurants, as well as farmers markets and school cafeterias, are

9

Manuel Diaz Rivera, Manual práctico para el Cultivo Sustentable de Plátanos
[Practice Manual for the Sustainable Cultivation of Plantains] 8-9 (1997).
10See Departamento de Agricultra de Puerto Rico [Department of Agrigulture of
Puerto Rico], Orden Administrativa 2010-05 [Administrative Order 2010-05]. See
also Gerardo E. Alvarado León, Aceleran con technologia el cultivo de plátanos
[Technology Accelerates Cultivation of Plantains], PRESS READER (Feb. 2, 2019),
https://www.pressreader.com/puerto-rico/el-nuevodia/20190202/281492162554032.
11 Mildred Cortés & Manuel Díaz, U.P.R., Presupuesto Modelo: Plátano en la
Altura (1 cuerda) [Model Budget: Plantain in Highlands] (2022); CORTÉS & DÍAZ,
supra note 4.
12 Mildred Cortés, U.P.R., Empresas Agrícolas de Puerto Rico: Potencial de
Desarrllo [Agricultural Companies of Puerto Rico: Development Potential] 19,
available
at
https://www.uprm.edu/tamuk/wpcontent/uploads/sites/299/2019/07/Mildred_Cortes_empresas_agricolas_reduced1.pdf.
13 Mildred Cortés & Leticia Gayol, Cambio en las preferncias del consumidor de
plátano en Puerto Rico, 2003-2008 [Change in Consumer Preference for Plantain
in Puerto Rico, 2003-2008], 96 J. AGRIC. U. P.R. 107, 109 (2012).
14 Ada N. Avlrado Ortiz & Manuel Díaz, Guía Práctica de Plagas y Enfermedades
en Plátano y Guineo [Practical Guide to Pests and Diseases in Plantains and
Bananas] AGRIC. Extension Serv., Coll. Of Agric. Scis., U. PR., 13-14, 17-18
(2007), available at https://academic.uprm.edu/aalvarado/HTMLobj-119/PyGPDF.pdf.
15 Cortés & Gayol, supra note 17, at 110.
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the main points of sale of this product.16 Plantain plantations are very
susceptible to hurricanes.17
III. Farm Service Agency and the National Table of
Crops
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service
Agency (FSA) administers countless programs to assist farmers.18
Most prominently, FSA handles those programs aimed at providing
financing, as lender of last resort, to otherwise underserved farmers,
as well as disaster assistance programs. As part of its operation, the
Agency adopted the concept of "national crops" in its Non-Insured

Figure 1: NCT 2018

Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP)19 regulations. This concept
refers to types or cultivars that have little price differences, for their
most predominant use. The planting area and production for the crop
group is summarized in a table called the National Crop Table
("NCT"), like the one seen on Figure 1, which is used to calculate

16

Based on observations by the author.
Gary L. Miller & Ariel E. Lugo, Guide to the Ecological Systems of Puerto Rico,
FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., IITF-GTR-35, 137 (2009).
18 For statutes authorizing activities performed by FSA, see Authorizing Statutes,
FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programsand-services/laws-and-regulations/authorizing-statutes/index (last visited Apr. 29,
2022).
19 1-NAP (REV. 2), Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program for 2015 and
Subsequent Years, ¶200 FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., (2022)
[Hereinafter 1-NAP].
17
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losses.20 This table often collects the following information: planting
periods; crop payment code; crop payment code; crop types or
varieties (E.g., Maricongo or Common Dwarf plantains); intended
use; secondary use; county expected yield ("CEY"); average market
price damage factor; unharvested factor (UH); and units of measure;
among other.21
FSA is required to maintain its county records based on the
best available information for yield averages per crop, per land area,
and average prices.22 An Olympic average should be used to set
yields and prices. To calculate the yield or price for any given year,
data from the five (5) most recent crop years must be obtained,
eliminating the highest and lowest values, averaging the remaining
three (3).23 If data is not available, the rules provide alternate
methods of calculation that must be carefully followed.24 County
Committees ("CoC") as well as State Committees (“StC”) must
maintain minutes and documentation to evidence the process used to
obtain such averages.25 This data is used to award compensation
under the NAP, and recently, under the Wildfires and Hurricanes
Indemnity Program (WHIP).26
IV. The Wildfires and Hurricanes Indemnity Program
The Wildfire and Hurricanes Indemnity Program (WHIP)
was adopted by the U.S. Congress to compensate farmers for losses
suffered due to natural disasters experienced in 2017. 27 FSA was
ordered to administer the program. To do so, proper regulation28 was
adopted and the corresponding procedure was implemented under
the WHIP Handbook,29 short references as 1-WHIP. To determine
20

For example, see the 2018 NCT published: Javier. Rivera-Aquino, Dear Farmer,
Do You Know How Your Crops Are Valued for Compensation After a Natural
Disaster?,
JAVIER
A.
RIVERA-AQUINO
BLOG,
app.
D,
https://javierriveraaquino.com/dear-farmer-do-you-know-how-your-crops-arevalued-for-compensation-after-a-natural-disaster/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2022).
21 For an example of the data gathered by FSA, see id.
22 1-NAP, supra note 23, ¶ 276(B) (indicates that the expected performance by the
county will be based on the best available information provided by any of the
following sources: average APH per year, the Department of Agriculture, county
committee knowledge, local markets, NASS, NIFA, RMA, Rural Development, as
well as other reliable sources such as universities).
23 See id. ¶ 276(C), ¶ 278(D).
24 Id. ¶ 278(D).
25 Id. ¶ 280.
26 Agricultural Disaster Indemnity Programs, 7 C.F.R. §§ 760.1500—.1517.
27 7 C.F.R. § 760.1500.
28 2017 Wildfires and Hurricanes Indemnity Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 33,795 (July 18,
2018) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 760).
29 See generally FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1-WHIP, Wildfires &
Hurricanes Indemnity. Program (2018) [hereinafter 1-WHIP].
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losses, the agency had the responsibility of establishing expected
values based on an average price set by the system, times the
expected yield for the county per cultivar, times the producers crop
acres. A WHIP factor, any harvested portions, and crop insurance
payments would be deducted to finally determine a WHIP payment.30
In jurisdictions of the U.S., loss determinations considered historical
yields reported by each farmer. In Puerto Rico, a special provision
was adopted for WHIP indicating that FSA could only use the
expected yield per crop for each county ("CEY") and average prices
found to the 2017 National Crop Table (NCT), seen on Figure 2.31
This blanket provision was adopted to “ensure disaster assistance” in
a “timely and efficient manner.”32

Figure 2: 2017 NCT

30

See id. ¶ 210(A-F).
¶ 191(B). The 2017 NCT can be found at Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app.
A, at 16.
32 1-WHIP, supra note 33, ¶ 191(A).
31Id.
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V. The Effect of the NCT on WHIP’s Plantain
Compensation in Puerto Rico
Since the data on the NCT was used to compensate the losses
caused by Hurricane Maria, a deep dive at its content is needed to
understand what was compensated and how. For the purposes of
WHIP compensation, only the loss of plantain harvest or yield was
considered; plantation was determined not eligible.33 This contrasts
with the payment of farm insurance offered by the Puerto Rico Crop
Insurance Corporation (CSA for its Spanish acronym), which only
considers compensation for plantation losses.34
The NCT used for WHIP payments was adopted through the
"PR Notice WHIP-1;" plantains are found on page 16.35 The code for
plantains is 186 and only includes the Maricongo (Mar) and
Common Dwarf (Com) varieties. Under the "intended use" column,
the nomenclature adopted is for fresh use ("FH"). In the “practice”
column, there are irrigated ("I") plantains or non-irrigated ("N"). The
alleged source of data, the PRDA, does not measure plantain farm
output as either irrigated or not irrigated. The UPR, as said before,
differentiates plantains between Highlands and Semiarid zones. The
unit of measurement used is the "Hundredweight" or "CWT" (in
Spanish, “quintales” or “QQ”) when typically, in Puerto Rico, the
unit used is "per fruit" or "thousands of fruits”, almost never in
pounds, CWT or kilograms. For example, the PRDA, measures
plantains in “thousands of fruits”, as it can be seen on the
“Agricultural Gross Income Report”36 so, does the National
Agricultural Statistics Service.37 According to the NCT, the expected
average plantain production, for all counties in Puerto Rico, has
remained unchanged since 2013, at 180 CWT in irrigated plantations
and 134 CWT for plantations without irrigation.38 This crop does not
reflect a county disaster yield (CDY). The average price set for 2017
is $49.1167/CWT or $0.4912 per pound.39 The discount factor for
not having incurred in cost of harvesting the crop ("unharvested
factor") is 92%.40 The “WHIP factor” may vary depending on

33

Id. ¶ 140(B). Notice that in the PR Notice WHIP-1, Exhibit 2, found at RiveraAquino, supra note 24, app. A, enumerates plantations, and plantains is not among
them.
34For the 2017-2018 Insurance Program for the Puerto Rico Crop Insurance
Corporation, see Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. G.
35 Id. app. A, at 16.
36 Id. app. B, at 2, 7.
37NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. supra note 7, at 19 tbl. 15.
38 See Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, at app. B.
39 Id. app. A, at 16. Price per pound was converted CWT dividing by 100.
40 Id.
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whether it was insured; as stated before, CSA does not offer crop
insurance for plantain harvest, just plantation.
The NCT for 2018 includes additional values (not publicized
in the 2017 NCT) that shed light on the considerations taken by FSA
for Plantain crops.41 Among them: the “planting period”, which for
plantain is the entire year; the “planting distances” considered for this
cultivar being six (6) feet by seven (7) feet; and, therefore, the
“density of plants” per acre considered, for plantains being 1,037
(1,077 plants per “cuerdas”).42 The average price of plantains in 2018
was set at $52.56/CWT or $0.5256/pound.43 There is also a column
indicating the duration in the field, in the case of plantains with a
footnote referencing information provided by the UPR in 1999.44 At
the bottom of the 2018 NCT, it also indicates that its data source is
the P.R. Gross Agricultural Income Report provided by the PRDA's
Agricultural Statistics Division in fiscal year (FY) 2013/2014.45 The
2018 NCT was adopted in November 2018. From a request under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) made to FSA, pursuant to what
conversion factors were utilized for plantains, a "PR Notice CM-2"
document was released FSA uses a conversion factor of 1,000
plantains equivalent to seven hundred (700) pounds. 46
If the data for the NCT comes from the PRDA’s Agricultural
Statistics Service, why does FSA convert the unit of measuring of
plantains instead of utilizing the same unit from their source? Where
does the conversion factor come from? How accurate is it? These
are all questions that to this date are still without an answer.

41

See id. app. D.
Id. app. D, at 3.
43 Id.
44 Javier. Rivera-Aquino, Dear Farmer, Do You Know How Your Crops Are Valued
for Compensation After a Natural Disaster?, JAVIER A. RIVERA-AQUINO BLOG, app.
D, at 4 n.7, https://javierriveraaquino.com/dear-farmer-do-you-know-how-yourcrops-are-valued-for-compensation-after-a-natural-disaster/ (last visited Apr. 29,
2022).
45 Id. app. D, at 4. According to source referenced in the 2018 NCT, data was
obtained from the PR Agricultural Gross Income as of November 29, 2016, the final
data for the 2013/2014 and the preliminary 2014/2015 data reported. Per the author’s
research, the following database reported for the Agricultural Gross Income,
containing corrected information for 2013/2014 and preliminary data for 2014/2015
through 2016/2017 was not available until November 4, 2019. Id. app. B, at 1-5.
Agricultural Gross Income containing preliminary data for 2016/2017 through
2018/2019, was not publicized until April 27, 2021. Id. app. B, at 6-10.
46 On August 12, 2020, the author requested certain information on conversion
factors for agricultural crops used by FSA into P.R., under the Freedom of
Information Act of 1996 (FOIA). For the conversion factor of plantains, see id. app.
E, at 10, 23. The document makes no reference to the source from which this
conversion factor was obtained.
42
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Seemingly, PRDA and FSA failed to share data between 2014 and
2019. If PRDA fails to report statistical data to FSA, what other
sources does FSA has to supplement up-to-date farming production
information? Knowing the answer to these questions is of utmost
importance, so farmers and authorities can standardize production
reports and obtain reliable data. Additional (FOIA) requirements
were made to FSA to obtain historical NCT’s. The following
information for plantains was gathered:
Table 1.1: Average yield (in CWT) per acre and average
price for Plantain cultivation according to FSA-NCT.47
Plantains
Average
Yield

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

130
N
175 I
$38.3
667

134
N
180 I
$42.2
3

134
N
180 I
$40.5
733

134
N
180 I
$52.5
6

134
N
180 I
$52.5
6

134
N
180 I
$49.1
167

134
N
180 I
$52.5
6

Average
Price
N = non-irrigated, I = irrigated.

Since a reference is made to the PRDA's Gross Agricultural
Income Report48, the Plantain data used in these reports and the
averages resulting from such data are summarized below:
Table 1.2: Annual Plantain Production according to the
PRDA Gross Agricultural Income Report.49
Plantains
Average
Price
-Thousands
of Fruits
-Per Fruit

201
0

201
1

201
2

201
3

201
4

201
5

201
6

201
7

$26
9.1
2
$0.
269
1

$29
5.6

$36
6.5

$37
1.4

$36
7.89

$28
3.1

$33
0.6

$30
9.8

$0.2
956

$0.3
665

$0.3
714

$0.3
679

$0.2
831

$0.3
306

$0.3
098

Production

47

See Javier. A. Rivera-Aquino, Dear Farmer, Do You Know How Your Crops Are
Valued for Compensation After a Natural Disaster?, JAVIER A. RIVERA-AQUINO
BLOG, app. C, at 16, 41, 57, 67, 73, 84, 96, https://javierriveraaquino.com/dearfarmer-do-you-know-how-your-crops-are-valued-for-compensation-after-anatural-disaster/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2022).
48 To access this report, see id. at app. B.
49 Data compiled from the revised figures for the Agricultural Gross Income reports
dated 11/29/2016 and 4/11/2019. See id. app. B, at 2, 7.
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-Thousands

256
,91
3
-Acreage
N/
A
-Average
N/
Yield
(in A
Thousands)/
“Cuerda”50
(Acre)

123

154,
643

117,
700

119,
404

209,
012

255,
818

179,
544

245,
884

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

8,85
7.64
28.8
1

7,10
4
25.2
7

9,12
5.86
26.9
4

(27.
97)

(24.
53)

(26.
16)

Another source of information on plantains is the
Agricultural Census conducted by the USDA's National Agricultural
Statistics Service, which is typically conducted every five (5) years,
although the most recent was delayed because of Hurricane María.
This data was obtained in 2018 and was not released until 2020.
Table 1.3: Average Production Based on Data from the
NASS Agricultural Census. 51
Plantain – Harvested
Units (fruits)

2007
9,437,462
249,948,000

Average Fruit/Plant52
26.48
Average
Plants/ 916.31
“Cuerda” (Acre)53
(889)

2012
11,955,808
405,256,000
33.9
876.82
(850)

2017
6,273,622
169,073,00
0
26.95
974.49
(946)

Additionally, there is data from the UPR, specifically the
model budget for plantains, which estimates average yields and
prices for the product.54

50

Id. This figure, results from the division of thousands produced between the
“cuerdas” in production.
51 NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AC-12-A-52, 2012 Census of
Agriculture: Puerto Rico: Island and Municipio Data 133 tbl. 46 (2014); NAT'L
AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. supra note 7, at 19 tbl. 15.
52 Dr. Alexandra Gregory, from the Department of Agricultural Economics of the
UPR in Mayagüez, assisted in the computation of these data, particularly in the
estimation of the averages of "plants/acre" and "fruits/plant.”
53 Id.
54 See Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. F.
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Table 1.4: Average Production Based on Data from the UPR
Plantain Model Budget. 55
Plantain – Harvested

Highland/H
umid
Average
Fruits/ 30,00056
“Cuerda” (Acre)
(29,130)
Average
Plants/ 85058 (825)
“Cuerda” (Acre)
Average Fruit/Plant60
35.29

Coastal/Sem
iarid
42,07557
(40,854)
1,10059
(1,068)
38.25

Average
36,037.5
(34,992)
975
36.77

From the analysis and associations of these data sets,
important assumptions and pieces of information can be obtained. A
contrast is here performed, between the "NCT" and other sources of
information, to determine whether the compensation was fair and
how in future instances it can improve. Three areas will be subject of
review: 1) Plant Density; 2) Average Yields; and 3) Average Price.
A. Acreage Density
This element is of vital relevance since FSA must reflect
accurately the data average per county. According to the UPR,
farmers in counties that are predominantly coastal or semiarid areas,
are likely to use irrigation, and have greater plant density than those
in the highlands, likely not to use irrigation.61 For example, a farmer
from the highlands who, plants ten (10) “cuerdas” (9.71 acres) of
plantains at the rate of 850 plants per “cuerdas,” following UPR's
recommendation, will have a total of 8,500 plants in total. However,
if the farmer reports total plants, FSA will divide that number, 8,500,
by the density by 1037 plants per “acre,” as stated on the NCT, for
the acreage determination, which will result in 8.21 acres: one and
one half (1.5) acres less to which the WHIP Payment will not be
applied.

55

See id.
Id. Note “venta de plátanos” or sale of plantains, “millar” or thousands, in the
quantity of 30.
57 Id. Note “venta de plátanos” or sale of plantains, in the quantity of 42,075.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Divide Average fruits per acre by average plants per acre to obtain average fruits
per plant.
61 See CORTÉS & DÍAZ, supra note 14, at 2 n.1; Mildred Cortés & Manuel Díaz,
Presupuesto Modelo: Plátano en lo Llano (1 CUERDA) [Model Budget: Plantain in
Plains]
n.1
(2022),
U.
P.R.,
available
at
https://www.mercadeoagricolapr.com/herramientas/presupuestos-modelo/.
56
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Table 2.1.1: Planting densities for Plantain cultivation
according to various sources (UPR/FSA).62
Plants
per UPR
Acre
Highland
82563
Semiarid
Coastal

or 106864

FSA

Difference

1037

212

1037

-31

According to the 2017 NCT, one non-irrigated acre, as
typically occurs in the highlands, produces 134 CWT at a price of
$49.1167, for a value of $6,581.6378 per acre.65 If 1.5 acres of
plantains are not considered, $9,872.46 will not be part of the
computation for compensation under WHIP under this scenario. The
UPR, is the only source that distinguishes between two different
practices in plantain cultivation, clearly stating that the Semiarid
areas utilize irrigation whereas such recommendation is not made to
farmers in the Humid areas.66
Since the data of the 2017 Agricultural Census was not
collected until 2018 and was not published until 2020, the Census
information available to FSA in 2017 was the 2012 Agricultural
Census. NASS data makes no distinction between plantain “cuerdas”
with irrigation or without irrigation, nor between highland or coastal
areas. Therefore, it is unlikely that this data is being used by FSA.
Still, for the sake of dataset comparison, the average density obtained
from NASS when compared with the NCT shows a difference of 187
plants per acre.

62

See Rivera Aquino, supra note 7, app A. Comparison between data from Table
1.4 and the 2017 NCT.
63850 plants per “cuerda” are planted in the highlands. CORTÉS & DÍAZ, supra note
14, 2 n.1. If multiplied by the equivalence of “cuerdas” to acres, 0.971, results in
825 (825) plants.
64 Around 1,100 plants are planted per “cuerda” in the semiarid zone. CORTÉS &
DÍAZ, supra note 65, at n.1. If multiplied by the equivalence of “cuerdas” to acre,
0.971, results in 1068.
65 Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. A, at 16.
66 CORTÉS & DÍAZ, supra note 14; CORTÉS & MANUEL supra note 4. Irrigation is a
cost for the Semiarid, Coastal plains, whereas it is not recommended for the
Highland, Humid regions.
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Table 2.1.2: Planting densities for Plantain cultivation
according to various sources (NASS/FSA).67
Plants
per NASS 2012
Acre
Highland
Semiarid
Coastal

68

or 850

FSA

Difference

1037

187

1037

187

Unfortunately, there is not enough data from the PRDA to
determine the average density of plants per acre. So, where exactly
does the NCT plant density comes from? How the dataset is built is
not fully understood, but it seems to mix and match (or mismatch)
several sources at once.
B. Acreage Yield
In the case of Puerto Rico, instead of taking the individual
data from each farmer,69 the yield averages of each county or region
(CEY) from the NCT were utilized. 70 The weight of this factor in the
calculation of compensations under programs such as the "NAP" or
the WHIP is substantial.
As stated before, data from both PRDA and from NASS
measure Plantain production in “thousands of fruits,” while FSA uses
CWT as a unit of measurement, based on a conversion factor that
indicates that, for every 1,000 Plantain fruits, a weight of seven
hundred (700) pounds will be presumed.71 In other words, each
Plantain must weigh 0.7 lbs. or 11.2 ounces.72
67

Rivera-Aquino, supra note 7, app. A, at 16. A comparison between data from
Table 1.3 and Appendix A.
68 According to USDA/NASS reflects 876 plants per “cuerda”, which adjusted to
acres ("x 0.971") result in eight hundred and fifty (850) plants. NAT'L AGRIC. STAT.
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. supra note 7, at 105.
69 FSA encourages farmers to yearly file , Report of Acreage, to maintain historical
records of production. See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FSA-578,
REPORT
OF
ACREAGE
(2003),
available
at
https://forms.sc.egov.usda.gov/efcommon/eFileServices/eFormsAdmin/FSA0578
MANUAL_031015V01.pdf.
70 According to the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program Handbook, CEY
should reflect the average production potential in the county by practice and
intended use. 1-NAP, supra note 23, ¶ 276.
71 This information was obtained through a FOIA, and appears published RiveraAquino, supra note 24, app. E, at 10.
72 The average weight per Plantain fruit with sigatoka treatment was 320.8 grams,
which equals to 11.28 ounces. Note that the average fruit per bunch (therefore, per
plant) of Plantain variety with treatment for Sigatoka was forty-seven (47) fruits. In
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A second element that must be carefully analyzed, is that
since 2013, the average yields per acre have been the same, without
considering variations in rainfall, pest effects, etc., which tend to
influence crop yields. If the source of data has been the PRDA, as
claimed by FSA, productions between 2010 and 2014 should reflect
variations.
i. Pounds per Plant (Cluster)
By performing a conversion from Hundredweight to pounds,
the dividing the pounds by the total number of plants the NCT says
exist in an acre, the weight per plant can be determined.
Table 2.2.1: Equivalence of Plantain Weight per Plant
(Bunch).73
NCT

Irrigated Acre

Plants
Hundredweight
Pounds
Pounds per plant

1,037
180
18,000
17.35

No
Irrigated
Acre
1,037
134
13,400
12.92

ii. Plantains per Acre according to "NCT"
If the average production considered by FSA is taken into
consideration, against its own conversion factor, an important piece
of data can be obtained on the average fruits per acre.
Table 2.2.2: Plantain Fruit Equivalency per Acre.74
Acre
(Irrigated)
18,000
by 0.7

Pounds
Divided
conversion factor75

Acre
(Not
Irrigated)
13,400
0.7

the case of untreated plants, the average weight per fruit is 229 grams or eight (8)
ounces, with thirty-seven (37) fruits per raceme. It is not known whether this is the
source of information for establishing the conversion factor, but the coincidence is
remarkable. See Agenol González-Vélez, Behavior of Plantain Clones Maricongo
and FHIA -21 Under the Presence of the Black Sigatoka at the Humid Uplands of
Puerto Rico, 98 J. AGRIC. U. P.R. 21, 25 (2014).
73 Using data on the 2017 NCT, converting hundredweight to pounds, then dividing
pounds per plant. See Rivera-Aquino, supra note 7, app. A.
74 Id. (according to FSA data found on the 2017 NCT).
75 Per FSA’s PR Notice CM-2, 1,000 Plantains equals seven hundred (700) pounds,
therefore, one plantain equals 0.7 lbs. or 11.2 oz. See González-Vélez, supra note
76, at 25.
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25,714.3

[Vol.18
19,142.8

Plantains per Acre according to UPR, PRDA and
NASS compared to "NCT"

The following differences in plantain production per acre
between FSA and UPR data, can be inferred considering that in the
semiarid or coastal zones, plantain is cultivated with irrigation, and
that, in the Highlands, being humid, plantain is cultivated without
irrigation.
Table 2.2.3: Contrast between to FSA
Fruit Production/Sales per acre.76
Production per Acre With irrigation
Fruits per Acre 25,714.3
based on FSA Data
Fruits per Acre 42,075
based on UPR Data
Difference
-16,360.7
x conversion factor 0.7
Difference
in -11,452.49
pounds
Difference in CWT -114.52
x NCT average $49.1167/QQ
price
Not Considered for -$5,625.08/Acre
Compensation

and UPR Plantain
No irrigation
19,142.8
30,000
-10,857.20
0.7
-7,600.04
-76.00
$49.1167/QQ
-$3,732.88/Acre

In the case of Semiarid zone with irrigation, there are 11,452
pounds that are not being considered by FSA, when compared with
the UPR data; in the case of Highlands without irrigation, 7,600
pounds, not considered, after applying the Agency’s conversion
factor.77 This difference results in a drastic reduction in
compensation. If the pounds are converted to hundredweight, and
76

Comparison between the 2017 NCT (Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. A, at 16)
and Presupuesto Modelo para el Cultivo de Plátano en Zona de Altura de Puerto
Rico (Mildred Cortés & Manuel Díaz, Gastos e ingresos proyectados para la
producción de una cuerda de plátanos con una densidad de 1,000 plantas en la zona
de altura húmeda de Puerto Rico [Projected Expenses Revenues for the Production
of a “cuerda” of Plantains with a Density of 1,000 Plants in the Humid Altitude
Zone of Puerto Rico] (n.d.), available at https://www.mercadeoagricolapr.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Copy-of-pl%C3%A1tano-altura.pdf), and, Presupuesto
Modelo para el Cultivo de Plátanos en la Zona Semiárida de Puerto Rico (CORTÉS
& DÍAZ, supra note 4).
77 In other words, if multiplied by 0.7 for each of the production differences. See
Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. E.
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multiplied by $49.1167/CWT, the difference reflects $8,035 in the
Semiarid zone with irrigation, or $3,732.88 in the Highlands, not
being compensated.
It is important to bear in mind that in 2018, there were 1,363
plantain farms in Puerto Rico, with 10,624 “cuerdas” (10,315 acres),
right after Hurricane Maria.78 Although it is difficult to predict how
much was not compensated, imagine the impact in dollars if the
amounts not considered were compensated. If the least amount on
Table 2.2.3 is taken, $3,732.88 per acre, $38,504,657.20 were not
considered for plantains, assuming the NCT average price is
accurate. This amount will be utilized later to estimate WHIP
payments not considered.
Since FSA indicates that prior to the hurricane, it only had
PRDA data available until 2014, and since then, PRDA’s data was
not captured, it is questionable how FSA calculates its Olympic
averages, beyond that date. For illustrative purposes, of the years in
which the PRDA did reflect acreage data, the year 2017 is chosen to
show the differences in fruits per acre.
Table 2.2.4: Contrast between Plantain Fruit Production per
acre according to FSA and PRDA 2016 data.79
Production per Semi-arid
Acre
zone/with irrigation
Fruits Based on 25,714.3
FSA Data
Fruits Based on
26,160
PRDA Data
Difference
445.7

Highlands/no
irrigation
19,142.8

-7,017.20

Table 2.2.5: Contrast between Plantain Fruit Production per
acre according To FSA and NASS 2012 data.80
Production per
Acre
Fruits Based on
FSA Data
Fruits according
to NASS

Semiarid/irrigated
zone
25,714.3

Highland/no
irrigation
19,142.8

29,72481

NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. supra note 7, at 19 tbl. 15.
See supra, Table 1.2 & Table 2.2.2.
80 See supra. Table 1.3 & Table 2.2.2.
81 It is calculated by multiplying 876.82 “plants” per acre, estimated according to
data from the NASS 2012 for Plantains on Table 1.3, by 33.9 fruits per plant. NASS
78
79
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-10,581.2

Considering the data through NASS, marked differences in
production are reflected. About 4,010 fruits per “cuerdas” in zones
semiarid with irrigation; 10,581 fruits difference in the Highlands
without irrigation. Again, the effect of this difference shows a trend
towards reduced disaster loss compensation.82
iv. Plantains per Plant (Raceme) according to FSA
Since data is collected per “thousand units”, meaning
“thousand fruits”, by both PRDA and NASS,83 it is important to
understand what the average amount of fruits per plant looks like. In
the case of FSA, the average number of fruits per plant or raceme
using irrigation is just 24.79; without irrigation, the average is
18.46.84
Table 2.2.6: Average Fruits per Bunch according to "NCT"85
Acre

Irrigated

Not Irrigated

Fruits

25,714.3

19,142.8

÷ Plants/acre86

1,037

1,037

Fruits/Plant

24.79

18.46

data does not distinguish between zones or practices. NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV.,
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 55, at 10.
82 If the pounds are converted to quintals, and multiplied by $49.1167/QQ, the
difference reflects about $1,969.08 in the semi-arid zone with irrigation or $5,197.13
in the highlands, which seemingly were not part of the FSA compensation
calculation. Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. E.
83 Bear in mind that data is collected on the field by PRDA, on a yearly basis, and
NASS every five (5) years. There is no known set of data independently gathered by
FSA.
84 This data was calculated by using Table 2.2.2 and then dividing by the number of
plants according to the source (the 2017 Puerto Rico National Crop Table published
Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. A, at 16) which is 1,037.
85 Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. A, at 16.
86 According to FSA, one acre has a density of 1,037 plants.

2022]

PLANT CULTIVATION IN PUERTO RICO

131

FSA’s own PR Notice CM-287, states that one (1) “cuerda”
(0.971 acres), has between 800 to 1,000 plants and that there are 40
plantains per bunch (thus per plant) for a total 25,000 plantains per
cuerda. The arithmetic in this document is erroneous. If each plantain
plant has one (1) bunch (or raceme), and each bunch has 40 plantains
(fruits), the yield per “cuerda” is between 32,000 (if 800 plants/
“cuerda”), to 40,000 (if 1,000 plants per cuerda). Thus, the average
weight according to the conversion factor on p. 8 (1,000 plantains =
700 pounds), should yield 224 CWT to 280 CWT per “cuerda”, or
217.5 CWT and 271.9 CWT per acre, instead of 134 CWT or 180
CWT per acre which appear on the 2017 NCT’s County Expected
Yield (CEY). 88 There is a difference of 110 to 100 CWT less in the
2017 NCT if compared to the yield information seen on the Puerto
Rico Notice CM-2. According to the 2017 NCT, the price for
plantain was $49.1167/CWT. This difference amounts $4,911.67 not
considered for compensation, per acre, in the 2017 NCT. This
information will later be used to approximate non-compensated
portions to plantain farmers under WHIP.
v. Plantains per Plant (Raceme) according to NASS
compared to FSA
Even within the USDA, the difference in fruits per raceme
seems to be at odds. Data from the 2012 NASS is here used, as it was
the one available in 2017.
Table 2.2.8: Contrast between Plantain Fruit Production per
raceme or plant according to FSA and NASS data.89
Fruits
per
FSA
Plant/Maricongo
Highland/Not Irrigated 18.46
Semiarid/ Irrigated

NASS
2012

Difference
-15.44

33.9
24.79

-9.11

vi. Plantains per Plant (Raceme) according to UPR and
compared to FSA
In their field studies, the UPR has averaged fruit production
per raceme. This is another perspective where the NCT reflects
diminished yields.

87

Copy of this Notice can be found at Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. E, at 5-

7.
88
89

See Id.; Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24 app. A, at 16.
See supra, Table 1.3 & Table 2.2.6.
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Table 2.2.7: Contrast between Plantain Fruit Production per
raceme or plant according to FSA and UPR data.90
Fruits
per
FSA
Plant/Maricongo
Highlands/Not
18.46
Irrigated
Semi-arid/ Irrigated
24.79

UPR

Difference

35.2991

-16.83

38.2592

-13.46

C. Price
Another determining factor in compensation setting is price.
Not estimating correctly, the average price of plantains at the farm
gate will have an adverse effect on the calculation for compensation
under programs such as the NAP or the WHIP. An Olympic average
must be used. According to FSA data, 1.42 plantains are equivalent
to one pound.93
i. Price per Pound and Per Fruit according to NCT
First, a conversion using simple arithmetic from CWT to
pounds must be performed. To obtain the average price per fruit, the
equivalence of fruits necessary to reach one pound is applied.
Table 2.3.1: Equivalence of Plantain Price per Pound and per
Fruit according to data in NCT.94
Plantains
Price/CWT
Price/Lb.

90

2012
$38.
3667
$0.3
837

2013
$42.
23
$0.4
223

2014
$40.
5733
$0.4
057

2015
$52.
56
$0.5
256

2016
$52.
56
$0.5
256

2017
$49.
1167
$0.4
912

2018
$52.
56
$0.5
256

See supra, Table 1.4 & Table 2.2.8.
According to the Model Budget for Plantains in the Highlands, an estimated
30,000 fruits are estimated on a “cuerda” with a density of 850 plants. To convert to
acre, the production must be multiplied by 0.971. See Cortés & Díaz, supra note 80,
at 1 n.1.
92 According to the Model Budget for Plantains in the Semi-Arid Zone, an estimated
42,000 fruits are estimated on a “cuerda” with a density of 1,100 plants. To convert
to acre, the production must be multiplied by 0.971. See Cortés & Díaz, supra note
4, at 2 n.1.
93 By dividing seven hundred (700) pounds by 1,000 Plantains based on FSA
conversion factor. See Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. E, at 10, 23.
94 Obtained from the compilation of NCTs 20212-2018, through a FOIA query,
published Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. C, at 16, 41, 57, 67, 73, 84, 96;
dividing CWT by 100 to obtain pounds.
91
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95

$0.2
702

$0.2
973

$0.2
857

$0.3
701

$0.3
701

133

$0.3
459

$0.3
701

Do notice that between 2012 and 2016, and upward
movement in prices was reflected. Also notice that the prices in 2015,
2016 and 2018, are the same. Yet the year Hurricane María was
experienced, 2017, the price fell by three (3) cents below 2015, 2016,
and 2018.
ii. Price per Unit (Fruit) according to the PRDA, the UPR
and NASS
If the average production considered by FSA is taken into
consideration, against its own conversion factor, an important piece
of information can be obtained on the average fruits per acre.
Table 2.3.2: Price equivalence for each Plantain Fruit
according to the PRDA Gross Agricultural Income Report.96
Plantains
Average
Price
-Thousand
Fruits
-Per Fruit

201
0

201
1

201
2

201
3

201
4

201
5

201
6

201
7

$26
9.1
2
$0.
269
1

$29
5.6

$36
6.5

$37
1.4

$28
3.1

$33
0.6

$30
9.8

$0.
295
6

$0.
366
5

$0.
371
4

$36
7.8
9
$0.
367
9

$0.
283
1

$0.
330
6

$0.
309
8

PRDA average prices show increasing numbers that peaked
in 2013, and from there decreased by as much as six (6) cents in
2017.Figures from NASS Agricultural Census for 2012, estimate the
total value of plantains as $80,505,103.00, with an estimated
production of 405,256,000 plantains.97 This averages a price per fruit
of $0.19, below all FSA estimates. Average price used by the UPR’s
model budget for plantain is $0.30.98

95

To calculate price per fruit, the price per pound is divided by the number of fruits
that make up one pound according to FSA, in this case, 1.42.
96 This price equivalency is obtained from data on Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24,
app. B, at 1-10.
97 See NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. supra note 55, at 15 tbl. 12.
98CORTÉS & DÍAZ, supra note 4.
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Average Olympic Price using PRDA’s Gross
Agricultural Income Report

According to FSA rules, to obtain the Olympic average, you
must have the 5 years immediately consecutive, prior to the year for
which you want to perform the calculation, remembering to discount
the highest and lowest value, averaging between the remaining three
values. According to the NCT of 2018, the last set of data available
to FSA in 2017 was 2013/2014, so, in 2015, they should have to their
avail the required 5 years, between 2009/2010 and 2013/2014. There
are exceptions when data is not available. What exactly has been the
source of information FSA used when PRDA did not deliver its
statistical report is yet to be determined.
the

Table 2.3.3: 2015 Olympic Average according to data from
PRDA's
Gross
Agricultural
Income
Report.99

Plantain 2010
Price

2011

2012

2013

2014

$0.2691 $0.2956 $0.3665 $0.3714 $0.3679

Average 5 yrs.
$0.3341

Olympic Avg.
$0.3321

The average Olympic price for plantains (per fruit) obtained
from the PRDA data for 2015, does not coincide with the data of the
"NCT" for the same year.
Table 2.3.4: Olympic Average Prices for 2017 and 2018
according to data from the NCT itself.100
Plantai 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
n
Price/ $0.27 $0.29 $0.28 $0.37 $
Fruit 02
73
57
01
0.370
1
Planta 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
in
Price/ $0.29 $0.28 $0.37 $0.37 $
Fruit 73
57
01
01
0.345
9

Average 5 Olympic
years
Average 2017
$0.3187
$0.3177

Average 5 Olympic
years
Average 2018
$0.2646
$0.3378

As seen on table 2.3.4, the NCT equivalent price per fruit for
2017 is $0.3459 and for 2018 is $0.3701. Therefore, it must be ruled
out that data from the NCT itself was utilized to produce the average
prices in the respective years above discussed.

99

Based on data found on published Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. B, at 2.
Using input from Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. C, at 16, 41, 57, 67, 73, 84
and 96.
100
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D. Compensation under WHIP
According to 1-WHIP, eligible acres includes acreage of
initial crops and subsequent crops in multiple planting periods.101
Yield data used for WHIP for all Puerto Rico producers, must be the
County Expected Yield (CEY).102 Payment calculations in WHIP
“will be calculated on a crop-by-crop basis, for all acreage of the crop
within the unit (not just acreage affected by a hurricane or
wildfire).”103 There is also a “WHIP Factor” to be applied, which for
this case of an uninsured crop is sixty five percent (65%).104
Payments received (such as RMA indemnities, NAP payments,
secondary use, or salvage value payments) are to be subtracted. An
“Unharvest Factor” (UH) must be applied as well.105 It also states
that payment factors will be applied to WHIP payments “when
significant and variable harvesting expenses are not incurred because
the crop acreage was either prevented from being planted or planted
but not harvested.”106 Also, “WHIP production includes all harvested
production, unharvested appraised production.”107 When “[c]rops
with multiple planting periods within the same crop year [they] are
identified as a separate WHIP pay grouping”108 while “[c]rops with
the same planting period will be grouped together unless they have
different pay crop and payment type codes.”109
For the sake of illustrating the extent of the effect of the 2017
NCT, two examples of farmers are adopted: a Coastal Plantain
Farmer who utilizes irrigation; and a Highland Farmer who does not
utilizes irrigation. To maintain the exercise simple enough, ten
“cuerdas” (9.71 acres) dedicated to cultivating plantains are assigned

101

See 1-WHIP, supra note 33, ¶90(C).
See id. ¶ 191.
103 See id. at ¶ 210.
104 See id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. ¶ 110 (B): Appraised production is production determined by FSA, or an
insurance provider approved by FCIC, that was unharvested, but was determined to
reflect the crop’s yield potential at the time of appraisal. It is important to note that
when a producer certifies that acceptable record of harvested production is not
available from any other source, an assigned yield based on CDY provision applies.
Harvested production means the total amount of harvested production for the unit
supported by an acceptable record and/or certification by the producer. The
production of any eligible crop harvested more than once in a crop year will include
the total harvested production from all harvests.
108 Id. ¶ 63 (D).
109 Id.
102
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to each.110 Because CSA only covers plantation,111 and WHIP only
considers crop losses, no indemnities for crop insurance are deducted
in these examples, and the lowest WHIP factor is applied.
i. Coastal Plantain Farmer
Based on the information derived from the previous
discussion, the following can be said about this farmer: a) Plantain
plant density per acre is 1,100 according; b) if FSA converts this
plant density unto acres, it results in 10.6 acres; c) NCT’s CEY is
180 CWT per acre for irrigated plantains; d) CEY utilizing UPR’s
data, after being converted from units to weight, is 286 CWT; e)
CEY based on PRDA’s data is 171 CWT/acre; f) 2017 prices
according to the NCT were $49.12/CWT; g) Assuming that UPR’s
estimated prices are for the same period, once converted into price
per weight, it results in $42.86/CWT; h) PRDA’s price conversion
results in $44.26/CWT.
Following 1-WHIP, once acreage is determined, production
value is calculated. After this value is calculated, and the WHIP
Factor, Unharvested Factor, and Indemnities112 are all subtracted the
following compensations result:
Table 2.4.1: Coastal Farmer WHIP Compensation vs
Expected Compensation using UPR and PRDA Data.113

110

WH
IP
Usin
g

Plant
ain
Acres

Product
ion
(CWT)

Value

Expected
Compensa
tion

Differe
nce
(NCTOthers)

NC
T
UPR

10.6

1,909

$56,081

0

9.71

2,776

$93,78
1
$119,0
10

$71,186

$15,08
6

The arithmetic for each example can be found at Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24,
app. F.
111 Id. app. G, at 7.
112 Since WHIP compensation is only for harvest (or production) and not for the
plant, as stated on 1-WHIP, supra note 33, ¶140, no compensation is deducted,
because the CSA only covers plantation losses. Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app.
G, at 4.
113 For an in-depth detail on the calculations, see Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app.
F.
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A

9.71

1,667

$73,81
1

$44,139

137
$11,94
1

For a Coastal Plantain Farmer, if the data from the UPR had
been adopted by the NCT, $15,086.00 more would have been
compensated for 10 “cuerdas” or 11,000 plants. On the other hand,
if the data used had been that from the PRDA, $11,941.00 less should
have been paid. If data from the UPR had been used, this Coastal
farmer would have received $15,086 more in WHIP payment. If data
from the PRDA had been used, the same farmer would have been
overpaid $11,941. Of course, the PRDA data does not reflect the
effect of irrigation in plantain production, nor the higher density of
plants in Coastal plains.
ii. Highland Plantain Farmer
Based on the information derived from the previous
discussion, the following can be said about this farmer: a) Plantain
plant density per acre is 850; b) if FSA converts this plant density
into acres, it results in 8.19 acres; c) NCT’s CEY is 134 CWT per
acre; d) CEY utilizing UPR’s data, after being converted from units
to weight, is 204 CWT; e) CEY based on PRDA’s data is 171
CWT/acre; f) 2017 price according to the NCT was $49.12/CWT; g)
Assuming that UPR’s estimated prices are for the same period, once
converted into price per weight, it results in $42.86/CWT; h)
PRDA’s price conversion results in $44.26/CWT.
Following 1-WHIP, once acreage is determined, production
value is calculated. After this value is calculated, and the WHIP
Factor, Unharvested Factor, and Indemnities114 are all subtracted
the following compensations result:
Table 2.4.2: Highland Farmer WHIP Compensation vs
Expected Compensation using UPR and PRDA Data.115

114
115

WHI
P
Usin
g

Planta
in
Acres

Product
ion
(CWT)

Value

Expected
Compensa
tion

Differe
nce
(NCTOthers)

NCT

8.19

1,421

$69,8
14

$41,749

0

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. F.
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1,979
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A

9.71

1,667

$84,8
55
$73,8
11
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$50,743

-$8,994

$44,139

-$2,390

For a Highland Plantain Farmer, if the data from the UPR
had been adopted by the NCT, $8,994.00 more would have been
compensated for 10 “cuerdas” or 8,500 plants. On the other hand, if
the data used had been that from the PRDA, $2,390.00 more would
have been paid. Again, it is important to keep in mind that PRDA
data neglects irrigation practices and plant density. In this case, this
Highland plantain farmer could have received between $2,390 to
$8,994 more in WHIP payments had data from the PRDA or the UPR
been used, respectively.
Earlier it was stated that in 2018, there were 1,363 plantain
farms in Puerto Rico, with 10,624 “cuerdas” (10,315 acres).116 If the
least amount on Table 2.2.3 is taken, $3,732.88 per acre, and
multiplied by the total acres accounted tight after Hurricane Maria,
$38,504,657.20 were not considered as part of the value for
plantains. Assuming the NCT average price is accurate and applying
the WHIP factor (0.65) and the Unharvest factor (0.92) to the
approximation before made, $38,504,657.20 in plantain value not
considered at all under WHIP, it yields to $23,025,785 that could
have been additionally compensated to plantain farmers if the NCT
had considered the values of the UPR.117 This amount is likely to
increase as irrigated plantain acres enter the equation.
Additionally, while comparing the 2017 NCT118 with the
Puerto Rico Notice CM-2119, it was found that $4,911.67 were not
considered for compensation under WHIP. This value multiplied
times the acreage reported by NASS in 2018, 10,315, results in
$50,663,876 not considered as part of the value of plantains. Again,
if the 2017 NCT average price is accurate, applying the WHIP factor
(0.65) and the Unharvest factor (0.92), it is likely that
$30,296,997.90 in compensations did not reach Puerto Rico plantain
farmers under WHIP.120

NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 7, at 19 tbl. 15.
Id. Multiply the value per acre, $3,732.88, times total plantain acreage reported
in 2018, times WHIP and UH factors.
118 Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. A, at 16.
119 Id.; see also Rivera-Aquino, supra note 24, app. E, at 23.
120 Multiply the value per acre, $4,911.67, times total plantain acreage reported in
2018, times WHIP and UH factors.
116
117
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In most scenarios, there is a clear tendency: plantain farmers
seem to have been under-compensated by WHIP. Since FSA’s NCTs
is also used for NAP and is likely to be used in future ad hoc
emergency programs, if the data is not modified to correctly reflect
the reality of the field, plantain farmers are likely to continue to be
under-compensated, thus being adversely affected. Indirectly this has
a broader effect in rural Puerto Rico, where plantain farms operate.
V. Legal Remedies Available to Plantain Farmers
FSA defines a “participant” as “any individual or entity who
has applied for, or who’s right to participate in or receive, a payment,
loan, loan guarantee, or other benefit in accordance with any program
of FSA to which the regulations in this part apply is affected by a
decision of FSA.”121 An “adverse decision” is defined by the Agency
as any denial of program participation, benefits, written agreements,
or eligibility that results in a participant receiving fewer funds than
the participant believes should have been paid, or not receiving a
program benefit to which the participant believes the participant was
entitled.122 Both issuance of payments or other program benefits to a
participant in a program and errors in documentation and calculations
necessary to determine program eligibility are numbered as
applicable for appeals.123
FSA offers various mechanisms to appeal, most prominently
requesting mediation and reconsideration to their CoC’s or StC.
FSA’s Appeal regulations are governed by 7 C.F.R. 780.
Additionally, there is also the opportunity to raise the issue to
USDA’s National Appeals Division (NAD). The procedures within
NAD are governed by 7 C.F.R. 11. In both forums, the farmer has
the burden of proof and must demonstrate, by preponderance of the
evidence, that the adverse decision made by the agency was in
error.124 Additionally, matters on time limitations and general
applicability determination will come into play. Finally, there is a
matter of funding availability.
A. Time Limitations
For reconsideration procedures, both at NAD and at FSA
(CoC or StC), there is a time limitation in place. The federal code
121

7 C.F.R. § 780.2 (2022). The term does not include individuals or entities whose
claim arise under the programs excluded in the definition of participant published at
7 CFR 11.1 (2022).
122 7 C.F.R. § 780.2 (2022).
123 FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1-APP (REV. 2), Program Appeals,
Mediation, and Ligtigation ¶ 9 (2016) [Hereinafter 1-APP].
124 7 C.F.R. § 11.8(e) (2022).
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prescribes time limitations for farmers who seek reconsideration
within FSA. Reconsideration or appeal petitions must not exceed
thirty (30) days from the date a participant receives written notice of
the adverse decision;125 written notice is usually considered to have
been received seven (7) days after it was made.126 As far as NAD
goes, based on case interpretations, there is indicia that it applies a
thirty-calendar-day jurisdictional limitation from the time the
participant receives the adverse decision.127 This thirty-day period
applies to instances when the agency fails to act. 128 Failure to act is
by itself an adverse decision.129 The language utilized states that the
clock begins to count “from the moment the participant knew” or
“should have reasonably known” that the agency had not acted.130
There are no clear references of what a “reasonable” timeframe
would be.131 This time limitation is there to bring finality to agency
decisions.132 Generally, to minimize confusion on the part of
participants, FSA does not issue letters notifying participants of the
opportunity to challenge, seek reconsideration, or appeal, favorable
decisions.133

125

7 C.F.R. § 780.15(c) (2022) (“A participant requesting reconsideration,
mediation or appeal must submit a written request as instructed in the notice of
decision that is received no later than 30 calendar days from the date a participant
receives written notice of the decision. A participant that receives a determination
made under part 1400 of this title will be deemed to have consented to an extension
of the time limitation for a final determination as provided in part 1400 of this title
if the participant requests mediation.”).
126 7 C.F.R. § 780.15(e)(2) (2022) (“The date when an adverse decision or other
notice pursuant to these rules is deemed received is the earlier of physical delivery
by hand, by facsimile with electronic confirmation of receipt, actual stamped record
of receipt on a transmitted document, or 7 calendar days following deposit for
delivery by regular mail.”).
127 Karen R. Krub, USDA’s National Appeals Division Procedures and Practice,
NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., 21 (rev. 2019).
128 7 C.F.R. § 11.6(b) (2022) (“To obtain a hearing under § 11.8, a participant
personally must request such hearing not later than 30 days after the date on which
the participant first received notice of the adverse decision or after the date on which
the participant receives notice of the Director's determination that a decision is
appealable. In the case of the failure of an agency to act on the request or right of a
recipient, a participant personally must request such hearing not later than 30 days
after the participant knew or reasonably should have known that the agency had not
acted within the timeframes specified by agency program regulations, or, where such
regulations specify no timeframes, not later than 30 days after the participant
reasonably should have known of the agency's failure to act.”). (Emphasis Ours)
129 7 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2022) (defining adverse decision).
130 7 C.F.R. § 11.6(b) (2022).
131 KRUB, supra note 132, at 10.
132 National Appeals Division Rules of Procedure, 64 Fed. Reg. 33367-01, 33371
(June 23, 1999).
1331-APP, supra note 127, ¶ 12. According to FSA, “[d]ecision letters should contain
as much information as possible summarizing all pertinent information and program
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So, what about a plantain farmer who received a payment,
without knowing that an error was made by the agency? Most
plantain farmers in Puerto Rico received their payments in 2019.
Farmers that received some sort of compensation from FSA and did
not learn of an error from just reading their payment statement or
Agency Record calculations, if available, should be able to request a
reconsideration or appeal, thirty (30) days from the moment they
learned about the error in their payment calculation, even if several
months, or years have elapsed since the payment determination.
Pieces of information for this article were obtained only after a FOIA
request was issued, thus, key information to assess errors in payment
calculations was not readily available to plantain farmers when they
received some form of payments. There is no indication that they
should have known that errors in payment calculations when they
received their payments.
B. Matters of General Applicability
Another jurisdictional matter arises on whether issues of
general applicability are appealable. FSA regulation states that
“[a]ny general program provision or program policy or any statutory
or regulatory requirement that is applicable to similarly situated
participants” or “[m]athematical formulas established under a statute
or program regulation and decisions based solely on the application
of those formulas,” among other, are decisions that are not
appealable.134 NAD’s Director has the authority to determine
whether the issue presented is one of “general applicability” and thus
not appealable.135 Price setting and CEY adoption are often regarded
by FSA as of “general applicability.”136 FSA has argued that, if an
error occurs in the application of a matter of general applicability,
that error affects all farmers and not just a particular farmer.
In relations to FSA’s plantain NCT record over the years,
many incongruencies arise: 1) having the same CEY between 2013

provisions that could be relevant to the determination. A good decision letter: is a
letter that adequately summarizes and explains everything that matters about a
case[;] should require little additional information to explain what is really at issue
in a case[; t]he decision letter is the starting point for the next administrative review
authority.” Id.
134 7 C.F.R. § 780.5(a)(1)-(2) (2022).
135 Christopher R. Kelley, The USDA National Appeals Division: An Outline of the
Rules of Procedures, NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., 4 (2003).
136 See 1-APP, supra note 127, ¶ 9. Issues that do not result in individual
determinations, but which may or may not impact individual applications, such as
definitions of eligible crops, prices, average yields, factors, signup dates or
deadlines, or other generally applicable matters not decided in response to any
specific application, applicant, or participant.
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and 2018; 2) the claimed source of information, PRDA, does not
differentiate between yields based on irrigation practices; 3) the
claimed source of information, PRDA, uses a different unit of
measure pertaining production; 4) the trends of historic prices in the
NCT do not resemble those from the claimed source of information,
PRDA; 5) utilizing a conversion factor without reference to a
scientific source to determine its accuracy; 6) sound data from the
UPR show higher yields of plantain fruits per plant than the data from
FSA; 7) references to UPR data from 1999 is still cited in the 2018
NCT, leading to believe that outdated sources are still being used; 8)
yields for plantains from the P.R. Notice CM-2, p. 23 and the P.R.
Notice WHIP-1, p.16, differ greatly; etc. FSA may claim that the
PRDA has not been consistent in providing their Agricultural Gross
Income report, seemingly after 2015. There is a major difference
between the “best data,” and the “best available data.” Now, FSA has
the responsibility of properly maintaining NCT data, not the PRDA,
including documenting how decisions are made.137
Whether these incongruencies are sufficient to prove that
FSA erred, by preponderance of the evidence, must consider the level
of deference NAD may yield FSA. In NAD case number
2008E000455, under National Director review, it was determined
that aspects such as “average market prices and the unharvested
factors are appealable,” contrary to what the Hearing Officer had
previously determined,138 as it “directly affects the amount of the
payments Appellant is eligible to receive.” Nonetheless, minor
deviations and use of different sources of data do not amount to
error.139
Recently, an NAD Case140 considered the issue of “agency
deference.” On it, a reference to a “Kisor” test, adopted by the
Supreme Court in 2019, is made. In the referred “Kisor” case, it is
summarized that the “deference doctrine” is applied in interpretative
137

1-NAP, supra note 23, ¶ 276(C).
Director Review Determination, NAD Case No. 2008E000455 (U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. Oct. 22, 2008). The case goes on to say “FSA erred in calculating the average
market price and the payment factors under its regulations that it then generally
applied. Resolution of the issues Appellant raises in this case, i.e., the proper price
and unharvested factors of his 2007 NAP crops, directly affects the amount of
payments Appellant is eligible to receive.” Id.
139 Director Review Determination, NAD Case No. 2016W000294 (U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. July 7, 2017) (“Each year, FSA conducts a nationwide review to ascertain the
basis of stark payment differences between counties... FSA also corrects
mathematical errors, adjusts state committee established yields when RMA data
becomes available, and adjusts RMA yields when NASS data becomes available.”).
140 Director Review Determination, NAD Case No. 2021S000076 (U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. Jan. 25, 2022).
138
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questions related to an agency’s own ambiguous rules.141 “The
subject matter of a rule ‘may be so specialized and varying in nature
as to be impossible’—or at any rate, impracticable—to capture in its
every detail.”142 In these cases, courts limit themselves and allow
agencies to construct “its own regulation.”143 But such deference
should not be afforded to agencies “unless the regulation is genuinely
ambiguous,”144 and the agencies reading must be reasonable145 if the
“agency interpretation entitles it to its own weight”146 and “implicate
its substantive expertise.”147 Finally, an “agency’s reading must
reflect a fair and considered judgement” to receive deference.148
To FSA, it may seem clear that plantain price setting and
plantain CEY adoption, being applied in general to all plantain
producers, even if in error, are not subject to appeal. Yet some
ambiguity has been raised, once the issue of general applicability
seemingly in error, is applied to a payment of a participant. It seems
that this ambiguity, at least by NAD’s standards, is not the sort that
usher’s deference. From the “Kisor” test, FSA’s interpretation seems
to fail both at the reasonableness and fairness elements as it would
be unjust to allow an error generally applied, that affects an
individual participant, not to be appealed.149 To pinpoint errors in
price setting and plantain CEY adoption, it may be necessary to issue
a subpoena requiring the production of evidence and the attendance
of witnesses, following 7 C.F.R. 11.8, to reverse engineer the
confection of the plantain 2017 NCT.
C. Funding Availability
Lack of funding is another element to be considered outside
the scope of the informal appeals process.150 Most of the time,
agencies need not to spend their funding by the end of the fiscal year,
but rather obligate its use; actual spending, in most cases, must be
spent under the “five-year” rule. This rule states that funds obligated
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Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
Id. at 2408.
143 Id. at 2411.
144 Id. at 2415.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 2416.
147 Id. at 2417.
148 Id.
149 See generally, Director Review Determination, NAD Case No. 2004W000899
(U.S. Dep’t of Agric. Jan. 13, 2005).
150 1-APP, supra note 127, ¶ 9.
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by the end of a fiscal year must be expended within five fiscal years
from the last day it could have been obligated.151
Whether the funding for WHIP has been depleted, is outside
the scope of this analysis. But this could well be an argument
presented by FSA that may limit reconsiderations or appeals.
Nonetheless, an OIG report on WHIP performed in 2020, studied the
breadth of improper payments and in the cases underpaid producers,
the OIG recommends that a payment be issued.152 Still, OIG’s report
on WHIP did not cover Puerto Rico; it only covered Gorgia and
Florida.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
FSA will utilize the best data available to them. If the
Agency, nor the plantain farmers, do not make their best effort to
have the most suitable sources of information on plantain production
possible on a yearly basis, the best data available could well be
obsolete data. CoC and StC members need to get more involved with
NCT determinations, and periodically enter in communications with
the UPR and the PRDA to request updated information. The
information shared here shows the possibility that several sources of
information were utilized and extrapolated to build NCT values, that
do not reflect the reality of plantain farms today. There are references
in the 2018 NCT dating back to 1999. The county expected yields
are founded on values that do not resemble UPR data. A much deeper
look is needed to figure out how exactly the NCT values for plantain
have come into being over the years in FSA-Puerto Rico. This indepth look may well occur in an appeals process. Had FSA used more
current crop values in 2017 and the preceding years for plantain, such
as the ones used by the UPR to prepare its plantain model budget, the
NCT’s average yield and average prices would have been higher and
an additional $8,035/acre in the semiarid zone with irrigation, or
$3,732.88/acre in the Highlands without irrigation should have been
part of the values considered in the compensation calculation for
these farmers. If the values within the NCT are not corrected, in
future events that may affect plantain producers, they are likely to
receive, once again, a reduced compensation.

The term “five-year rule” is borrowed from the course, Farm Policy, and the
Federal Budget, at the LLM Program of the University of Arkansas. As reference
material, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-29 (4th ed. 2016).
152 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REPORT NO. 03702-000231, WILDFIRES AND HURRICANES INDEMNITY PROGRAMS 8 (2020).
151
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Here are some recommendations for farmer organizations,
the Agency and other agricultural support structures such as the UPR
and the PRDA, to prevent reduced compensation in future climatic
events that may affect plantain producers in Puerto Rico:
First – Adjust planting densities for the counties that
predominantly cover the Highland or Coastal zones in such a way
that they fairly represent the reality of the practices carried out by
farmers, who often adopt UPR’s recommendations. Knowing that the
FSA is divided into Field Offices (counties) that can reasonably be
representative of Highlands or Coastal zones, it would be more than
reasonable to modify expected yields as such instead of having a
blanket yield across all counties.
Second – Propose to FSA, PRDA and NASS methods that
estimate more accurately the number of plantains produced per plant
and per acre. This is particularly critical for farmers in the semiarid
zones, who use irrigation, and undoubtedly obtain higher volumes of
production if compared to humid zones.
Third – Request the Division of Agricultural Statistics of the
Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture (PRDA), to officially
publish, with logo and signature of the person in charge, the reports
of Gross Agricultural Income at a certain and known date, every year.
This way, accurate data will be available to make just compensations
in the event of future events. If this piece of information is ever to be
introduced as evidence in any administrative procedure, it will be
recognized as an officially publicized document. In addition, they
must publish data on land use, with irrigation and without irrigation,
by product, to estimate more precisely the average production by
type of practice.
Fourth - Request FSA to use the same units to estimate
production and product yields as captured by PRDA and NASS. For
example, in the case of plantains it is recommended to use thousands
of fruits, as it is the commonly accepted unit of measure, instead of
using hundredweight.
Fifth - Request FSA to publish annually the minutes of the
meetings in which the data to contained in the "NCT" for plantains
is adopted, to verify correctness.
Sixth – Request that FSA and CSA share data, to ensure that
any deductions on insurance payments are for the appropriate item,
be it plantation (plants) or harvest (yield).
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Seventh – Congregate UPR, FSA and PRDA to work
together to achieve more uniform statistical analysis and
recordkeeping pertaining plantains, considering the information
required by the NCT.
Eighth – Recommend Congress that in future Ad Hoc
disaster loss compensation programs, Puerto Rico farmers be
allowed to use their historic records when submitted, as in the rest of
the U.S.
Ninth – Petition PRDA and NASS to dissect their plantain
data based on irrigation practices.
Tenth – Strengthen farmer participation in County
Committees (CoC) and State Committees, allowing them to truly
become an independent voice from FSA’s administrative structure,
to better serve their farming communities, through knowledge on
procedures and agronomic data. Delegation of CoC functions to
FSA’s employees must be limited and CoC meetings must be held
frequently.
When Federal or State governments issue agricultural
disaster assistance programs, the goal is to help speed the recovery
of American farmers who satisfy the nutritional security of the
American people. This is also a way to revamp the rural economy
where most farms operate. To achieve the goals intended, suitable
procedure must be followed adequately. The objective of this paper
is to raise awareness within FSA and other agricultural related
agencies on the importance of maintaining an adequate data bases;
farmers need to get more involved in the decision making within
FSA. It is likely that climatic events will affect plantain farmers in
the future. Unlike playing dice, which gives different results by doing
the same action, if changes are not made to the NCT plantain data in
Puerto Rico, the same result will occur over and over: less than fair
compensation for losses experienced after natural disasters,
perpetuating the condition of being socially disadvantaged farmers.

